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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is to examine philosophical archeology and the feasibility of 
knowledge that derives from researching it simultaneously through theoretical and artistic 
practice. 
 Philosophical archeology essentially embodies one’s relation to history and 
historiographic research—a research methodology at the core of which lies a “historical a 
priori”, that which a priori conditions the historical development of a phenomenon. 
However, this research conceives of philosophical archeology more broadly, as a 
multifaceted term that traverses the discourse of the humanities at large. 
 By pursuing this doctoral research, my original contribution to knowledge is 
twofold: (1) I historicize philosophical archeology—a term that has been in use throughout 
humanities-based research since 1793, when it was formulated for the first time in this 
manner; and (2) expanding on its history, I show how, in the broader context of 
contemporary art and particularly in my artistic practice, philosophical archeology is 
conceived and carried out as a modus operandi. 
 
Section I outlines philosophical archeology in theoretical practice. Based on Giorgio 
Agamben’s œuvre (and the work of other pertinent thinkers), it explicates Agamben’s 
conception of messianic time that in turn conditions his conception of history. Messianic 
time is conceived as the paradigm of historical time par excellence, mainly drawing on 
Saint Paul’s text Epistle to the Romans (and in reference to Agamben’s work on it, The 
Time that Remains) and Walter Benjamin’s text “Theses on the Philosophy of History.” 
The concept of messianic time is further elaborated by discussing (under the framework of 
aesthetics) Benjamin’s method of montage that likewise contributes to his theory of 
historical signature/consciousness. 
 
Section II is an integral component of my thesis exhibition titled Philosophical Archeology 
Space 2009–2019—a space that is constituted as, and by, philosophical archeology in my 
ongoing artistic practice; this archeological/historiographic operation, in the framework of 
artistic research, resulted in the identification of three signatures comprising the (material-
 
 
iii 
based) “historical a priori” of my artistic practice. The section contextualizes archeological 
orientation in contemporary art, and examines whether philosophical archeology (as artistic 
modus operandi) is in a position to distend history and historiography rather than vice 
versa. 
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Lay Summary 
This doctoral research revealed philosophical archeology to be multifaceted—it is a 
research methodology (a historiographic framework) in the humanities at large, which 
essentially embodies one’s relation to history and historiographic research; a metaphor 
(allegory); (art) content or subject matter as well as a material-based historiography or 
method of historical inquiry in art; a critical force that conceives of its (past) objects as 
(future) prototypes or blueprints; and, lastly, philosophical archeology embodies a certain 
(messianic) conception of time that conditions a conception of history. The originality of 
philosophical archeology, as a critical methodology, does not necessarily stem from the 
nature of its tools, but from the integration of threads drawn from various disciplines and 
broad fields of knowledge. 
 
The first section explores philosophical archeology in theoretical practice. As a 
historiographic methodology in use throughout research across the humanities at large, 
philosophical archeology aims at researching the “historical a priori” dimension of a 
certain historical phenomenon, a dimension that cannot be identified as the phenomenon’s 
diachronic origin, but as an active tendency within it that conditions its development in 
time. 
 
The second section explores philosophical archeology in artistic practice. In its first part, 
the historiographic turn in contemporary art, characterized by the metaphor of the 
archeological dig and the need to look backwards, is depicted as contributing to artists’ 
historical consciousness and in particular with regard to the societal knowledge economy. 
The second part unfolds from my artistic work, where I ask: What is an origin? I inquired 
into the concept of the origin as such, but also into my personal origin: what gave birth to, 
and still commands, my personal identity and meaning as self; what conditions my artistic 
engagement in the world, and how? In this inquiry, I practiced philosophical archeology—
a research methodology that is nowadays associated mostly with the theoretical work of 
Giorgio Agamben; however, in this research, I applied this methodology both theoretically 
and artistically as two different but complementary means of generating knowledge.
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Preface 
In his opening remarks to The Signature of All Things: On Method, Giorgio Agamben 
claims, building upon an idea by Ludwig Feuerbach, that “the genuine philosophical 
element in every work, whether it be a work of art, of science, or of thought, is its capacity 
to be developed.”1 It is a tensive element within the work, a seed encapsulating future 
realizations, whose unique nature enables its interpreter to also become its developer. 
 Upon encountering Agamben’s book for the first time, I identified this very element 
in it. This element was referred to by the descriptor “Philosophical Archeology”—a term 
that today is associated, to a large extent, with the work of Agamben, who identifies his 
overarching research methodology as philosophical archeology and is working tirelessly to 
systematize it. Though this is only a partial definition of its multifaceted nature, 
philosophical archeology essentially embodies one’s relation to history and historiographic 
research—a method of historical inquiry at the core of which lies a “historical a priori” 
(conceptually tangential to the arche), that which a priori conditions the historical 
development of the phenomenon, whether this phenomenon is an objective, historical one 
or a subjective self.2 Initially, philosophical archeology seemed pertinent to my scholarly 
work and—of at least equal importance—echoed central concerns of my ongoing artistic 
practice. As my interest in it deepened, I identified an unexpected but nonetheless evident 
correlation between Agamben’s philosophical archeology and my own research 
methodology, albeit worked out by different means and in the different but tangential 
discourse of visual art. It was as if, similarly to Agamben but unknowingly, I was exercising 
an artistic modus operandi as philosophical archeology. I asked myself: What conditions 
(as an arche or “historical a priori”) my artistic engagement in the world, and how? Thus, 
philosophical archeology was selected as the Archimedean point of this present study; a 
study that is therefore both objective and subjective, since, and in accordance with 
 
1 Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method, 7. 
2 Overall, this research conceives of philosophical archeology more broadly (the complexity of which 
will gradually be revealed as the research unfolds): it is, as said, a research methodology (a historiographic 
framework) in the humanities at large; a metaphor (allegory); (art) content or subject matter; a material-based 
historiography; a critical force that conceives of its (past) objects as (future) prototypes or blueprints; and 
lastly, philosophical archeology embodies a certain conception of time that conditions a conception of history. 
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Agamben, “[I]t is never the emergence of the fact without at the same time being the 
emergence of the knowing subject itself.”3 
 
The (above-mentioned) methodological correlation is also the reason that led to the 
theoretical aspect of this doctoral thesis pivoting on Agamben’s œuvre. Due to the 
methodological, philosophical, and historiographic characteristics of philosophical 
archeology, theorizing it means (for me) not to write, as if externally, about philosophical 
archeology, but to make it (with words), to do it in practice (through language). In this 
sense, Agamben’s corpus also becomes the site (or the research object) where I practice 
and execute philosophical archeology in writing, where I use language as an artistic 
medium—a performance that illuminates the development of philosophical archeology, 
and the manner in which it is constituted, within Agamben’s own multilayered, extensive 
corpus. Thus, I apply the logic of philosophical archeology onto itself. 
 This form of archeological production parallels the ways in which I work in the 
studio as an interdisciplinary artist; and specifically, it shows itself in the way that I 
produced the thesis exhibition.4 Therefore, the other aspect of this doctoral thesis (that is, 
the thesis exhibition) aligns with my ongoing artistic practice, which includes projects on 
historical accounts, archives and documents, acts of excavating and unearthing, memorials 
and testimonies, as well as processes of reconstruction and reenactment. What they all 
share is not only storytelling, but also history telling (of self and other). This is equally true 
also in regard to this artistic project on philosophical archeology. 
 
The two-fold orientation of my research (theory on the one hand, practice on the other) 
does not necessarily entail a dichotomous or binary conception of its subject matter; rather, 
I research philosophical archeology both theoretically and artistically as two different but 
 
3 Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method, 89. 
4 The exhibition shows a large-scale installation comprised of interdisciplinary mediums. The gallery 
is divided into two parts: an archive and its index. The archive, delimited in roughly one-third of the 
exhibition space, is not fully accessible. A perforated metal door blocks the physical entry to the archive, so 
that one can merely view and listen to (remotely behind the door) what is inside. The archive contains 
previous works of mine: some of these works are boxed, some are fully exhibited, and some are displayed in 
a manner in between. The index, situated in the main part of the gallery space, is a series of photo-litho prints 
(Japanese Washi paper sheets, 30 x 55 in. each) infused with collage work, sounds, and ephemera, forming 
a constellation rendered and conceived by archeological art-making. 
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complementary ways of generating knowledge. The relationship between the theoretical 
and artistic knowledge-generation methods—or, in other words, the precise dialogue 
between the exegesis and artefact—could effectively be described as one of analogy or 
parallelism. Both avenues of research equally investigate philosophical archeology, albeit 
from different orientations, and thus can be seen as two tensive polarities comprising one, 
unified (bipolar) forcefield of research that is measured, echoing Agamben’s wording, “not 
by extensive and scalable magnitudes but by vectorial intensities.”5 
 These polarities form a certain congruence. The studio work cannot become a 
translation or merely a realization of theory in the discourse of art, and vice versa, a theory 
to come cannot retrospectively explain or illustrate the artistic practice or body of work it 
refers to. The theory is not an inquirer who sounds out a meaning supposedly concealed in 
material practice; and, likewise, the studio work is not a vehicle to illustrate predefined 
answers to questions. 
 Additionally, the relationship between theory and studio work cannot constitute 
itself hierarchically—both realms are equally important and should be seen as 
complementary to one another rather than as cancelling each other out. The challenge is to 
find the right way, the suitable balance, that will enable both of their own, distinct  
operative spaces while, at the same time, allowing each part to positively contribute to the 
needs of the other part. Both are parallel responses in the research of philosophical 
archeology, like light rays aligned in parallel, communicating as collimated spirits in non-
linear time. 
 
Certainly, there are limits to this research. The discussion is chronologically framed—it 
begins with the first appearance of philosophical archeology (as a term, in 1793), and ends 
(though not concluded) with present time. Additionally, the discussion of philosophical 
archeology in the field of contemporary art is based on my own artistic modus operandi, 
although it is contextualized more broadly in order to correspond and resonate with works 
of other artists. This delimitation results from the inability to include all the artistic 
embodiments of philosophical archeology to date. 
 
5 Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method, 20. 
 
 
4 
 
*** 
 
Part I (of section I) outlines philosophical archeology in theoretical practice. It is 
particularly based on Giorgio Agamben’s œuvre (which characterizes his research 
methodology as philosophical archeology), but, in order to thoroughly historicize 
philosophical archeology’s development in time, the outline also includes various 
references to other pertinent thinkers (Kant, Overbeck, Nietzsche, Benjamin, Foucault, to 
name a few) who practiced philosophical archeology in their writings. 
 
A few questions guide this part: What is the Agambenian research methodology of 
philosophical archeology? What comprises it? How does it operate? What does it result in? 
What can it take as a subject? What enables and prevents it? Can one trace its history within 
Agamben’s œuvre or within others? What exactly does it consist of that can further be 
developed? 
 
One distinct quality of this part (as well as of Section I) is its textual structure. It is 
comprised of five continuous paragraphs (1.1.1–1.1.5), and a series of nine subsequent 
glosses that are integrated throughout. The readers are expected, once arrived at a gloss 
mark (a red in-text hyperlink), to skip forward and read that certain gloss; and once 
finished, to return back to the point in the text from which they “departed” and continue 
the reading. These glosses (in accordance with, as noted above, the 
Agambenian/Feuerbachian idea of the encapsulated philosophical element that awaits its 
development) comment on key issues that are crucial to a thorough comprehension of 
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philosophical archeology.6 
 The glosses are marked with a descriptive title as well as with an image or graphic 
sign; this sign has a two-part structure: it is comprised of the letter “aleph” (the first letter 
in the Hebrew alphabet) and a certain vocalization point/mark (one out of roughly eleven 
marks of the Hebrew grammar that, when combined with one of Hebrew’s four matres 
lectionis, form the vowels in the language). Beyond the tribute it pays to Agamben’s use 
of the “aleph” in his writing, these glosses’ form of marking has another aim that can be 
efficiently explicated by referring to the following text. 
 An interview with writer Edmond Jabès (conducted by artist Bracha Ettinger 
Lichtenberg) opens the accompanying catalogue to the exhibition Routes of Wandering: 
Nomadism, Journeys and Transitions in Contemporary Israeli Art (1991). In her preface 
to the interview, curator Sarit Shapira writes: 
 
Jabès’ texts are a succession of fragments that purport to be quotations from 
‘texts’ from different times and places, which are printed at times with 
spaces between them that separate and fragment them; the sequence of the 
text is impaired also in the parts attributed to Jabès himself—because they 
are written in a technique that sabotages development of any kind, that 
mixes together different levels and kinds of language, and uses diversified 
generic formulas. ... [I]n this way his writing concretely demonstrates the 
openness of the text—not only towards all prior texts, but also to the text 
that will be written out of it, in an act analogous to reading it. All active 
reading of this kind not only unites the foreign linguistic elements and fills 
the gaps in the text; all reading is also tearing, which echoes the breakage 
in the tablets of the covenant and the prolonged tearing that characterizes 
the history of the Jewish people. ... [H]is view of the break as the source of 
all things and of the point as the minimal graph from which speech and 
writing grow, each time anew, brought Jabès close to the Kabbalah.7 
 
6 Commentary is a discussion or expansion of a text in the form of writing (glosses, annotations) or 
images (diagrams, miniatures) as features that can form part of the original program of work, but which can 
also take a  secondary or extraneous nature. A gloss is a marginal or interlinear annotation of a word or 
wording in a text, commenting on, elucidating, or translating those of the main text. In the history of 
commentary, glossing, and marginalia, the gloss (as an ancient genre of writing) is a creative form of 
intellectual work. The gloss focuses, in most cases, on a single object, formally shaping itself to its object 
while preserving the object’s structure. The gloss forms a relationship of “continuing discontinuity” with its 
object; it digresses from it in order to open it from within. The gloss multiplies and synthesizes meanings, 
ideas, and references without necessarily revolving around a central thesis, providing interpretive and 
philological access into its object. 
7 Routes of Wandering: Nomadism, Journeys and Transition in Contemporary Israeli Art, 255. 
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In the interview, Jabès says: 
 
I see my books as a cycle of gathering cycles, in which the last circle is a 
point. This is a reference to the Kabbalah, where it says that God, to 
manifest Himself, will reveal Himself as a point. I think this is marvellous, 
because the point in Semitic writing is the vowel. Hence, the point, which 
is at the end, is the center, is the vowel. 
 
Ettinger Lichtenberg: Why is the point a vowel? 
 
Jabès: Because if you put three points under the consonant it’ll be ‘eh’, and 
if you put one point below it’ll be ‘ee’. In writing, it’s the point. It’s 
marvellous. The point is the meaning of the word. It’s the very life of the 
word. Without vowels it’s impossible. All the writing is only consonants, 
it’s like the name of God, unpronounceable.8 9 
 
Part II (of section I) begins with the tenth gloss. It is an explication of Agamben’s 
conception of time that conditions his conception of history; this conception of time is also 
a system of thinking. The evolution of the Western conception of time, from ancient to 
present time, is surveyed and a definition of an authentic conception of time is attempted—
for Agamben, this means messianic time. Messianic time is discussed as the paradigm of 
historical time par excellence (as a time characterized by a cessation and by its redemptive 
quality) mainly through Paul’s text the Epistle to the Romans (and in reference to 
Agamben’s work on it, The Time that Remains) and Walter Benjamin’s text “Theses on the 
Philosophy of History.” 
 Benjamin’s work serves as a further elaboration on the concept of messianic time. 
His philosophical conception of history is articulated in the broader context of his thought, 
and, principally, the aesthetic dimension and the possibility of redemption it might offer. 
This part thus continues with an outline of Benjamin’s method of montage as it is 
practiced—both in theory and in practice—in his writing and through the Agambenian 
perspective of it. The montage formulates Benjamin’s theory of historical 
 
8 Ibid, 248. 
9 In “Hebrew Grammar,” Spinoza writes about vowels only in passing: “[A]mong the Hebrews 
vowels are called souls of letters, and letters without vowels are bodies without souls.” (Spinoza, “Hebrew 
Grammar,” 588.) 
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signature/consciousness and the methodological idea of “dialectical image” as a visual 
vocabulary. The montage’s pertinent relation to Benjamin’s conception of language is also 
discussed in the last, eleventh gloss. The Benjaminian image is explored as an image of 
thought and as an image that is used in the discourse of aesthetics. The gesture of the artist 
is discussed in this sense as well, with a nod to its possible epistemological implications 
based on Agamben’s text Taste. 
 
Section II is an integral component of my thesis exhibition. Its title, Philosophical 
Archeology Space 2009–2019, is a paraphrase of Joseph Beuys’s pioneering work Das 
Kapital Raum 1970–1977, made for the Venice Biennale in 1980. Referring to Karl Marx’s 
magnum opus Das Kapital, Beuys’s work renders, in practice, a theoretical thought. Eugen 
Blume and Catherine Nichols (who curated Beuys’s work to the exhibition Capital: Debt, 
Territory, Utopia) write: “Art is not only the object of a historical discipline that 
systematises, classifies and interprets works created over a long period, but also of 
philosophy, which conceives the special essence of art as a challenge to thinking.”10 
Moreover, Beuys’s work is constantly and non-linearly developed—it is “a field of action, 
a transformative terrain that unfolds in the space, in the opening, between the words Beuys 
kept permanently separate, between Kapital and Raum.” 11  In this sense, the thesis 
exhibition I present is likewise (to use Alan Badiou’s words) a “thinking through a form of 
thought,”12 a space that is constituted as, and by, philosophical archeology in my ongoing 
artistic practice: it is an archeological/historiographic operation, in the framework of 
artistic research, that resulted in the identification of three signatures comprising the 
(material-based) “historical a priori” of my practice, projects, and exhibitions.13 
 
The discussion in section II (part of the discussion of philosophical archeology in artistic 
practice at large) is framed in the context of what seems to be a historiographic turn in 
contemporary art, where “the one sector of culture most commonly associated with looking 
 
10 Capital: Debt, Territory, Utopia, 14. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Quoted in Capital: Debt, Territory, Utopia, 14. 
13 In the documentation and articulation of my work, I always refer to (installation-based) exhibitions 
as “fields” in order to emphasize (what I hope is) their exploratory, open-ended, and stratificational character. 
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forward should appear so consumed by a passion for looking not just the proverbial other 
way but in the opposite direction―backwards.”14  Part I of this section thus offers a 
contextualization of the archeological orientation in contemporary art with several 
references to works of other artists that are pertinent to the discussion. 
 
The following questions reverberated in the making of Philosophical Archeology Space 
2009–2019: If examined from the perspective of contemporary art practices, is 
philosophical archeology at all a research methodology that (in part or entirely) can or 
should be rethought, executed, or transformed into the different but related discourse of 
art? In what sense could philosophical archeology be artistically used, or, better, 
regenerated as an integral, organic part of artistic practices and productions? How can an 
artistic act interpret and develop philosophical archeology (as a relation to history), both 
theoretically and in practice? And consequently, how will it influence the knowledge 
generated relationally at the intersection of the foregoing discourses of the humanities? 
 With the intention to illuminate philosophical archeology as a modus operandi, and 
to examine whether this artistic practice is in a position to distend history and 
historiography rather than vice versa, these questions are addressed by the process of 
making the exhibition—by deciding upon (and constructing) the two-part structure of the 
exhibition (archive and index), by choosing the previous artworks to be included and the 
way to exhibit them, by the materials I used in the process (sound included), by the staging 
of the archive and its positioning, by lighting, etc. 
 Furthermore, productive insights opened up by these questions are offered 
throughout this section and (perhaps particularly) by the commentary in part II of section 
II (2.2.3) where, as a supportive element to the exhibition, these insights are reached (in 
the tradition of glossary) as part of a “creative form of intellectual work.” 
 
Lastly, this section is also rendered partly as dossier that, due to the structural nature of 
Philosophical Archeology Space 2009–2019, is a decade-long documentary (visual images 
and sonic compositions) comprised by the various works included in the archive.
 
14 Roelstraete, “Field Notes,” 15–16. 
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Section I—Philosophical Archeology in Theoretical Practice 
 
Part 1—Philosophical Archeology in Giorgio Agamben et alia 
 
1.1.1 
Chapter 3 of Giorgio Agamben’s book The Signature of All Things: On Method is titled 
“Philosophical Archeology,” and outlines an overarching research methodology that 
essentially embodies one’s relation to history and historiographic research.  ֹא [Agamben’s 
Methodology] 
 Philosophical Archeology, as Agamben acknowledges, has developed based on a 
series of philosophical ruins in which “Jottings for the Progress of Metaphysics,” 15 
Immanuel Kant’s appendix to his own treatise of 1793, is considered to be its point of 
departure inasmuch as the term appears there for the first time. 
 Kant’s essay struggles between, on one hand, the empirical, temporal nature of 
historical inquiry, and specifically, the history of philosophy that presents the empirical 
and thus contingent, successive order of how thinkers philosophized up to the present; and, 
on the other hand, the rational and necessary order of philosophical concepts, the ahistorical 
nature of philosophical thought or, in other words, the unconditional and thus a priori 
nature of a philosophical history of philosophy. A philosophical history of philosophy is 
thus conceived as a special kind of historical inquiry that becomes possible, in Kant’s 
words, “not historically or empirically, but rationally, i.e., a priori. For although it 
establishes facts of reason, it does not borrow them from historical narrative, but draws 
them from the nature of human reason as philosophical archeology [als philosophische 
Archäologie].”16 17 Thus for Kant the idea of philosophical archeology entails coming to 
 
15 Kant, “What real progress has metaphysics made in Germany since the time of Leibniz and Wolff?,” 
413–424. 
16 Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method, 81; Kant, “What real progress has metaphysics 
made in Germany since the time of Leibniz and Wolff?,” 417. 
17 A philosophical history of philosophy, in this regard, is already discussed (albeit somewhat 
interchangeably or as a philosophical ruin) in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (1781), where 
it is referred to as the “History of Pure Reason.” 
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know the means and ways by which philosophy is articulated by reason itself, as well as to 
know the history of philosophy as it is determined by the necessity of a priori principles. 
 Because philosophical archeology is not merely an empirical history, but also one 
that becomes possible a priori, and since philosophizing (specifically, in this case, about 
the history of philosophy) is a gradual development of human reason that could not have 
begun upon the empirical path, it fundamentally implies that (due to its paradoxical 
element) archeology runs the risk of lacking a beginning and putting forth, as Kant writes, 
“a history of the thing that has not happened.”18 Thus we can derive, Agamben deduces, 
that as an a priori history (which is, after all, a historical practice), philosophical 
archeology’s origin, the arche it seeks, can never be given in chronology nor be dated since 
it coincides with the complete development of reason; in other words, it is an arche that 
will be given in its totality only at the end of philosophizing, while currently its history is 
the history of the thing that has not happened. Philosophical archeology is therefore a 
historiography of an incomplete gradation (a series of historical ruins, science of ruins—
“ruinology” in Agamben’s words) rather than of a given empirical whole, whose object or 
archai “exist only in the condition of partial objects or ruins ... given only as Urbilder, 
archetypes ... that can never be reached ... and serve only as guidelines.”19 20  ֹא [First 
Beginning] and   ֹא  [The Before of the Book] 
 
1.1.2 
The archetypal and unreachable characteristics of the arche, as herein conceived, imply 
that every authentic historical inquiry contains an “essential dishomogeneity,” a 
constitutive gap between the arche it investigates (made of ruins or archetypes, not given 
 
18 Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method, 81; Kant, “What real progress has metaphysics 
made in Germany since the time of Leibniz and Wolff?,” 419. 
19 Ibid, 82. 
20 In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant writes about the attempt to draw the architecture of all human 
knowledge, “which at the present time, since so much material has already been collected or can be taken 
from the ruins of collapsed older edifices, would not merely be possible but not even be very difficult. We 
shall content ourselves here with the completion of our task, namely, merely outlining the architectonic of all 
cognition from pure reason.” (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 692–93.) Additionally, in regard to a future 
task that is currently left open, he writes: “I will content myself with casting a cursory glance from a merely 
transcendental point of view, namely that of the nature of pure reason, on the whole of its labors hitherto, 
which presents to my view edifices, to be sure, but only in ruins.” (Ibid, 702.) 
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in its totality within chronology) and the phenomenon’s factual origin.  ֹא [Dishomogeneity] 
 This idea ,according to Agamben ,forms the basis of Foucault’s essay “Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, History” (1971) where Genealogy [whose model Foucault finds traces of in 
Nietzsche, particularly in Human, All Too Human (1878), The Gay Science (1882) and On 
the Genealogy of Morals (1887)] is positioned against “the search for an ‘origin’.”21 At the 
historical beginning of things, the Genealogist will never find “[T]he ‘inviolable identity 
of their origin.’ ... [W]ill never neglect as inaccessible all the episodes of history.... [W]ill 
cultivate the details and accidents that accompany every beginning.... The genealogist 
needs history to dispel the chimeras of the origin.”22 The true object of Genealogy (or 
genealogical research) is thus not the exact essence of things but, following the logic of the 
“essential dishomogeneity,” what Foucault calls “descent” or “emergence, the moment of 
arising,” which is qualitatively different from the empirical origin and what follows it 
historically. The question remains: what kind of object is “the moment of arising,” and 
where exactly is it located if never at the “non-place of the origin”?  ֹא [Genealogy] 
 Agamben traces the discussion of Genealogy’s dishomogeneity (beyond Foucault 
and Nietzsche) back to the German theologian Franz Overbeck. According to Overbeck, 
Genealogy’s research object of “the moment of arising,” which is a fringe or heterogenous 
stratum within the life of a historical phenomenon, “is not placed in the position of a 
chronological origin but is qualitatively other.”23  In his research on the origin of the 
patristic literature, he names it “prehistory” (Urgeschichte), although the prefix “pre” 
should not indicate chronology; it need not be understood as the most historically ancient 
past, since prehistory’s past is not homogeneous with history’s past and “is not tied to any 
specific site in time.” The original (somewhat untranslatable to English) German prefix 
“Ur” is more apt in this instance since it is better equipped to convey prehistory’s 
fundamental character, which is to be “the history of the moment of arising” rather than 
the history of its development, as well as the idea that prehistory is “a constitutive 
heterogeneity inherent in historical inquiry itself, which each time must confront a past of 
a, so to speak, special type.” This means, for Overbeck, that every historical phenomenon 
 
21 Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method, 83. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid, 85. 
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splits itself into prehistory and history according to a qualitative difference that is not time-
dependent—a differentiation that is based on their different qualities thus requires 
“different methodologies and precautions.” Agamben brings as an example to this required 
precaution the case of the division between the religious and the profane juridical spheres: 
should we hypothesize the existence of a more archaic stage beyond both spheres in which 
they supposedly are not yet separated, we will in fact be at risk of projecting upon the 
presupposed unified phase the characteristics defining both spheres, characteristics 
“[W]hich are precisely the outcome of the split. Just as ... [W]hat stands prior to the 
historical division is not necessarily the sum of the characteristics defining its fragments. 
... In this sense, too, prehistory is not homogenous with history and the moment of arising 
is not identical with what comes to be through it.”24 
 The distinction between prehistory and history means that the historical efficacy of 
a phenomenon is bound up with this distinction, and that the dishomogeneity of every 
historical inquiry is thus a subjective datum that is, according to Agamben, embedded 
within the inquiry and guides it. Engaging this constitutive heterogeneity is crucial for 
whomever wishes to practice historical research, and can be carried out as a critique of 
tradition and sources. This critique concerns, above all, “the mode in which the past has 
been constructed into a tradition,” not in terms of chronological projections, but in terms 
of the very structure of historical inquiry. It constitutes a critical view on a certain tradition 
in which the withdrawal to the past will eventually coincide with “renewed access to the 
sources” (previously unattainable due to the mechanism of “canonization” in Overbeck’s 
terms) and will thus enable new epistemological possibilities in the present. According to 
Agamben, however, it is impossible to gain a renewed access, beyond tradition, to the 
sources without putting into question the very historical subject who seeks access: “What 
is in question, then, is the epistemological paradigm of inquiry itself.”25 
 Archeology is thus a historical inquiry that has to do with the moment of a 
phenomenon’s arising, and that must engage anew with the sources and tradition, must 
confront the various mechanisms through which tradition regulates and conditions what it 
 
24 Ibid, 90. 
25 Ibid, 89. 
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transmits; it is a practice that eventually determines “the very status of the knowing subject” 
because the moment of arising is situated at a threshold of undecidability between object 
and subject, thus is both subjective and objective: “It is never the emergence of the fact 
without at the same time being the emergence of the knowing subject itself: the operation 
on the origin is at the same time an operation on the subject.”26 The emergence of a 
historical phenomenon (its moment of arising, its arche as we have outlined it thus far) that 
archeology seeks to reach cannot be localized in a remote past nor beyond this in a 
metahistorical, a-temporal structure. It represents a present and operative tendency within 
the historical phenomenon that conditions and makes intelligible its development in time. 
As Agamben concludes: “It is an arche, but, as for Foucault and Nietzsche, it is an arche 
that is not pushed diachronically into the past, but assures the synchronic comprehensibility 
and coherence of the system.”27  ֹא [arche] 
 
1.1.3 
The term “archeology,” which nowadays is largely associated with Foucault’s 
investigations, appears in his texts (albeit in a somewhat different form) already in the 
preface to his renowned early work The Order of Things (1966).  ֹא [Archeology] 
 Archeology is presented there as an investigation into a dimension that is at once 
paradigmatic and transcendent, a kind of “historical a priori” where knowledge finds its 
structure and conditions of possibility (via the differentiation in the French language 
between connaissance and savoir).  ֹא [Historical a priori] 
 This “historical a priori” dimension manifests the history of (a certain) 
knowledge’s conditions of possibility; it is an epistemological field that Foucault termed 
episteme: not so much a place where ideas are historically revealed, but where an inquiry 
attempts to discover “on what basis knowledge and theory became possible; within what 
 
26 Ibid. For a discussion of subjectivity, in the context of philosophical archeology, see de Libera, 
Archéologie du sujet I: Naissance de sujet; and Dolgopolski, “Who Thinks in the Talmud?,” 7–11. 
27 Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method, 92. Agamben exemplifies in due course a few 
possible manifestations of this arche: “The archē is like the Indo-European words expressing a system of 
connections between historically accessible languages, or the child of psychoanalysis exerting an active force 
within the psychic life of the adult, or the big bang, which is supposed to have given rise to the universe but 
which continues to send towards us its fossil radiation.” (Ibid, 110.) These examples are already given in an 
earlier text from 2008 (originally in Italian): Agamben, The Sacrament of Language: An Archeology of the 
Oath, 10. 
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space of order knowledge was constituted; on the basis of what historical a priori ... ideas 
could appear,”28 in other words, an unconscious category of the intellect that conditions 
the formation of knowledge. 
 Foucault’s oxymoronic “historical a priori” attempts to underscore, according to 
Agamben’s interpretation, that (although conditioning the historical experience) it is not a 
metahistorical origin that founds and determines knowledge, but the episteme is itself a 
historical practice.29 That is, “The a priori that conditions the possibility of knowledge is 
its own history grasped at a specific level.”30 It is a concrete, ontological level of existence, 
a “brute fact” of its existing in a given time for a given society, “or, to use the terminology 
from the Nietzsche essay, the brute fact of its ‘moment of arising’ (or, in Overbeck’s terms, 
its prehistory).”31 
 Yet how could the a priori itself be embedded in an historical constellation? And 
how is it possible to gain access to it? Agamben asserts that the idea of the “historical a 
priori” as such originates more from Marcel Mauss’s discussion of the idea of mana in his 
book A General Theory of Magic rather than from Kant’s philosophical archeology: 
 
Mauss defines this historical transcendental as ‘an unconscious category of 
understanding[,]’ ... suggesting in this way that the epistemological model 
required for such knowledge cannot be entirely homogeneous with that of 
conscious historical knowledge.... But as with Foucault, it is nevertheless 
clear that for Mauss the a priori, though conditioning historical experience, 
is itself inscribed within a determinate historical constellation.... In other 
words, it realizes the paradox of an a priori condition that is inscribed within 
a history and that can only constitute itself a posteriori with respect to this 
history in which inquiry—in Foucault’s case, archeology—must discover 
it.32 
 
28 Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method, 93. 
29 In The Archeology of Knowledge, the “historical a priori” is described as a term that “does not elude 
historicity: it does not constitute, above events, and in an unmoving heaven, an atemporal structure: it is 
defined by the group of rules that characterize a discursive practice: but the rules are not imposed from the 
outside.” (Lawlor, The Cambridge Foucault Lexicon, 203.) The original text appears in: Foucault, The 
Archeology of Knowledge, 126–131. 
30 Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method, 93. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid, 94. The “historical a priori” is thus a form of conceptual analysis, but not in a timeless manner 
because concepts have their being in historical sites—as Ian Hacking writes of concepts: “The logical 
relations between them were formed in time, and they cannot be perceived correctly unless their temporal 
dimensions are kept in view.” (Hacking, “Historical Ontology,” 598.) 
 
 
15 
 
1.1.4 
Agamben claims that Foucault did not question the unique temporal structure that seems 
to be indicated by the idea of a “historical a priori.” Yet the past that is in question here, 
echoing previous ideas of such past that we have seen so far (such as Kant’s, Nietzsche’s, 
and Overbeck’s) is “a special kind of past that neither precedes the present chronologically 
as origin nor is simply exterior to it.”33 In his attempt to articulate the specific temporal 
structure of this past, Agamben assembles a series of paradigmatic examples out of which 
I will concentrate on a few distinctive ones. 
 The first example, relatively limited in scope, is that of Henri Bergson’s conception 
of the phenomenon of déjà-vu as it appears in his book L’Énergie spirituelle (1919). 
Bergson understands déjà-vu as a phenomenon in which memory does not follow 
perception chronologically, but occurs simultaneously with it, and thus is able to produce 
“false perceptions” that he defines as “a memory of the present.” This is a kind of memory 
that “is of the past in its form and of the present in its matter.”34 Similarly, according to 
Agamben, the condition of possibility in the “historical a priori” that the archeologist is 
seeking to reach is not only contemporary with the present and the real, but is an inherent 
and continuous part of them. The temporal structure of the “historical a priori” exemplifies 
a unique conception of the past that therefore enables the archeologist pursuing such an a 
priori to “retreat, so to speak, towards the present.” It is as if every historical phenomenon 
splits into prehistory and history (“a history of the sources and a historical tradition”), 
which are “in actuality contemporaneous, insofar as they coincide for an instant in the 
moment of arising.”35 
 Similarly, another example (as a matter of fact, merely a note in Agamben’s text, 
but an important one in the overall context) concerns Walter Benjamin’s suggestion (in 
convolute N—Theory of Knowledge, Theory of Progress) that “the entire past must be 
brought into the present in a ‘historical apocatastasis’.” 36  Benjamin’s reference to 
 
33 Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method, 94. 
34 Ibid, 95. A further discussion of déjà-vu, in the context of the philosophy of history, appears in 
Virno, Déjà Vu and the End of History. 
35 Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method, 95. 
36 Ibid; Benjamin, The Arcades Project, 459. 
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eschatological reality (when a restitution of the origin will take place at the end of time), 
while characterizing it as historical, means a temporal structure that is similar to the 
“historical a priori.” 
 Lastly, an elaborated example to the temporal structure of the (“historical a priori”) 
past is that given by the work of the Italian philosopher Enzo Melandri. Reflecting upon 
the philosophical relevancy of Foucault’s archeology, writes Agamben, Melandri notices 
that while the codes and matrices of our culture are usually explicated by referring to a 
higher code that includes a mysterious explanatory force (this is the model of the “origin”), 
Foucault’s archeology suggests to reverse the process, or better, “to make the explication 
of the phenomenon immanent in its description.”37 This means refuting any metahistorical 
structure (or metalanguage in Foucault’s case due to the centrality of language in his 
perimetric analysis) and, instead, favouring the model of the “historical a priori” while 
seeking (Melandri) to analyze its structure “vis-à-vis the Freudian opposition between the 
conscious and the unconscious.” In order to perform his analysis—ultimately in order to 
arrive at his own conception of archeology—Melandri first departs (just as Foucault) from 
a point rooted in Nietzsche, in particular his concept of “Critical History,”38 indicating a 
history that criticizes and destroys the past in order to enable the life in the present.39 
However, Melandri, according to Agamben, generalizes Nietzsche’s concept by 
connecting it to Freud’s concept of regression, thus granting his concept of archeology 
(which is based on a “Dionysian” regression in time) the role of the healer or the redeemer. 
Melandri writes: 
 
[Critical history] must retrace in the opposite direction the actual genealogy 
of events that it examines. The division that has been established between 
historiography and actual history is quite similar to the one that, for Freud, 
has always existed between the conscious and the unconscious. Critical 
history thus has the role of a therapy aimed at the recovery of the 
unconscious, understood as the historical ‘repressed.’... [This archeological 
process] consists in tracking genealogy back to where the phenomenon in 
question splits into the conscious and the unconscious. Only if one succeeds 
in reaching that point does the pathological syndrome reveal its real 
 
37 Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method, 96. 
38 Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, 57–125. 
39 Ibid, 67. 
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meaning. So it is a matter of regression: not to the unconscious as such, but 
to what made it unconscious.40 
 
In contrast to the pessimistic vision of regression (which is “incapable of overcoming the 
original infantile scene”), Melandri’s archeology seems to be capable of a regression back 
to the point where the dichotomy between history and historiography (or conscious and 
unconscious when he relates his discussion to psychoanalysis) was produced, a regression 
not to a previous state (bringing the repressed back to consciousness) but to the moment 
which constituted it as such, to “the source of the split.” In this sense, it is the opposite of 
rationalization, an archeological operation, Agamben quotes, that “requires a ‘Dionysian 
regression’ ... To understand the past, we should equally traverse it à reculons [i.e., 
backwards].”41 This “Dionysian regression” is an advance in time, a singular manifestation 
of the past’s temporal structure, that turns its back to its final destination. It is the inverse, 
complementary advancement to that of the Angelus Novus—Walter Benjamin’s well-
known advancing “angel of history” described in his ninth thesis on the philosophy of 
history.42 While Benjamin’s angel advances towards the future as it gazes at the past, 
Melandri’s angel regresses towards the past as it gazes at the future. Both advance towards 
an unidentifiable final destination—though we know that the destination of these two 
images of historical process is the present. At the end point of the archeological regression, 
at the point where the split (between conscious and unconscious; historiography and actual 
history) produces the condition of our present experience, we realize that our way of 
representing the moment before the split is governed by the split itself, and that we should 
not presuppose or expect (or try to represent) a kind of “golden age” beyond the dichotomy 
that is devoid of repressions. Rather, “before or beyond the split, in the disappearance of 
the categories governing its representation, there is nothing but the sudden, dazzling 
disclosure of the moment of arising, the revelation of the present as something that we were 
not able to live or think.”43  ֹא [The Contemporary] 
 
 
40 Quoted in Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method, 97. 
41 Ibid, 98. 
42 Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” 253–265. 
43 Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method, 99. 
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1.1.5 
If we have conjured a somewhat psychoanalytic vocabulary, it is to help us form an analogy 
to the archeological regression. The idea, writes Agamben, that the present might be given 
in the form of a “constitutive inaccessibility” is bound up with Freud’s theory and 
understanding of what repression essentially means. In the context of psychoanalysis, 
repression is discussed through the event of trauma according to which an experience is 
repressed due to its traumatic character or because the conscious mind is unable to accept 
its consequences. Throughout the latent period of its repression, as if it had never taken 
place, the event nonetheless keeps on living, somewhat in secrecy, only to reappear later 
on in the form of “neurotic symptoms or oneiric content.” Only a successful analysis, 
according to Freud, can go beyond the symptoms back to the repressed event and heal the 
patient. The present’s form of “constitutive inaccessibility” is further supported by the 
(psychoanalytic) idea, set forth by Cathy Caruth in Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, 
Narrative, and History, that latency is constitutive of historical experience and that “the 
traumatic event is preserved and experienced precisely and only through its forgetting.”44 
In other words, the inherent latency, the inherent forgetting, within the traumatic 
experience itself, made it available to be experienced from the outset. This is the trauma’s 
historical power, and thus “history can be grasped only in the very inaccessibility of its 
occurrence.” From these ideas (and previous ones we mentioned, such as Bergson’s 
conception of déjà-vu), Agamben concludes, with reference to archeology, that both 
memory and forgetfulness 
 
are contemporaneous with perception and the present. While we perceive 
something, we simultaneously remember and forget it. Every present thus 
contains a part of non-lived experience. ... This means that it is above all the 
unexperienced, rather than just the experienced, that gives shape and 
consistency to the fabric of psychic personality and historical tradition and 
ensures their continuity and consistency.45 
 
In both cases (of psychoanalysis and archeological regression), the past, which was never 
 
44 Quoted in Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method, 101. 
45 Ibid. 
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really experienced and therefore “technically cannot be defined as ‘past’,” remains as a 
present—either in the form of neurotic symptoms (as in the Freudian schema) or, in the 
case of Genealogy, in the form of canonization that only patient work that focusing on “the 
moment of arising” (rather than searching for an origin) can gain access beyond tradition. 
Yet in contrary to the analytic work of psychoanalysis which, if successful, withdraws to 
the originary event and brings back to consciousness all the content that has been repressed 
in the unconscious, the archeological regression withdraws further and reaches “the fault 
line where memory and forgetting, lived and non-lived experience both communicate with 
and separate from each other.”46 In its withdrawal, genealogical inquiry does not search 
for the phenomenon’s origin but focuses on its “moment of arising”; it does not wish, as in 
Freud, to restore a previous stage but, as Agamben writes: 
 
to go back not to its content but to the modalities, circumstances, and 
moments in which the split, by means of repression, constituted it as origin. 
... It does not will to repeat the past, ... it wills to let it go ... in order to gain 
access beyond the past to what has never been. ... Only at this point is the 
un-lived past revealed for what it was: contemporary with the present. It 
thus becomes accessible for the first time, exhibiting itself as a ‘source’.47 
 
For Agamben, this is why contemporaneity is rare and difficult, and why archeology 
constitutes the only path of access to the present. 
 Agamben’s analysis thus far showed us that in regard to the specific temporal 
structure implicit in philosophical archeology, we deal not so much with a past (in its 
conventional sense) but with a “moment of arising,” and that the access to it (within the 
“historical a priori” dimension) can only be obtained by returning back to the point where 
it was covered over and neutralized by tradition (or in Melandri’s terms, to the split between 
conscious and unconscious, history and historiography): “The moment of arising, the arche 
of archeology is what will take place, what will become accessible and present, only when 
the archeological inquiry has completed its operation. It therefore has the form of a past in 
the future, that is, future anterior.”48 Gaining access to the present, beyond memory and 
 
46 Ibid, 102. 
47 Ibid, 103. 
48 Ibid, 106. 
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forgetting (or rather “at the threshold of their indifference”), beyond their inverse, 
reciprocal operation on (and in) time, is archeology’s aim; and that is why the space opened 
towards the present is “projected into the future” while intertwining with it. Once the 
archeological work has cleared away the blocked access to history, the future will be 
realized as a “past that will have been”; the arche will become accessible once it is realized 
as the past that “will have been,” and only in this form “can historical consciousness truly 
becomes possible.”49 
 The relation between archeology and history becomes clear, writes Agamben, by 
realizing that archeology moves backward through the course of history, representing a 
regressive force that retreats towards the point “where history becomes accessible for the 
first time, in accordance with the temporality of the future anterior.”50 Only then will this 
relation [just as in the Abrahamic theological doctrines where the work of redemption 
precedes in rank that of creation (while making it comprehensible and meaningful), and 
even though seems to follow the latter it is in truth anterior] reveal itself as an archeological 
a priori condition that is embedded within history, making it possible. It is a relation of 
separation and, at the same time, unification. Benjamin, writes Agamben, “made 
redemption a fully historical category,” making clear that “not only is archeology the 
immanent a priori of historiography, but the gesture of the archeologist constitutes the 
paradigm of every true human action.”51  ֹא [Messianic Time and History]
 
49 In summation, at the end of chapter 3, Agamben once again stresses the arche’s most crucial 
characteristic. The arche that is in question in philosophical archeology is to be understood (from the 
perspective herein proposed) not as a given nor a substance locatable in a chronology, but instead as an 
operative force within history (e.g., an Indo-European word, the child of psychoanalysis, the Big Bang, etc.), 
a field of bipolar historical currents “stretched between anthropogenesis and history, between the moment of 
arising and becoming, between an archi-past and the present. And as with anthropogenesis, which is supposed 
to have taken place but which cannot be hypostatized in a chronological event—the arche alone is able to 
guarantee the intelligibility of historical phenomena, ‘saving’ them archeologically in a future anterior in the 
understanding not of an unverifiable origin but of its finite and untotalizable history.” (Ibid, 110.) 
50 Ibid, 107. 
51 Ibid, 108. 
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 [Agamben’s Methodology] אֹ 
I 
For Agamben, method and theory (and likewise practice and theory) are inseparable as 
each theory contains within itself the way or path to itself. Theory, he marks, is practice 
thus any proper destruction (during the investigation) is also a construction; they are also 
inseparable.52 First methodological principle. 
 Moreover, “method shares with logic its inability to separate itself completely from 
its context. There is no method that would be valid for every domain, just as there is no 
logic that can set aside its objects.”53 Second methodological principle. 
 The third methodological principle, modestly ascribed to Walter Benjamin, is that 
“doctrine may legitimately be exposed only in the form of interpretation.”54 It is in the 
context of this principle that Agamben frames his scholarly relatedness to Foucault’s work, 
as well as what may appear to be, across The Signature of All Things, as nothing more than 
(though erudite) “investigations on the method of Michel Foucault,”55 but in reality is 
much more. 
 Foucault once commented that his “historical investigations of the past are only the 
shadow cast by theoretical interrogation of the present.”56 Accessing the present is possible 
only by following the shadows these interrogations cast on the past. Foucault often draws 
relationships between his archeology and historical inquiries—for him they are distinct but 
also connected; archeology needs history and vice versa. This is likewise for Agamben, in 
accordance with philosophical archeology’s meditation on the relation between history and 
 
52 Agamben conceives of practice, however, as preceding theory, as he writes: “Anyone familiar with 
research in the human sciences knows that, contrary to common opinion, a reflection on method usually 
follows practical application, rather than preceding it.” (Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method, 
7.) This statement can be compared with Claude Lévi-Strauss’s statement: “The truth of the matter is that the 
principle underlying a classification can never be postulated in advance. It can only be discovered a 
posteriori by ethnographic investigation, that is, by experience.” (Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind, 58.) 
53 Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method, 7. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Quoted in Agamben, What Is an Apparatus? and Other Essays, 53. See also Agamben, Creation 
and Anarchy, 1. Elsewhere Agamben remarks: “I tend to work in crepuscular regions, at sunset, where the 
shadows are very long. For me they reach into the deepest past. There is no great theoretical difference 
between my work and Foucault’s; it is merely a question of the length of the historical shadow.” (Quoted in 
De La Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction, 246.) 
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archeology. He writes: “[E]very inquiry in the human sciences―including the present 
reflection on method―should entail an archeological vigilance. In other words, it must 
retrace its own trajectory back to the point where something remains obscure and 
unthematized.”57 Fourth methodological principle. 
 According to the fifth methodological principle, which further explains Agamben’s 
position on the interlocutory role of the interpreter, “the genuine philosophical element in 
every work, whether it be a work of art, of science, or of thought, is its capacity to be 
developed, which Ludwig Feuerbach defined as Entwickklungsfähigkeit.”58 This German 
expression is ambiguous: it signifies both a passive capacity as well as an active capacity; 
an expression that forms a buffer zone or a no man’s land that cannot be exclusively 
appropriated by author or reader, original or annotated text.59 Because of this principle, 
putting one’s finger on a clear difference between the author of the work and its interpreter 
“becomes as essential as it is difficult to grasp.”60 Elsewhere Agamben writes: 
 
Why does this search for the element liable to be developed fascinate me? 
Because if we follow this methodological principle all the way, we 
inevitably end up at a point where it is not possible to distinguish between 
what is ours and what belongs to the author we are reading. Reaching this 
impersonal zone of indifference, in which every proper name, every 
copyright, and every claim for originality fades away, fills me with joy.61 
 
In his lecture “What is a Paradigm?,”62 Agamben refers to the work’s capacity to be 
developed as an adequate representation or definition for philosophy at large—something 
that exists in literature, art, or science, which lacks a concrete territory in and of itself, but 
nonetheless exists as an element to be developed within them.63 Philosophy always exists 
in exile and requires to be assembled. For Agamben, the methodological principle of 
 
57 Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method, 8. 
58 Ibid. For further references Agamben makes to this idea see Agamben, I Luoghi della Vita; and 
Agamben, Intervista a Giorgio Agamben: dalla Teologia alla Teologia Economica. 
59 Agamben, “Un Libro senza Patria,” 45. 
60 Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method, 8. 
61 Agamben, The Fire and the Tale, 34. 
62 “What is a Paradigm?,” YouTube video, 9:36, “European Graduate School,” March 26, 2008, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G9Wxn1L9Er0. 
63 For Agamben’s pertinent definition of philosophy‒as‒intensity, see Agamben, “Philosophy as 
Interdisciplinary Intensity.” 
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Entwickklungsfähigkeit corresponds with Benjamin’s idea of messianic time that is 
prevalent throughout the length and breadth of “secular time,” or to the hermeneutical idea 
according to which one is required to understand a certain author more than the latter 
understands itself.64 
 
II 
In his introductory notes to Agamben’s book Potentialities, Daniel Heller-Roazen 
highlights one of the systematic pillars of Agamben’s methodology—the Agambenian 
method thinks the historical and the philological as inseparable. Referring to Benjamin’s 
concept of “redemption,” and his prefatory notes to the “Theses on the Philosophy of 
History,”65 the Agambenian historical method is always involved, writes Heller-Roazen, 
“in a messianic moment of thinking, in which the practice of the ‘historian’ and the practice 
of the ‘philologist,’ the experience of tradition and the experience of language, cannot be 
told apart.”66 In this moment, the past is saved not in its past form, but in being transformed 
into something that never was, in being read as “what was never written.” 
 The transmission of tradition, for Agamben, is conditioned by the transmission of 
language. Every communication between human beings must presuppose the fact that there 
 
64 Considered from a historical perspective, the Agambenian methodology is in this sense part of a 
corpus of techniques of interpretation. This corpus, which can be dated back to the Greek grammarians, was 
somewhat in suspension throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and was relaunched not before 
the nineteenth century. As Foucault indicates in “Nietzsche, Freud, Marx”, the corpus opened up once again 
the possibility of interpretation and hermeneutic. This new possibility, still relevant today, is characterized, 
according to Foucault, by the way these techniques of interpretation (including that of Agamben) were able 
to range signs “in a much more differentiated space, according to a dimension that could be called that of 
depth.” (Foucault, “Nietzsche, Freud, Marx”, 272.) The interpreter is, for example as per Nietzsche, “‘the 
good excavator of the lower depths’,” (Ibid, 273) thus the signifier “archeology” (in philosophical 
archeology) makes evident its belonging to this tradition. Another aspect that characterizes the techniques of 
interpretation, according to Foucault, emphasizes the idea that interpretation became an infinite task since 
signs are linked together in an inexhaustible network framed by an irreducible gaping and openness. This 
aspect of incompleteness of interpretation “is found once again ... in the form of the refusal of beginning.” 
(Ibid, 274.) Agamben’s methodology, as we shall see in due course, renounces the beginning much in the 
same way as Foucault’s or Nietzsche’s, but simultaneously renders it a categorically discoverable within, and 
at the end of, its archeological dig. 
65 “Historical method is a philological method, a method that has as its foundation the book of life. 
‘To read what was never written,’ is what Hofmannsthal calls it. The reader referred to here is the true 
historian.” (quoted in Agamben, Potentialities, I.) The quotation refers to Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, 
vol. I, pt. 3, 1238. 
66 Quoted in Agamben, Potentialities, 1. 
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is language,67 for without it there is no transmission nor signification, and it is this fact 
that cannot be communicated in the form of statements. Statements are possible only after 
speech has already begun. Philology, as Agamben states in Infancy and History, from the 
outset has the role of abolition between the thing to be transmitted and the act of 
transmission, “and since this abolition has always been regarded as the essential character 
of myth, philology can thereby be defined as a ‘critical mythology’.”68 
 “What was never written” in all communication (linguistic and historical), 
according to Agamben, is the fact that there is language, and the fact that it was never 
written derives from the fact that it can enter into “writing” only in the form of a 
presupposition. Yet this fact can be “‘read’: exposed, it can be comprehended in its 
existence as potentiality.” 69  “To read what was never written” means to bring back 
everything that has ever been said to the event of its taking place, to its pure potentiality. 
Language, in Benjamin’s terms, is thus “redeemed”; though brought to its pure potentiality, 
speech has nothing to say. 
 Reduced to its speechless capacity for speech, the pure existence of language shows 
its own potentiality for expression, it shows its own existence, that there exists a medium 
in which communication takes place, and that what is communicated in this medium is not 
one thing or another but communicability itself. To examine the pure existence of language, 
free from any form of presupposition, is to consider a community inconceivable according 
to any representable condition of belonging, a “coming community” without identity 
defined by its existence in language as irreducible, absolute potentiality. 
 
III 
In addition to its archeological element, the Agambenian method consists of two other 
intertwining elements: the paradigm and the signature.70 
 
 
67 This claim is echoed throughout Agamben’s books Infancy and History, Language and Death, The 
Sacrament of Language and What is Philosophy? as well as in his essays “The Idea of Language” and 
“Philosophy and Linguistics,” (Agamben, Potentialities, 62–76) to name a few. 
68 Agamben, Infancy and History, 146. 
69 Quoted in Agamben, Potentialities, 22. 
70 See Watkin, 2014 (a and b). 
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1) Agamben’s dealing with paradigms (or prime examples)71 begins specifically on the 
background of the discussion of the relationship between the whole and the part, the 
common and the proper, or the general and the particular.72 This antinomy of the general 
and the particular “has its origin in language,”73 where we name a particular object and by 
that transform it into a member of a general class defined by a property held in common. 
This procedure closely resembles the formation of political communities, thus both politics 
 
71 For a discussion of the paradigm as a particular mode and function of a historical example see 
Infancy and History: On the Destruction of Experience, 119–137. Additionally, Agamben dedicates the first 
chapter of The Signature of All Thing: On Method to the question “What is a paradigm?” where he attempts 
to clarify a few misunderstandings or criticisms raised against him on the account of using facts as metaphors 
and vice versa, thus failing to act as a responsible historian. However, he insists on using concrete historical 
examples as paradigms that attempt to articulate a broader set of problems. 
72  This relationship is also known in interpretive processes of knowledge as the hermeneutic circle—
the idea that the part can be understood only by means of the whole and every explanation of the part 
presupposes the understanding of the whole; or in other words, that knowledge of a single phenomenon 
presupposes knowledge of the whole (and vice versa), thus a paradox prevails and the epistemological 
procedure cannot begin. 
 Agamben refers to the idea of the hermeneutic circle a few times throughout his oeuvre, often in an 
attempt to come to terms with its interpretive complexity, which adheres as a challenge to the human sciences 
at large. 
 In his essay on Aby Warburg’s research methodology, “Aby Warburg and the Nameless Science,” for 
example, he explains that philological and historical disciplines consider the hermeneutic circle to be the 
epistemological process that is proper to them and is the foundation of all hermeneutics. However, contrary 
to the common belief, this is not necessarily a vicious circle that sabotages processes of knowledge (it is, he 
claims, in fact the rationality of the humanities) because if this science wants to remain faithful to its own 
law, it needs to “stay within it in the right way” (as per Heidegger). The passage from the part to the whole 
(and back) never returns to the same point; at every step it broadens its radius, discovering a higher 
perspective that opens a new circle: “The curve representing the hermeneutic circle is not a circumference ... 
but a spiral that continually broadens its turns.” (Agamben, Potentialities, 96.) 
 In The Signature of All Things: On Method this theme is interrogated once again specifically in the 
context of the current discussion, that is, the paradigmatic method. Tracing the hermeneutic circle in the 
discourse of Philology, from Georg Anton Friedrich Ast to Martin Heidegger, Agamben emphasizes the 
latter’s crucial contribution to understanding the hermeneutic circle not as a vicious circle but as a virtuous 
one: “Grounding this hermeneutical circle in Being and Time on pre-understanding as Dasein’s anticipatory 
existential structure, Martin Heidegger helped the human sciences out of this difficulty and indeed guaranteed 
the ‘more original’ character of their knowledge.” (Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method, 27.) 
However, Agamben claims, if the interpreter's activity is always already anticipated by a pre-understanding 
that is elusive, it seems as if the inquirer must be able to recognize in phenomena the signature of a pre-
understanding that depends on their own existential character, thus “the circle then seems to become even 
more ‘vicious’.” (Ibid.) The aporia, according to Agamben, is resolved if we understand that the hermeneutic 
circle is, in fact, a paradigmatic circle: “There is no duality here between ‘single phenomenon’ and ‘the 
whole’ as there was in Ast and Schleiermacher: the whole only results from paradigmatic exposition of 
individual cases. And there is no circularity, as in Heidegger, between a ‘before’ and an ‘after,’ between pre-
understanding and interpretation. In the paradigm, intelligibility does not precede the phenomenon; it stands, 
so to speak, ‘besides’ it (para). ... The phenomenon, exposed in the medium of its knowability, shows the 
whole of which it is the paradigm. ... With regard to phenomena, ... it stands neither in the past nor the present 
but in their exemplary constellation.” (Ibid, 27–28.) 
73 Agamben, The Coming Community, 9. 
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and language are caught between universality and singularity. The concept of the paradigm 
nonetheless escapes this antinomy: “Neither particular nor universal, the example is a 
singular object that presents itself as such.”74 An example is simultaneously both a simple 
member of a set and the defining criteria of that set. By providing its own criteria of 
inclusion, the example remains ambiguously positioned alongside the class of which it is 
most representative, neither fully included in a class nor fully excluded from it. The 
paradigm is always both suspended from its group and belonging to it. Thus, the separation 
of exemplarity and singularity is false or impossible. All groups are immanent to their 
paradigmatic members, never presupposed.75 
 Based on Aristotle’s description of the special logical movement of the example 
(which he distinguishes from both induction and deduction),76 Agamben writes that the 
paradigm constitutes a peculiar form of knowledge that calls into question the particular-
general relation as a model of logical inference. The paradigm is a mode of knowledge that 
moves between singularities. It refutes the general and the particular as well as 
dichotomous logic in favour of a bipolar analogical model.77 As the example moves from 
particular to particular, its epistemic character remains unconnected to general categories 
of any kind, thus must be understood as analogical inasmuch as analogy is a cognitive 
process in which particulars are associated without reference to generalities. The example 
is the deactivation of a particular from its normal usage such that it both constitutes and 
makes intelligible “the rule of that use, which cannot be shown in any other way.”78 
Paradigms make intelligible the analogical form of knowing, which can neither be 
explained with reference to an origin nor conveyed by way of rules. Herein lies its power 
to illuminate the present. 
 
 
74 Ibid, 10. 
75 Agamben further discusses the relation between an example and an exception in Agamben, Homo 
Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, 21–23. 
76 Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 69. 
77 Paradigms do not constitute the transfer of meaning, but rather an analogical model. Analogy refers 
to the third order of relationality; metonymy is relation due to proximity (or contact); metaphor due to 
meaning transfer; while analogy is a deactivated relationality where it is neither proximate nor transferable, 
but a mix of both occupying a space of suspensive mediation. Analogical paradigm is the process by which 
identity and difference (or common and proper) is suspended in a state of indispensability. 
78 Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method, 18. 
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Following Agamben, a paradigm is at once embedded in a given historical 
situation and a tool for better understanding ‘the present situation.’ These 
paradigms must then walk a fine line between past and present, and for this 
reason they require the most careful understanding—at once historical and 
hermeneutical—if they are to achieve their end.79 
 
In other words, paradigms draw on historical occurrences of the past, while being 
crystallized and concretized in the real time of the present, though directed towards a future 
point in time when the (future) present will be rendered inoperative and free to be reused. 
 
2) Signature is the mode of distribution of paradigms through time and discourses, thus it 
is the exposition of intelligibility (the signature is akin to the paradigm and contains a few 
elements that refer back to the logic of the paradigm). It is characterized by a signatory 
displacement: “Signature is something that in a sign or concept marks and exceeds such 
sign or concept, referring it back to a certain field without leaving the semiotic to constitute 
a new meaning... [S]ignatures move and displace concepts from one field to another, 
without redefining them semantically.”80 Signatures operate as pure historical elements 
precisely because they connect different fields and times. 81  In their historical work, 
signatures function “anachronistically” as they operate outside or against chronology. The 
signatures function on the basis of random interconnectedness, where one does not 
identifies a mythic origin but determines when signs first emerged on the horizon of 
perceptibility.82 
 A signature guides the interpretation of a sign or a concept in a specific direction, 
similarly to Benjamin’s idea of “secret indices,”83 where the past carries with it a secret 
index to be deciphered in the present when perceived.84 The meaning of a signature is not 
 
79 De La Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction, 350. 
80 Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, 4. “Oikonimia,” one of the book’s themes, for example, is 
a signature whose meaning remains the same but whose location alters (domestic-theology-politics). More 
broadly, Foucault’s Archeology; Nietzsche’s Genealogy; Derrida’s Deconstruction and Benjamin’s Theory 
of Dialectical Images are all “sciences of signature.” 
81 On what claimed to be the Heideggerian precedent (Spur) to the Agambenian concept of signature, 
see Östman, “Philosophical Archeology as Method in the Humanities. A comment on Cultural Memory and 
the Problem of History,” 84–86. 
82 Collili, Agamben and the Signature of Astrology: Spheres and Potentiality, 24. 
83 Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” 390. 
84 Collili, Agamben and the Signature of Astrology: Spheres and Potentiality, xvi. 
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found in the sign or the semantic meaning, but in the manner in which the signature allows 
things to be said or understood. The signature has a specific origin, a historical “moment 
of arising,” and a large number of historical presentations, all of them paradigmatic. 
 Additionally, a system of reading signs is based on signatures where the 
relationship between them is not that of cause and effect but of resemblance and analogy. 
For Agamben, a signature is not a sign but that element which makes the sign intelligible. 
The signature is a sign without a content and thus gives rise to a pure identity deprived of 
any meaning or signification.85 The relation between the signature and the thing that it 
semiotically marks is analogical—this is why signatures, which (according to the theory of 
signs) should appear as signifiers, always already slide into the position of the signified. 
Thus, “signum and signatum exchange roles and seem to enter into a zone of 
undecidability.”86 The signature is an impotentiality that permits potentiality to be altered 
through a movement to actuality (without actuality being a semiotic fullness). This 
movement brings two major Agambenian concepts together: the logic of potentiality 
(which includes impotentiality) and the ontology of potential.87 
 
The common-proper relationship is also at work within the relationship between paradigms 
and a signature. The metaphysical tradition presents any concept as a split structure (or as 
a bi-conceptual structure) between two heterogeneous elements: the common 
(unconditional power, founding element, signature) and the proper (singularity, a series of 
subsequent, dependent elements or paradigms, what's founded), which appears to actualize 
this original element. Thus, research into a certain phenomenon reveals a multiplicity of 
paradigms that can be organized under a single overarching concept (signature) such as 
power, language, potentiality, poetry, life, etc. 
 
85 The idea that the signature is a pure, historical, and self-referential element brings to mind Pierre 
Nora’s conception of “Lieu de mémoire” (Site of Memory), according to which a site of memory does not 
have a reference in reality; in other words, it is the reference of itself, a sign that points merely to itself as a 
sign in its pure state. This does not mean, according to Nora, that a site of memory lacks content, physical 
presence, or history, but what constitutes it as a site of memory is also the same thing that “de-historicizes” 
it as such. Thus, a site of memory is of a twofold character: a site of excess, sealed within itself, within its 
identity, folded around its name, and simultaneously attentive to reverberated space of its meaning. (Nora, 
Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past.) 
86 Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method, 37. 
87 Collili, Agamben and the Signature of Astrology: Spheres and Potentiality, 8. 
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 This structure is illogical, paradoxical, and self-negating due to the common’s self-
founding fiction of presence. For example, what seems to be the founding element of the 
law is a product of the law itself. The common founds the realm of the proper, which itself 
invents the constant need for a fiction of foundation through the modes of its operation. 
 Our ability to distinguish between the common and the proper becomes confused 
in a space that Agamben constitutes as a zone of indifference. There, we can no longer 
point to that which is the common and that which is the proper, and which one of them is 
the founding element. At this place, the energy of this dialectical system is eliminated 
because it depends on oppositional difference. This could be said to be the case for any 
metaphysical concept of Western thought, since any concept is traditionally split, as we 
state above, into two elements (common-proper). A system that depends on the common-
proper distinction becomes inoperative once this distinction breaks down. The signature is 
the act of presenting as necessary what is, in fact, an historical contingency, thus rendering 
it inoperative (in other words, rendering Metaphysics indifferent)—and such escape from 
false necessities—is Agamben’s aim.88 
 Thus, this structure can become inoperative by (1) showing that its illogical; (2) 
 
88 In this sense, Agamben’s methodology has a very precise and ambitious aim—to paradigmatically trace 
the arches, as identity-difference constructs (or signatures), in order to suspend them, and thus to render 
historiography (as a mode of metaphysical signature) indifferent; or in other words, to render indifferent the 
two oppositional methods of Western epistemological thought: logical deduction and empirical induction. 
Agamben’s methodology tries to go beyond the metaphysics of presence and difference through an 
archeological excavation of paradigms; thus, through the exposition of paradigmatic order and its signatory 
distribution (through common-proper dialectics), it tries to render inoperative the conditioning, binary logic 
of Western thought. Moreover, Agamben’s claim that all concepts (signatures) are historically contingent 
and not logically necessary also applies to the very concept of “difference.” Thus the “common” and the 
“proper” are not actual, existent ontological or transcendent states, but a result of the philosophy of difference. 
In contrast to the somewhat overly common interpretation of Agamben’s aim, his work (in my view) does 
not offer merely a negative or nihilistic critique, but wishes to constitute an epistemology that tries to allow 
us to see things differently than we are usually forced to. 
 Another way to speak about Agamben’s attempt to articulate a philosophy that is based on a different 
type of logic is perhaps offered by David Kishik in his book on Agamben. He writes: “Though he usually 
immerses himself in meticulous and systematic scholarly studies, Agamben likes to present his findings in 
the form of miniature sketches, images, or scenes—each of which can stand both still and alone. When he 
collects these vignettes into a monograph, they sometimes resemble a flip book, which gives the fleeting 
illusion of a moving image by the quick turn of the pages with the thumb and index finger. ... Agamben 
speaks about ‘brachylogy as a form of philosophy’ without developing this idea any further. Brachylogy 
comes from the Greek brakhus and logos, or ‘short speech.’... But if we consider this concept in logical rather 
than grammatical terms, ... [B]rachylogy could also be said to stand for a form of philosophy without logical 
operations (not, and, or, if/then).... This is ... that his thought does not pretend to lead us from point A to point 
B by means of an argumentative apparatus.” (Kishik, The Power of Life, 62–63.) 
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demonstrating that every concept, being historically contingent, operates as a founding 
fiction of oppositional division, but nonetheless has an origin that can be revealed and thus 
will become inoperative; and (3) identifying the constant communication between the 
common and the proper (the identity-difference opposition), and the way to suspend the 
difference between them. Nonetheless, Agamben’s attempt to free our intelligibility from 
our dependency on the structure of identity-difference does not necessitate the messianic 
future return to an ideal state of pre-divisive unity. 
[Continue Reading]
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 [First Beginning] אֹ 
It should be noted that in an earlier text Kant argued that a history of the first development 
of any phenomenon that has its original predisposition “in the nature of the human being” 
(reason, freedom, etc.) is fundamentally different from the history of the phenomenon “in 
its progression, which can be grounded only on records.”89 Attempts to outline the first 
beginning of a certain (natural) historical phenomenon may legitimately include [the 
insertion of] conjectures regarding the phenomenon’s arche, “insofar as nature makes it,”90 
since it can be based on experience as we assume it “was not better or worse than what we 
encounter now,” thus the beginning need not be invented by fiction. This, however, will be 
an illegitimate act in relation to outlining the first beginning of the history of human deeds 
since “to let a history arise simply and solely from conjectures does not seem much better 
than to make the draft for a novel.”91 92 
[Continue Reading]
 
89 Kant, “Conjectural beginning of human history (1786),” 163. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
92 For a complementary discussion of the end of all things and phenomena (and therefore of history), 
see Kant, “The End of All Things (1794)”. 
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 [The Before of the Book] אֹ 
“To let a history [of human deeds] arise simply and solely from conjectures does not seem 
much better than to make the draft for a novel.”93 
 In his relatively short meditations on literature, compiled under The Fire and the 
Tale, Agamben refers to Roland Barthes. Referring to any creative work, Barthes highlights 
the problem of the relation between “the fantasy of the novel” and the preparatory notes 
and fragments, and about the similar relation between the fragmented novel and the proper 
novel. The period that precedes the finished work is named by Agamben, paraphrasing 
Barthes, as “the before of the book”94—a limbo, pre- or sub-world of fantasies, sketches, 
notes, copybooks, drafts, and blotters.95 The problem with this world, according to Barthes, 
is that it is “poorly defined, and poorly studied”; to that Agamben adds that our culture is 
not able to give it “a legitimate status nor an adequate graphic design.”96 The reason for 
this cultural situation stems from the thesis, put forward by Agamben, that “our idea of 
creation and work is encumbered with the theological paradigm of the divine creation of 
the world,” according to which the world was created ex nihilo in an incomparable manner, 
and not only that, but was also instantaneously accomplished without hesitation and 
through an immediate act of the will. God thus had no preparatory draft nor initial matter 
for creation; and in fact, the very problem of the “before of the creation” is, in theology, a 
forbidden topic.97  In Romanticism we find the idea that fragments and outlines were 
superior to the completed work, and for this reason writers intentionally left their writings 
 
93 Kant, “Conjectural beginning of human history (1786),” 163. 
94 Agamben, The Fire and the Tale, 84. 
95 Perhaps the most outstanding example for that, in modern literature, is by another author closely 
related to Agamben’s thought—Walter Benjamin. Volume IV of Benjamin’s Gesammelte Schriften 
(Collected Writings) presents a mass of preparatory notes, quotations, photographic and bibliographic 
citations that were collected in preparation for his Arcades Project, and were never assembled into coherent, 
finished narratives. 
96 Agamben, The Fire and the Tale, 84. 
97 The theological traditions, both Christian and Jewish, refer to this problem. In the Christian tradition 
(having a Platonic origin and exerting its profound influence on the Renaissance conception of artistic 
creation) God always had an “outline” of the “ideas of all the creatures he then created,” (Ibid, 85) always 
possesses something that precedes creation, an immemorial “before” the work that was eventually 
accomplished in the biblical Hexameron. The Cabalistic tradition understands creation ex nihilo to mean that 
nothingness is the matter with which God made its creation, that the divine work “is literally made of 
nothing.” (Ibid.) 
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in a fragmented form.98 The way in which we conceive the identity of the work has 
transformed radically in recent decades, a tendency that can be witnessed in the field of 
“ecdotics” (the science that deals with the edition of texts) where, in comparison with the 
past when the aim was the reconstruction of a single definitive critical text, nowadays we 
encounter the reproduction of all the layers of the manuscript without distinguishing the 
different versions. Thus the “text” becomes an infinite temporal process, towards both past 
and future, whose interruption at a certain historical point is purely contingent.99 The 
caesura that ends the drafting of the work does not confer on it a privileged status of 
completeness; it just constitutes it as another fragment of a potentially infinite creative 
process. The “so called completed work is distinguished only accidentally from the 
uncompleted one.” If each version of the work is a fragment, we can speak also about “the 
after of the book,” that is, the process of retraction to previous “finished” works and the 
reworking of them in order to amend their flaws or clarify their meanings and aims.100 This 
is the other side of the theological paradigm of divine creation according to which creation 
is an infinite continuous process that, if stopped by God, will be destroyed. 
 The ontological status of the book and the work is governed by insufficient 
categories that our culture has accustomed us to think with. From Aristotle onwards, 
according to Agamben, we think of the work (ergon) by relating two concepts: potentiality 
and actuality, virtual and real. We tend to think the potential and virtual as the “before of 
the work” that precedes the actual and real (completed) work. This means that in notes or 
outlines “potentiality has not been transferred to the act ... [and thus remains] unrealized 
and uncompleted.”101 But, Agamben asks, “[I]s it not the case that every book contains a 
remainder of potentiality, without which its reading and reception would be impossible?” 
A work whose creative potentiality was totally exhausted would not be work but “ashes 
and sepulcher of the work.” If an author can go back to his work, the reason is not, like the 
Romantics believed, that the fragments are more important than the work itself, but that 
 
98 This idea is described in Edgar Wind’s essay “Critique of Connoisseurship” (Wind, Art and 
Anarchy, 30–46.) 
99 In accordance with Cézanne’s formula that “one never finishes a painting, but simply abandons it.” 
(Agamben, The Fire and the Tale, 89.) 
100 Augustine’s Retractationes (of 427) and Nietzsche’s Ecce Homo (of 1888) are just two of the most 
famous examples. 
101 Agamben, The Fire and the Tale, 93. 
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the experience of matter (or for the ancients, potentiality) is immediately perceivable in 
them. 
 The implications of the materiality of the book are vast and extend to both historical 
directions. The book as we know it today appeared in Europe between the fourth and the 
fifth century. The codex (technical term for book, introduced with Christianity) replaces 
the volumen and the scroll (the norm in Antiquity). The disappearance of the volume also 
reflects the conflict between the church and the synagogue: the Torah as a volumen as 
opposed to the New Testament as a book (a shape no different than any profane book). The 
codex introduces the page which was a real material and spiritual revolution for the West. 
The unrolling of the volume revealed a homogeneous and continuous space, while the 
codex presents a discontinued, delimited unity. This implies a different conception of time: 
from the cyclical (of Antiquity) to the linear (of the Christian world). Time of reading 
reproduces the time of life.102 
[Continue Reading]
 
102 For a detailed discussion of how in the early centuries AD the roll was replaced as the vehicle for 
literature by the codex, see Roberts and Skeat, The Birth of the Codex. 
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 [Dishomogeneity] אֹ 
The idea of “essential dishomogeneity” mirrors the old philosophical problem of 
discontinuity. From its ontological perspective, we recall Jabès’ view of the break as “the 
source of all things”. In the context of the following discussion, that is, a Foucauldian 
epistemological context, the problem of discontinuity establishes the background against 
which Foucault’s archeology (and later genealogy) must be thought, since his selection of 
different “moments” and the concentration on precise historical timeframes serve as the 
essential support for his analyses. The discontinuity element of Foucault’s archeology 
(which is characterized as Foucault’s research methodology at least up until the beginning 
of the 1970s) designates not a historical investigation in the formal sense (a reconstitution 
of a historical field, outlining the continuous evolution of ideas), but, by bringing together 
diverse dimensions together, an attempt to “obtain the conditions of emergence of 
discourses of knowledge in general in a given epoch.”103 Such an attempt emphasizes the 
emergence of the new rather than the rediscovery of former conditions of possibility: “It is 
a discourse of historical emergence rather than philosophical origin.”104 
[Continue Reading]
 
103 Howard, “Archeology and/or Genealogy: Agamben’s Transformation of Foucauldian Method,” 41. 
104 Lawlor, The Cambridge Foucault Lexicon, 201. 
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 [Genealogy] אֹ 
I 
In “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” Genealogy is described as “gray, meticulous, and 
patiently documentary. ... [It is a practice that] must record the singularity of events outside 
of any monotonous finality; must seek them in the most unpromising places, in what we 
tend to feel is without history.”105 Foucault distinguishes, among the terms employed by 
Nietzsche, between Ursprung (which is reserved, somewhat ironically, for “origin” albeit 
negatively) and the two terms that are more exact than Ursprung in recording the true 
object of Genealogy: Herkunft (“descent”) and Entstehung (“emergence, the moment of 
arising”).106 
 The Genealogist who examines the descent (with its “subtle, subindividual marks”) 
constructs “cyclopean monuments,”107 not by a regression in time in order to restore “an 
unbroken continuity that operates beyond the dispersion of oblivion,” nor by an attempt to 
demonstrate “that the past actively exists in the present, that it continues secretly to animate 
the present,”108 but by revealing “the myriad events through which they were formed,” and 
 
105 Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 369. 
106 Ibid, 373 and 376 respectively. 
107 Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 370. Foucault quotes Nietzsche’s term from The Gay 
Science (1882). 
108  Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 374. Although both Foucault’s and Agamben’s 
Genealogies attempt to offer (among others and in this context) a critique of the present, it seems as if 
Foucault’s critique is driven more by social, political, and historical aspirations rather than by ontological or 
metaphysical ones (in the manner that Agamben seems to attempt, although he does share with Foucault a 
clear, critical aspiration for a political reform that results from a methodological, genealogical intention). 
 However, both thinkers seem to disagree, or at least differ, over the importance of time (its structure and 
the role of its three traditional components of past, present, and future) to the process of Genealogy, whether 
time (in fact, the past) “actively exists in” and “secretly animates” the present (as per Agamben, although as 
we will see later on, he does not consider this past a “usual” past) or functions otherwise (as per Foucault, 
and in accordance with his claims that the Genealogist does not have much interest in restoring discontinuities 
or his wish to maintain the myriad events “in their proper dispersion”). 
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maintaining these events “in their proper dispersion” only to realize that “truth or being 
lies not at the root of what we know and what we are but the exteriority of accidents.”109 
The search for the descent does not wish to secure foundations, but conversely to “disturb 
what was previously considered immobile ...[,] to fragment what was thought unified”110; 
and if the Genealogist “listens to history,” he finds that “there is ‘something altogether 
different’ behind things: not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no 
essence,” that their origin has no inviolable identity. Thus the Genealogist rummages in 
history, in the “concrete body of becoming,” not searching for any “distant ideality of the 
origin”111 as the metaphysician does, but for all the imprints left on the historical body up 
to the point of its destruction. 
 Genealogy (“seen as the examination of Herkunft and Entstehung”112 ), writes 
Foucault, as opposed to history in the traditional sense is, for Nietzsche, a kind of 
“historical sense” that, contrary to a form of history that reintroduces a “suprahistorical 
perspective” and strives for a presentation of completed development based on its “belief 
in eternal truth, the immortality of the soul, and the nature of consciousness as always 
identical to itself,”113 can evade metaphysics if it refuses the certainty of absolutes; but if 
otherwise, if “mastered by suprahistorical perspective,” it can be bent by metaphysics to 
its own purposes. “The traditional device for constructing a comprehensive view of history 
 
 Agamben will assert that Foucault never really questioned the implicit temporal structure of the 
“historical a priori” (Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method, 94), a claim that can further 
illuminate this difference between the two thinkers, at least from the perspective of Agamben’s archeology 
(on the basis, as will become evident later on, of its future anterior’s movement in time). One notices, 
however, that in his work Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, Foucault discusses (to some extent) the 
problem of temporality in relation to Kant’s thought and specifically to the idea of the a priori. There Foucault 
ponders the account of time Kant proposes in the Critique of Pure Reason, “transforming it from a pure form 
of intuition—a transcendental condition of all possible experience that can be known a priori—to a dispersed 
framework that ‘harbors and reveals’ relationships that are both ‘openings’ and ‘bond’.” (Foucault, 
Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, 92.) Assuming that the original form of the a priori is this dispersed 
temporality, then “it is reasonable to assume that Foucault found something like the historical a priori in his 
studies of temporality in Kant’s Anthropology.” (McQuillan, “Philosophical Archeology and the Historical 
A Priori: From Kant to Foucault,” 152.) In other words, Foucault seems to defend the view that Kant’s a 
priori is originally temporal, and that in its temporal form “the a priori disperses the synthetic activity of 
transcendental subjectivity.” (Ibid, 156.) 
109 Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 374. 
110 Ibid, 374–375. 
111 Ibid, 373. 
112 Ibid, 379. 
113 Ibid. 
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and for retracing the past as a patient and continuous development must be systematically 
dismantled.” 114  Historical sense, as opposed to a historical tradition that aims at 
“dissolving the singular event into an ideal continuity,” deals with events “in terms of their 
most unique characteristics, their most acute manifestations.”115 
 
II 
For Foucault, one of Genealogy’s leading goals is to show specifically how the various 
“ways of life” come to be as they are and how they oppressively marginalize other people. 
The context of Entstehung (“emergence, the moment of arising”) is that of power 
dynamics, systems of subjection and dominations, and it is “always produced in a particular 
state of forces” 116  where a battle was won against certain concrete conditions: 
“[e]mergence is thus the entry of forces.” 117  A second leading goal is to develop 
interruptive knowledges that can lead to liberating options for those marginalized people. 
Having its roots in Nietzsche’s thought, Foucault’s Genealogy accepts the former’s insight 
that “formations of knowledge and values are always also formations of power (in 
Foucault’s jargon, formations of power relations)” 118 ; thus knowledge creation is a 
phenomenon that must be described in terms of power. Archeological and genealogical 
studies are not mutually exclusive in Foucault’s view; rather their different emphases are 
mutually supportive (“Archeology focuses on the emergence and formation of various 
mutational, regulatory, and guiding structures. ... Genealogy focuses on relations of power 
and their dynamic mode of operation”)119 120, thus Foucault’s Genealogy has both political 
and ethical dimensions. 
 
114 Ibid, 380. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid, 376. 
117 Ibid, 377. 
118 Lawlor, The Cambridge Foucault Lexicon, 165–174. 
119 Ibid, 170. 
120 Foucault’s methodological critique (and the relationship between his conceptions of archeology and 
genealogy) is likewise referred to as follows: “Rather than transcendental, the criticism will be archeological 
in its method and genealogical in purposes. The term ‘genealogy’, clearly derives from Nietzsche, becomes 
necessary to the completion of the ‘excavation’ carried out in the universalizing mechanisms of our 
knowledge in the search of what is contingent and empirical in them.... The conclusion will be, as we read in 
the introduction to L’usage des plaisirs (published in 1984, the year of Foucault’s untimely death): finally 
‘free thought from what it silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently’.” (Malinconico, “The Concept 
of Philosophical Archeology in Kant and Foucault,” 64–65). 
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 Stephen Howard reflects upon the relation between archeology and genealogy in 
Foucault as well as in Agamben, in an attempt to articulate the influence of Foucault’s 
method on Agamben’s work (especially since the latter formally declares such influence, 
being a stepping stone for his own methodology, in the preface to The Signature of All 
Things). 
 Howard’s argument 121  is as follows: although Agamben claims to develop 
Foucault’s archeological and genealogical methodology at large (mainly in Foucault’s 
works on governmentality, power and biopolitics), the fact is that Agambenian 
methodology deviates significantly from Foucault’s. 
 In Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France 1970–1971 (which 
marks Foucault’s methodological shift around 1976), Foucault defines Genealogy as the 
coupling together of the two elements of what he terms “subjugated knowledge,” that is, 
the buried historical conditions of possibilities of modern institutions (on the one hand) and 
disqualified knowledge of marginalized subjects (on the other hand). This coupling of, in 
other words, scholarly erudition and local memories “allows us to constitute a historical 
knowledge of struggles and to make use of that knowledge in contemporary tactics.”122 
The aim of Foucault’s Genealogy is to de-subjugate historical knowledges, to reactivate 
local knowledges against scientific hierarchization of knowledge, to free subjugated 
knowledge from its marginalized position and reactivate it for political ends. Foucault 
succinctly summarizes the relation between archeology and genealogy: “Archeology is the 
method specific to the analysis of local discursivities, and genealogy is the tactic which, 
once it has described these local discursivities, brings into play the subjugated knowledges 
that have been released from them.”123 Genealogy demands relentless erudition because it 
first requires archeology’s technical analysis; and after the analysis unveils the buried 
conditions of what had become the norm, genealogy then connects this analysis to the 
reactivation of marginalized knowledge. Foucault, as we have seen, builds upon 
Nietzsche’s idea of Entstehung by claiming that Entstehung is the “entry of forces” and 
 
121 Howard, “Archeology and/or Genealogy: Agamben’s Transformation of Foucauldian Method,” 27–
45. 
122 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 8. 
123 Ibid, 10–11. 
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“play of dominations,”124 thus norms have history and arise in particular contexts. The 
insurrection of subjugated knowledge made possible by the genealogical combination of 
archeological erudition and a politically motivated reactivation of marginalized 
knowledge.125 
 Throughout his entire œuvre and specifically in The Signature of All Things, 
Agamben conflates archeology and genealogy; and his understanding of these terms 
distances his methodology from Foucault’s. Although Agamben claims that their 
methodologies differ only in terms of the length of the historical shadow rather than in 
anything essential and intrinsic to their corresponding methodologies, it seems as if 
Agamben remains, methodologically, within the archeological period of Foucault’s 
thought. Agamben’s patient scholarly attention to literary sources and manuscripts amounts 
to Foucault’s idea of the work of the archeologist. If this is true, asks Howard, can Agamben 
“be accused of ultimately indulging in what Foucault called the ‘great, tender, and warm 
freemasonry of useless erudition’?”126 His answer is no; and to demonstrate this, he looks 
into Agamben’s method as manifested in The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and Form-
of-Life, highlighting the political significance of Agamben’s conflation of archeology and 
genealogy (and thus showing that he is not merely an archeologist in Foucault’s sense). 
 Agamben’s work in The Highest Poverty demonstrates that he does not subsume 
genealogy under archeology, but draws the two methods into equivalence or understands 
them as indistinct. In this book, Agamben had a political ambition—to return to a path not 
taken in the history of the West, to reactivate a conception of “use” that was available to 
the Franciscans but which they failed to develop. He accomplishes this through an 
archeological reading of texts, a scholarly operation that should be in itself political. In 
what manner is this operation political? The answer lies, according to Howard, in the 
methodological importance of Benjamin to the Agambenian method (even though it might 
 
124 Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 377. 
125 Agamben, as we will see, stresses the temporal issue and puts an emphasis on Foucault’s discussion 
of emergence (Entstehung), citing Franz Overbeck as the source to Foucault’s replacement of “origin” with 
“emergence.” Prehistory, Agamben will claim, is “the history of the moment of arising” 
[Entstehungsgeschichte (Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method, 85)], thus Overbeck’s idea of 
prehistory amounts to Foucault’s historical a priori in terms of being that which conditions knowledge in a 
given historical epoch. 
126 Howard, “Archeology and/or Genealogy: Agamben’s Transformation of Foucauldian Method,” 35. 
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seem, in The Signature of All Things, that Foucault has the most significant influence; thus 
Foucault is less the source of Agamben’s method than the subject of interpretation). 
 Benjamin provides not only Agamben’s undiscussed methodological principle (as 
stated in the introduction to The Signature of All Things), but also the key to Agamben’s 
interpretation of the Foucauldian method. Agamben’s Benjaminian principle of 
“messianic-time” or “now-time” (explained and elaborated in a later part of this thesis) 
entails that archeology (the patient, erudite attention to dusty texts) can itself have political 
effects, thus no further genealogical step is required (in contrast to Foucault’s approach 
that combines, in his Genealogy, archeological erudition with the reactivation of 
marginalized knowledge). Howard writes: “In Agamben’s conflation of Foucault’s 
archeology and genealogy, subjugated knowledges are reactivated not through genealogies 
of modern institutions and forms of knowledge; but through the archeological analysis 
itself.”127  Agamben and Foucault differ in their account of the forces of history: for 
Foucault these are contingent forces, which determine the historical shift in the meaning of 
our notions, real forces that are the struggle of power; for Agamben the force of history is 
not a real, historical struggle over meaning, but rather the force of the arche (as origin) 
itself, which is neither chronological nor empirical. Agamben’s archeology and genealogy 
is thus an interpretation of Foucault’s methodology conditioned by the influence of 
Benjamin. Agamben’s (Benjaminian) interpretations of the methodologies of archeology 
and genealogy conflate what in Foucault are two distinct approaches. Foucault’s 
Genealogy aims for a more direct political intervention than his archeology by “saving” 
oppressed knowledge, while Agamben’s detailed readings manifest an archeological 
method that intends to be in itself political without the need for a further genealogical step. 
Although Agamben considers Foucault and Overbeck to be his sources for the concepts of 
“origin” and “emergence,” which underpin his philosophical methodology, Howard’s 
claim is that they stem more from Benjamin (specifically Benjamin’s idea of “messianic-
time” and the eruption of the past into the present in an object’s “now if knowability”). 
Agamben’s methodological transformation of Foucault requires the acceptance of 
Benjamin’s conception of history if it is to share the political ambitions of Foucault’s 
 
127 Ibid, 41. 
 
 
42 
Genealogy. 
[Continue Reading]
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 [arche] אֹ 
I 
In Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit 
(originally published, in French, in 1947 as Introduction à la lecture de Hegel), Alexandre 
Kojève puts forth the somewhat ironic idea that Homo sapiens has reached a final moment 
in its history in which there are only two possible options left open for it: on one hand, the 
“Post-Historical Animality” exemplified, according to Kojève, by the American way of life 
(this was just an ironical-metaphysical remark) and, on the other hand, what he called 
“Japanese Snobbism,” by which he meant a continuation of historical rituals devoid of any 
historical content.128 We can try to imagine a third possibility of a relation to the past 
beyond Kojève’s two suggestions, one in which a culture remains human, even after its 
history has supposedly finished, because it is able to confront its own history in its totality, 
and find a new life in it. This is a conception that finds a historical phenomenon most 
interesting and alive when it is, in fact, finished. Once the history had reached its 
fulfillment, it can gain a new life precisely because one has managed to remain in the 
correct relationship with it, thus the ability to remain in a relation to the past means it is 
still alive and becomes present again. 
 
II 
This idea approximately resembles Walter Benjamin’s idea of “the now of legibility” or 
“the now of knowability.” Agamben explores this Benjaminian concept in relation to the 
arche (or the origin) in his essay “Walter Benjamin and the Demonic: Happiness and 
Historical Redemption,”129 where two forms of historical consciousness are depicted: one 
that understands all human work (and the past) as an origin destined to an infinite process 
of transmission “that preserves its intangible and mythic singularity”; the other, as the 
inverted specular image of the first, liquidates and flattens out the singularity of the origin 
“by forever multiplying copies and simulacra.”130 These attitudes are not in opposition but 
 
128 For a further discussion see Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, 60–62; and 
Agamben, Creation and Anarchy, 1. 
129 Agamben, Potentialities, 138–59. 
130 Ibid, 155. 
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rather are two faces of a cultural tradition in which the content of transmission and 
transmission itself are so irreparably fractured that this tradition can only ever repeat the 
origin infinitely or annul it in simulacra. The origin itself can be neither fulfilled nor 
mastered, the idea of the origin contains both singularity and reproducibility, and as long 
as one of them remains in force, writes Agamben, “every intention to overcome both is 
doomed to fail.”131 It is as if for Benjamin the revolutionary value that is implicit in the 
image of the eternal return can exasperate mythical repetition up to the point of bringing it 
to a halt. 
 In his book The Origin of the German Tragic Drama, Benjamin conceives of the 
origin not as a logical category but as a historical one: 
 
Origin [Ursprung], although an entirely historical category, has, 
nevertheless, nothing to do with genesis [Entstehung]. The term origin is 
not intended to describe the process by which the existent came into being, 
but rather to describe that which emerges from the process of becoming and 
disappearance. Origin is an eddy in the stream of becoming, and in its 
current it swallows the material involved in the process of genesis. That 
which is original is never revealed in the naked and manifest existence of 
the factual; its rhythm is apparent only to a dual insight. On the one hand it 
needs to be recognized as a process of restoration and re-establishment, but, 
on the other hand, and precisely because of this, as something imperfect and 
incomplete. There takes place in every original phenomenon a 
determination of the form in which an idea will constantly confront the 
historical world, until it is revealed fully, in the totality of its history. ... The 
category of the origin is not ... a purely logical one, but a historical one.132 
 
 
131 Ibid. 
132 Quoted in Agamben, Potentialities, 156. 
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The idea of origin here is tangential to Goethe’s concept of Urphänomen:133 it is not a 
factual event nor a mythical archetype, but rather a vortex in the stream of becoming, 
manifesting itself through a double structure of restoration and incompleteness. In the 
origin, there is a dialectic that reveals every original phenomenon to be a reciprocal 
conditioning of “onceness” and repetition. In every original phenomenon, what is at play 
is an Idea that confronts the historical world until it is completed in the totality of its history 
(the theory of origin is tied to the theory of Idea).134 
 Benjamin speaks about his concept of origin as a transposition of Goethe’s 
Urphänomen (which belongs to the domain of nature) to the domain of history; in other 
words, origin is in effect the concept of Urphänomen extracted from the pagan context of 
nature and brought into the Jewish context of history. 
 Benjamin’s explicit morphological awareness enables him to oppose the historical-
chronological genesis to the morphological origin. This opposition highlights a possible 
polar tension working within the concept of temporality and/or that of history: on one hand, 
there is the historical dream of the traditional, historical quest for the first element of the 
 
133  Goethe’s morphology, emanated from his research on nature (which is as important as his literary 
research or poetic work), is conceived via three domains: Botanics (The Metamorphosis of Plants of 1790); 
Osteology (First Draft of a General Introduction to Comparative Anatomy of 1795); and Theory of Colours 
(Theory of Colours of 1810). Common to all these domains is a particular way of seeing, a certain taming of 
the gaze exemplified by the following maxim (#1137): “The highest stage is seeing as identical what is 
different.” (Goethe, Maxim and Reflections, 141). The form (the “morpheme”) is not only a visible object, 
but also the visible phenomenon and the ideal structure within it. It is the condition of possibility inherent to 
the phenomenon itself. This is the famous concept of Urphänomen—a theme that is visible only through its 
infinite variations. In the botanical realm, Goethe refers to the Urphänomen in Kantian terms, calling it a 
“transcendental leaf” (one cannot present a manifestation of a transcendental structure but can nevertheless 
recognize it in all botanic phenomena as the theme of their variations); in the osteological realm, the 
Urphänomen is the “original vertebra” whose transformation gives existence to all possible forms of bones, 
including the skull. 
 Goethe’s morphological gaze exerted its influence also on the humanities at large, becoming a 
methodological model in the 1920s. A few examples include: Oswald Spenglers’ cultural morphology of The 
Decline of the West; Lucian Blaga’s Original Phenomenon; Ernst Cassirer’s Philosophy of Symbolic Forms; 
André Jolles’ Simple Forms; Vladimir Propp’s Morphology of the Folktale; and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s 
anthropological Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough. These studies share a common feature—a consideration 
of the relationship between the ideal and the phenomenal level, not as a mutual opposition but as mutual 
codetermination, a reciprocal relationship between idea and phenomenon or empirical level. (Minotti, “Origin 
vs Genesis: Warburg and Benjamin in the Footsteps of Goethe's Morphology.”) 
134 In this theory, the exposition of the Ideas and the salvation of the phenomena are simultaneous and 
merge in a single gesture. In philosophy, for Benjamin, the concept of Being (at issue in the Idea) is not 
satisfied by the phenomenon until it has consumed all its history, thus the phenomenon does not remain the 
same (as singularity) but becomes what it was not (totality). “To save phenomena in the Idea (to expose the 
Idea in phenomena),” writes Agamben, “is to show them in their historical consumption, as a fulfilled totality. 
To show this in the work of art is the task of criticism.” (Agamben, Potentialities, 157.) 
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iconic linear chain from which every other element can be drawn through proper 
transformation; on the other hand, the morphological gaze presents a radial structure where 
the various manifestations gather around the Urphänomen in a non-linear manner.  
 Agamben revisits the Benjaminian concept of the origin-as-vortex in “Vortexes,”135 
beginning with a similar, slightly deviated statement: 
 
The origin [Ursprung] stands in the flux of becoming as a vortex and rips 
into its rhythm the material of emergence [Entstehung]. ... On the one hand, 
that which is original wants to be recognized as restoration and 
reestablishment, but, on the other hand, and precisely because of this, as 
something incomplete and unconcluded. There takes place in every original 
phenomenon a determination of the figure in which an idea will constantly 
confront the historical world. Origin is not, therefore, discovered by the 
examination of actual findings, but it is related to their pre- and post-history. 
The category of origin is not therefore, as Cohen holds, a purely logical one, 
but a historical one.136 
 
Origin, for Benjamin, does not precede phenomenon’s becoming nor is separated from its 
chronology; and although it autonomously dwells in it, it also and at the same time derives 
its matter from it. Origin accompanies historical becoming, and like a vortex, is still present 
in it. The whirling origin that archeological investigation tries to reach, writes Agamben, 
is an arche, a “historical a priori that remains immanent to becoming and continues to act 
in it. Even in the course of our life, the vortex of the origin remains present until the end 
and silently accompanies our existence at every moment.”137 For Agamben, the “correct” 
relation to the past138—this dialectic in the origin—echoes the arche in archeology, which 
 
135 Agamben, The Fire and the Tale, 57–62. 
136 Ibid, 58–59. 
137 Ibid, 59–60. Likewise, relating (in a few pages earlier) to the becoming of man, or subjectivity, 
Agamben writes: “In an important book, Simondon wrote that man is, as it were, a two-phased being, which 
results from the dialectic between a non-individuated part and an individual and personal part. The pre-
individual is not a chronological past that, at a certain point, is realized and resolved in the individual: it 
coexists with in and remains irreducible to it.” (Ibid, 44.) 
138  A relation to the past can yield a characterization of the whole category of “Identity.” Identity does 
not necessarily mean a substantial concept, just a temporal relation to the past, something that has to do 
merely with time. A relation to the past implies a certain temporal structure; a relation to one’s past implies 
a certain movement in time, and only this movement is important (not the fact that time is supposedly 
comprised of three elements, past, present, and future). (See Shlomo Pines, La Liberté de Philosopher: De 
Maïmonide à Spinoza.) Pines’ idea deprives the movement to the past from any substantiality (political, 
cultural, etc.), and just considers the simple movement in time (to the past) as being constitutive for man, and 
the only essential element. 
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is not simply a historical fact that exhausts itself (as it is situated in a chronology) nor a 
meta-historical archetype, but something immanent within history, internal to it, which 
cannot coincide with a precise chronological moment nor is simply a historical fact given 
in chronology. 
 
III 
This conception is evident in the arche’s double meaning (in Greek)139 which has its origin 
in the theological idea according to which God created the world but also continuously 
governs it. The word arche entered philosophical language approximately with Plato and 
Aristotle. Aristotle historically innovated the use of the concept in the sense of uniting both 
meanings into the same single abstract concept, and until the end of antiquity it remained 
“a technical term for designating the constitutive, abstract, and irreducible element in 
being, becoming, and knowing,”140 an abstract element that cannot be surpassed. The 
doctrine of origin, for Aristotle, “is a doctrine of a material substance from which things 
arise in order to return to it as to their primordial element,”141 but the arche itself is not an 
entity (nor supreme being) that creates and governs change, “but only the common trait of 
the different types of causes.”142 
 
 Jewish identity, according to Pines, should be regarded more as a problem rather than a fact, since 
identity is no longer a substance that one can define and limit, but a complicated lace among cultures. In other 
words, Jewish identity is not a continuity, but a lace that each time is woven among different cultures. This 
theory can be applied to any cultural identity, and nowadays in Europe the issue of continuity (as part of the 
identity of cultures) is a problem and should not be taken for granted or as a given. Cultural identity in present-
day Europe is, as we witness, discontinuous and fragile. 
139 “The term archè in Greek means both ‘origin’ and ‘command.’ To this double meaning of the term 
there corresponds the fact that, in our philosophical and religious traditions alike, origin, what gives a 
beginning and brings into being, is not only a preamble, which disappears and ceases to act in that to which 
it has given life, but is also what commands and governs its growth, development, circulation, and 
transmission—in a word, its history.” (Agamben, The Use of Bodies, 275; Agamben, The Omnibus Homo 
Sacer, 1276.) See also Agamben, Creation and Anarchy, 51–54. 
 In “On the Being and Conception of Physis,” Heidegger writes that the Greeks usually hear two things 
in the word arche: “[T]hat from which something takes it egress and inception,” and at the same time, “that 
which, as such egress and inception, at the same time reaches beyond whatever emerges from it, thereby 
dominating it.” (Heidegger, “On the Being and Conception of Physis,” 227.) Arche thus means both inception 
and domination inseparably. 
140 Schürmann, Heidegger On Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy, 97. In the domain of 
being, the arche is a substance that begins and commands everything; in the domain of becoming, the archai 
are the causes; and in the domain of knowledge, they are the premises on which cognition depends. 
141 Ibid, 99. 
142 Ibid, 105. 
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 In the second half of the twentieth century, three important attempts were made to 
theoretically wedge this dual meaning of the arche. The first was that of Reiner Schürmann 
in his interpretation of Heidegger in Heidegger On Being and Acting: From Principals to 
Anarchy (Le principe d’anarchie: Heidegger et la question de l’agir, 1982). He tried to 
separate the two meanings of the arche, to reach an arche only as a pure coming to being 
(to the present) without any pretention of commanding an historical development. This is, 
according to Schürmann, an anarchical interpretation of Heidegger, as Heidegger (perhaps 
paradoxically) was trying to reach an anarchical principle that would not command any 
historical development. The second attempt (and second interpretation of Heidegger) was 
that of Derrida, and his idea/methodology of deconstruction. He also tried to separate the 
origin from its commanding function, but unlike Schürmann, who opposed the two, Derrida 
put in question the notion of the origin. For Derrida there is no origin, only trace, but 
precisely because of that, one can infinitely deconstruct. The third possibility of dealing 
with this dichotomy or duality comes from Foucault and his idea of the historical a priori: 
Foucault’s critique of the origin in history and the favouring of the idea of the “point of 
emergence,” that is, the point when something appears with no consequences or aspirations 
of commandment. He draws this idea most probably from Husserl’s in Origin of Geometry, 
but while for Husserl this idea (of the historical a priori) means a universal category, for 
Foucault this implies a very concrete meaning (for example, the Indo-European language 
as an historical a priori: it is a priori because it makes understandable concrete historical 
phenomenon, and it is historical not because we have a written evidence of its existence 
but because we have to presuppose that it had existed). 
 
IV 
The earlier remark that the word arche was introduced into philosophical jargon roughly 
in the times of Plato and Aristotle requires slight amendment, since one can retrace its 
appearance even farther back in time. In his essay on the arche (and its relation to the 
apeiron, the infinity, and the current socio-political order in the West), Stathis Gourgouris 
maintains that the word arche first appears as a philosophical principle in the well-known 
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Anaximander fragment,143 written around 570 BCE (although the word itself is already 
present in textual traces going back to Homer), where it is conjugated with a new concept: 
apeiron (infinity). Reading Anaximander’s fragment, Gourgouris makes the clear 
argument: “[T]he notion of archē (origin and rule) is first used philosophically in order to 
identify what has no origin and no end and over which there can be no rule.”144 He thus 
establishes two essential elements: The first is that the arche is infinite but at the same time 
is understood as the source of all things, a source not external to all things since (as finite 
things) they eventually decay and return to become source again. Source is not Ursprung 
in terms of being the one and only origin, but “an infinite space of interminably enacted 
beginnings of an indefinite array of ‘things’ that have one thing in common: they 
terminate.”145 The apeiron is not only limitless, but also cannot be completed; the infinite 
is also incomplete. Thus, the paradox is that the incomplete/infinite enables the emergence 
of the complete/finite, an emergence that is a disturbance of the infinite, thus “the finitude 
of existence is thus justified by its very violation of the infinite.”146 The infinite (apeiron) 
is not only the unlimited and incomplete, but also whatever exceeds experience (peira) and 
cannot be empirically determined. Thus, the infinite (apeiron) cannot be empirically 
known; it is interminable and indeterminable—it has no telos, no finality, no termination: 
“it lacks de-finition, de-limitation, de-termination.” 147  The second of Gourgouris’s 
elements is that the disturbance of the infinite by finitude also means that the infinite is not 
omnipotent, for it is thus crossed by time. Time decays things and by doing so opens 
infinity to their re-admittance and return; thus, the infinite source is “a sort of repository, a 
burial ground, of what has come into the world and has gone out of it.”148 The condition 
 
143 “Among those who say that the first principle [archē] is one and movable and infinite, is 
Anaximander of Miletus. ... He said that the first principle [archē] and element of all things is infinite 
[apeiron], and he was the first to apply this word to the first principle; and he says that it is neither water nor 
any other one of the thing called elements, but the infinite is something of a different nature, from which 
came all the heavens and the worlds in them; and from which things are generated in their substance and to 
which they return of necessity when they degenerate; ... for he says that they suffer retribution [dikēn] and 
give recourse [tisin] to one another for justice [adikian] according to the order of time ... , putting it rather 
poetically.” (Quoted in Gourgouris, “archē,” 9.) 
144 Gourgouris, “archē,” 9. 
145 Ibid, 10. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid. Ground, writes Gourgouris, is merely metaphorical, for the apeiron rests on nothing and is 
abyssal and void. 
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of things entering the world, and necessarily going out of it, constitutes injustice (adikia). 
In other words, “time itself constitutes an injustice, which the infinite, though an archē, 
can neither overrule nor alleviate.”149 Worldly things unsettle the “cosmic balance” that 
the relation between infinity and time attempts to maintain [that is, infinity holds together 
a balance of contentious forces, where one kratos (power) cannot overcome another], since 
matter is subject to time and thus defies the infinite, but simultaneously, matter returns to 
infinity and thus defies time. “This unsettling of balance, this injustice, is life itself—the 
tragic life, from which there is no redemption.”150 This archaic Ionian imaginary, writes 
Gourgouris, for which finitude itself constitutes an injustice,151 provides justice (dikē) by 
determining that one makes its own limits in the course of life, “while submitting 
unredemptively to the ultimate limit of death.” 152  Throughout man’s life, potentially 
unlimited, one’s infinite imagination partakes in the abyssal infinite, and therefore is 
required to authorize one’s own limits, to create or poietize (poiein) these limits. 
 Gourgouris quotes Jean-Pierre Vernant’s reading of Aristotle 153  regarding the 
apeiron, according to which infinity is not another force in the cosmos, but the intermediary 
between the elements, what exists in the middle (meson) of them: “[T]he mediating space 
of the elements—the medium of a limitless abyssal terrain—on which the limit and capacity 
for self-limitation in every element is tested ... [:] the limitless is a mediatory field that 
enables limits to be self-instituted.”154 Thus, the importance of the middle (meson) is not 
only figurative, as a mediatory space, but should also be considered in geometric terms, as 
a central space from which all elements are equally distanced due to the balance they are 
forced to maintain at all times; the geometrics of meson, of mediation and middle, thus 
“irrevocably alters an understanding of archē as the fixed point of origin and primary 
rule.”155 Not only is the arche not constituted as a primordial whole, but simultaneously it 
 
149 Ibid. 
150 Ibid. 
151 “It is not death that signifies injustice, because this thought leads to the desire for an afterlife. It is 
life itself that signifies injustice because it interrupts the universal infinite fold. Finite creatures come into 
being and then this beautiful and perfect, even if incomplete, infinite is disrupted. Our death is retribution for 
the fact that we have come to be.” (Ibid, 14.) 
152 Ibid, 11. 
153 Vernant, Myth and Thought among the Greeks, 205. 
154 Gourgouris, “archē,” 12. 
155 Ibid, 15. 
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is cleft and permeated, and this condition renders it as a condition of mediation. “The archē 
becomes a shared space of mediation that thereby disrupts the constitution or reconstitution 
of absolute singular (literally monarchical) rule/origin,” and moreover, “the archē’s 
interminable generation from the matrix of the infinite is preserved by finitude, the same 
finitude that its necessity is expressed by the ‘ordinance of time.’”156 
 
V 
In The Use of Bodies, Agamben advances the claim that the structure of the arche, in 
Western culture at large, is determined and constituted by a “structure of exception”; in 
other words, the structure of exception has been revealed more generally to constitute in 
every sphere the structure of the arche. According to this idea, the originary structure of 
Western culture consists in an ex-ceptio, in an inclusive exclusion of human life.157 The 
dialectic of the foundation that defines Western ontology is understood only as the function 
of this exception: “The strategy is always the same: something is divided, excluded, and 
pushed to the bottom, and precisely through this exclusion, it is included as archè and 
foundation.”158 The mechanism159 at work is always the same [whether in relation to the 
juridico-political (State of Exception); or between rule and governance and between 
inoperativity and glory (The Kingdom and the Glory); or between the human being and 
animal (The Open)]: the arche is constituted by dividing the factual experience and pushing 
down to the origin—that is, excluding—one half of it in order then to rearticulate it to the 
other by including it as foundation. Thus, for example, “the city is founded on the division 
of life into bare life and politically qualified life, the human is defined by the exclusion-
inclusion of the animal, the law by the exceptio of anomie, governance through the 
exclusion of inoperativity and its capture in the form of glory.”160 If the structure of the 
 
156 Ibid, 16–17. 
157 In the context of the Homo Sacer project, this was evident in relation to politics, where “life is not 
in itself political—for this reason it must be excluded from the city—and yet it is precisely the exceptio, the 
exclusion-inclusion of this Impolitical, that founds the space of politics.” (Agamben, The Use of Bodies, 263; 
Agamben, The Omnibus Homo Sacer, 1265.) 
158 Agamben, The Use of Bodies, 264; Agamben, The Omnibus Homo Sacer, 1266. 
159 In Agamben, the mechanism of exclusion is constitutively connected to the event of language: the 
ex-ceptio, the inclusive exclusion of the real from the logos and in the logos, is the originary structure of the 
event of language. 
160 Agamben, The Use of Bodies, 265; Agamben, The Omnibus Homo Sacer, 1267. 
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arche of our culture is such, claims Agamben, then philosophical archeology is not a matter 
of thinking new articulations of the two elements (playing them against each other), nor a 
matter of an archeological regression to a more originary beginning: “[P]hilosophical 
archeology cannot reach a beginning other than the one that may perhaps result from the 
deactivation of the machine (in this sense first philosophy is always final philosophy).”161 
 Moreover, according to Agamben, the anarchist tradition and (parts of) twentieth-
century thought are pertinent but insufficient attempts to go back to a historical a priori in 
order to depose it. The practice of the artistic avant-garde and political movements of our 
time was often a miserably failed attempt to actualize a destitution of work, an attempt that 
ended up recreating in every place the museum apparatus and the powers that it pretended 
to depose, “which now appear all the more oppressive insofar as they are deprived of all 
legitimacy.”162 If it is true that the bourgeois is the most anarchic (Benjamin) and that true 
anarchy is that of power (Pasolini), then the thought that seeks to think anarchy (as negation 
of “origin” and “command,” principium and princeps) remains imprisoned in endless 
aporias and contradictions. “Because power is constituted through the inclusive exclusion 
(ex-ceptio) of anarchy, the only possibility of thinking a true anarchy coincides with the 
lucid exposition of the anarchy internal to power. Anarchy is what becomes thinkable only 
 
161 Agamben, The Use of Bodies, 265; Agamben, The Omnibus Homo Sacer, 1267. Colin McQuillan 
advances the claim that, according to Agamben, once one recognizes the structure of inclusion/exclusion that 
operates in our construction of the image of the past, one frees oneself from its supposedly tyrannical 
conditioning for the present moment, no longer understands it as an inheritance that must be carried into the 
future, thus archeology presents the past “as a work of fiction.” (McQuillan, “Philosophical Archeology in 
Kant, Foucault, and Agamben,” 43.) McQuillan mentions the etymological origin of “fiction,” that is, the 
Latin fingere, which means “to touch,” but also “to shape” and “to form” (these being actions at the basis of 
any fiction). This recognition is the concrete meaning of redemption in Agamben, according to McQuillan, 
as it “unworks” the distinctions that organize our life and opens it to new possibilities. 
162 Agamben, The Use of Bodies, 275; Agamben, The Omnibus Homo Sacer, 1275. 
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at the point where we grasp and render destitute the anarchy of power.”163 164 
[Continue Reading]
 
163 Agamben, The Use of Bodies, 275; Agamben, The Omnibus Homo Sacer, 1276. 
164 Agamben thinks the arche, in the anarchic context, also in relation to perhaps two of the most 
anarchic institutions ever to exist—Christianity and Capitalism. The intimate connection Agamben draws 
between Christianity and Capitalism [a parasitical one, in fact, on behalf of the latter which he defines as “a 
religion in which faith—credit—has been substituted for God. Said differently, since the pure form of credit 
is money, it is a religion whose God is money” (Agamben, Creation and Anarchy, 70)] is made to emphasize 
the an-archaic nature of both institutions. This connection, according to Agamben, reveals itself most clearly 
with respect to time and history. Attesting its religious character in any sphere of experience, “Capitalism has 
no telos; it is essentially infinite yet, … always in the act of ending.” (Ibid, 74) Thus, since it can never really 
end, “[C]apitalism also does not know a beginning; it is intimately an-archaic yet, precisely for this reason, 
always in the act of beginning again.” (Ibid, 75) This is the an-archaic, anarchic essential characteristic of 
capitalism, “which is perhaps the most anarchic power ever to exist, in the literal sense that it can have no 
archē, no beginning or foundation.” (Ibid) And lastly, “Capitalism inherits, secularizes, and pushes to the 
extreme the anarchic character of Christology.” (Ibid, 76) 
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 [Archeology] אֹ 
In Thinking Through French Philosophy: The Being of the Question, Leonard Lawlor 
claims that French philosophy in the sixties felt a need to rethink history without end and 
without origin. Perhaps for the first time in the history of philosophy, he writes, an entire 
system of thought was governed by a profound spatiality that came to be known as 
“transcendental topology,” or, in other words, “archeology.”165 
 The word “archeology” belongs (at least philosophically) to Michel Foucault, but 
no less, also to Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who characterized his own thinking using the same 
terminology already in the fifties. Merleau-Ponty’s proximity to Foucault lies in a concern 
for the profound spatiality of “archeology” that is characterized by a lack, gap, hollow, or 
divergence. An increasing distance between them lies in their characterization of this lack 
in terms of transcendence or immanence. Philosophy of immanence is based on three 
propositions: (1) the world is all that exists, is the entirety of existence, and for us, this 
entirety is the only horizon that can be known; (2) existence is the only source to any moral 
decrees, to legitimacy of political power, etc.; and (3) recognizing and assimilating the 
previous two propositions is the only available key for liberation that humans are capable 
of. There exists a philosophy of immanence that we can name “dogmatic” (Spinoza, Hegel, 
or the pantheistic religions are just a few examples) and another that we can name “critical,” 
which first and foremost recognizes human finitude and the incapability of our reason to 
reach the absolute, while recognizing that this immanence is finite rather than infinite. If 
we seriously consider the idea of finite immanence, we must also remain open to a 
dimension of transcendence which appears as a question rather than answer, an empty 
dimension of transcendence devoid of substances or ideas, whose sole function is to reflect 
back at us the sheer fact of the finitude of our existence. One does not address this 
dimension by speech but by silence, and this is where the primary distance between our 
French protagonists fundamentally manifests itself. Despite this distance, both Foucault 
and Merleau-Ponty put the past at the centre of their archeological projects, a past that is 
still effective, still present, a past that “has always already been present,” thus a past that 
 
165 Lawlor, Thinking Through French Philosophy: The Being of the Question, 24–31. 
 
 
55 
was never present, a past free for the future. 
 But as in most cases where we can identify someone who preceded the supposedly 
first one to have conceptualized a certain matter, the case of the kind of past we are here 
interested in is no different. This past is, more or less, what Kant (1724–1804) called “a 
priori,” what Husserl (1859–1938) called “transcendental subjectivity” or 
“Phenomenological Archeology” (including Eugen Fink’s writings on Husserl), and what 
Freud (1856–1939) called “the unconscious.” These three thinkers thus constitute the 
prehistory of the concept of “archeology.” Therefore, a concise summation of their ideas 
of archeology is apposite and will be carried out in reverse chronology in order to come 
full circle to Kant, who is the main influence on Foucault’s concept of archeology [though 
Foucault is not always in keeping with Kant, and at times even contradicts Kant and Husserl 
(for example, his accusation of phenomenology being a “transcendental narcissism” or his 
wish to “free history from the grip of phenomenology.”]166 
 According to Lawlor, by means of investigating the past, archeology concerns itself 
in the transformation of the present. This concern comes from psychoanalysis (which is 
concerned, among others, with curing the hysteric, and not for investigating the past for its 
own sake), thus paradoxically archeology is, in fact, interested in the future. This means 
another two characteristics of archeology: on the one hand, as Freud says, the past that one 
returns to is always incomplete (and so the curing of the hysteria is always incomplete), 
thus the future cure is based (in addition to an incomplete past) on a reconstruction that is 
inventive; on the other hand, in order to find a future cure, the past must remain as a present 
and not really as a past—it must be conserved. Freud draws an analogy between the concept 
of the mind and ancient Rome, where everything is preserved, and thus the historical 
sequence of the mind is represented by juxtaposition in space; however, this is not a perfect 
analogy since in Rome there are intentional demolitions, whereas in the mind there are 
 
166 Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge, 203. 
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unintentional traumas (that can destroy remains of the past).167 Although the past has an 
incomplete nature, the past remains intact in the unconscious (the processes of the 
unconscious are timeless for Freud, thus we should accept that there is an absolute memory, 
memory not relative to consciousness). The idea of an absolute memory implies the fourth 
characteristic of archeology: the displacement of the conscious subject. The analyst is like 
an explorer who finds ruins and who can operate in two ways: either to ask the inhabitant 
(patient) about the history and meaning of these remains or to encourage the inhabitant to 
excavate the scene; then things are deciphered (Freud's slogan is “stones talk”). This leads 
to the fifth characteristic: the dead monuments that nevertheless speak. 
 In sum, the philosophical concept of archeology is characterized by the following: 
its investigation of the past concerns the future; the past it investigates is incomplete; yet, 
the past is conserved, juxtaposed, and simultaneous with the present; present consciousness 
is not the object of archeological investigation; and the object of interest is the monument 
that speaks for itself. 
 In his interpretation of Husserl, Fink defines Husserl’s phenomenology in terms of 
the problem of Being or human access to Being through experiences. These experiences 
are not given (to consciousness) immediately but are mediated by tradition and 
forgetfulness, and in order to overcome this distance phenomenology engages in a 
regressive inquiry which aims at “re-establishing” what Fink calls “the initial knowledge 
forgotten in the buried traditions” and even aims at “returning to the immediate knowledge 
of the Being from which the traditions, even though they obscure, derived.” 168  This 
regressive inquiry is not the psychical origin, a genesis of human thought, or psychological 
development. Instead, the phenomenological regressive’s question concerning the 
 
167 Freud elaborates on the archeological metaphor to explain psychoanalysis in his essay 
“Constructions in Analysis”: “[The Psychoanalyst’s] work of construction, or, if it is preferred, of 
reconstruction, resembles to a great extent an archeologist’s excavation of some dwelling-place that has been 
destroyed and buried or of some ancient edifice. The two processes are in fact identical, except that the analyst 
works under better conditions and has more material at his command to assist him, since what he is dealing 
with is not something destroyed but something that is still alive ... But just as the archeologist builds up the 
walls of the building from the foundations that have remained standing, determines the number and position 
of the columns from depressions in the floor and reconstructs the mural decorations and paintings from the 
remains found in the debris, so does the analyst proceed when he draws his inferences from the fragments of 
memories, from the associations and from the behaviour of the subject of the analysis.” (Freud, 
“Constructions in Analysis [1937],” 259.) 
168 Lawlor, Thinking Through French Philosophy: The Being of the Question, 29. 
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beginning of knowledge attempts to grasp the human intellect in its movement towards the 
Being. The consciousness or subjectivity that phenomenology interrogates is 
transcendental and also includes the unconscious. Fink distinguishes Wissen from 
Erkenntnis, thereby anticipating Foucault’s distinction between savior and connaissance. 
 Kant speaks of archeology in (at least) three places: in Anthropology from a 
Pragmatic Point of View, the context is the “faculty of designation” and thus concerns 
signs; in The Critique of Judgment, he speaks about the “faculty of Nature” that concerns 
signs and traces (archeology of nature distinguishes from natural history—the first 
describes past genera and species and thus passes through signs and traces, while the latter 
describes present ones and takes place by means of intuition); and in Progress in 
Metaphysics, as we saw earlier, he distinguishes between a mere history of philosophy 
(which presents the empirical and thus contingent order of how thinkers philosophized up 
to the present) and a philosophical history of philosophy (which is rational and necessary, 
thus a priori). Thus, Kant’s philosophical archeology concerns not the contingent, 
successive order of the history of philosophy, but the rational and necessary order of 
philosophical concepts. Yet this order would still be historical since it would account only 
for this factual or singular set of concepts. Philosophical archeology will constitute, with 
this necessary and yet factual order, a historical a priori. This archeology, like that of 
nature, will proceed not by intuition but by means of signs. Kant’s concept of philosophical 
archeology implies that archeology is a method of reading signs.169 
 The prehistory of the concept of archeology, before Foucault and Merleau-Ponty, 
is summed up by Lawlor as follows: (1) archeology concerns signs and traces of the past—
that is—mediation, thus archeology is not a form of intuition but a form of interpretation 
or regressive inquiry; (2) in the reading of signs, consciousness is displaced towards the 
unconscious that precedes it and had been conserved, and thus is incomplete. Therefore 
philosophical archeology is a kind of an-archeology—the complete origin is missing; (3) 
archeology thus investigates the space of the unconscious, a spatial order that precedes 
 
169 In his erudite book on Kant’s methodology, Charles Bigger claims that although Kant destroyed 
traditional epistemology and metaphysics, he simultaneously offered a method for philosophy to advance in 
a new way which he termed “archeology.” Archeology stresses the role of the imagination in the constitution 
of the world, not in the sense of formulating the world from its own constructs, but rather that the imagination 
is founded in participation or dwelling. 
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consciousness or empirical/psychological genesis, thus is an order that can be called a 
priori; (4) although prior, this order is not an abstract a priori, but an a priori for these 
singular historical facts or signs; (5) in the investigation of this historical a priori, 
archeology overcomes a kind of forgetfulness that implies it consists in memory; and (6) 
this memory is not really a memory of the past (it is not interested in the past for its own 
sake) but rather its interest is the future.170 
 
Archeology, in Foucault, means the description of a record. The word “record” does not 
designate a mass of texts that have been collected at a certain period for a certain social 
group, but means and entails a discussion of rules. These rules define the limits of the forms 
of expressibility, of conservation, of memory, of reactivation, and of appropriation—these 
are the rules that a certain archeology seeks to describe, and therefore to analyze, a 
discourse’s conditions of existence.171 
 In an interview, Foucault refers to his conception of archeology, understood as the 
science of an archive of a given period: 
 
By archeology I would like to designate not exactly a discipline, but a 
domain of research, which would be the following: In a society, different 
bodies of learning ... refer to a certain implicit knowledge (savour) special 
to this society.... This knowledge is profoundly different from the bodies of 
learning that one can find in scientific books, ... but it is what makes possible 
at a given moment the appearance of a theory, an opinion, a practice.172 
 
From this discussion derives the discourses’ status of potential knowledge. Thus the 
Foucauldian archeology means (in this sense, and not exclusively) an archeology of 
knowledge where the archeological metaphor signals knowledge as a substratum that “lies 
beneath a surface and needs to be uncovered before it can be understood.”173 It is the 
 
170 Lawlor, Thinking Through French Philosophy: The Being of the Question, 31. 
171 Foucault and Lotringer, Foucault Live, 39–40. 
172 Ibid, 13. 
173 Lawlor, The Cambridge Foucault Lexicon, 13–19. It should be noted that “understood” might not 
be the most accurate choice of words here, since Foucault himself is very precise about one’s conception of 
(or operation on) knowledge: “Knowledge [savoir], even under the banner of history, does not depend on 
‘rediscovery’ ... knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting.” (Foucault, “Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, History,” 380.) 
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practice of an inquirer that deals with contingent historical facts regarding systems of 
knowledge, essentially through their lingual manifestations in written corpuses. These are 
not the formal rules of language, but the material rules that condition what can be said 
about the domain in question and thus condition the boundaries of a given “historical mode 
of thought”174 or what Foucault calls the episteme. 
 Generally the concept of episteme is understood not as a world view, theory, or 
framework, but a set of elements from which a variety of conflicting world views, 
frameworks, and theories can be developed; in other words, the episteme reflects the 
relation that exists between discourses (a term that differs from another Foucauldian term, 
the Archive, which designates the set that encompasses these discourses). 175  176  The 
historiographic method of archeology aims to reveal the differences or forms of non-
identity between the discourses rather than an underlying common identity that unites 
them. 
 Foucault’s archeology of knowledge does not have a purposely epistemological aim 
(reflecting upon the nature of knowledge in general), nor is it “épistémologie in the French 
sense ... a philosophical account of the nature of scientific knowledge,”177 rather it is a 
historical project that by going deep into a given field’s cognitive structure, into its level 
of savoir (rather than operating merely at the level of connaissance, that is, “the concepts 
 
174 Foucault’s definition to “Philosophical Archeology” is the history of what makes necessary a certain 
form of thought [“L’historie de ce qui rend nécessaire une certaine forme de pensée.”] (Foucault, Dits et 
écrits II, 211.) 
175 Foucault defines the Archive as the ground rules that determine the appearance and disappearance 
of enunciations, and its analysis as the conduction of archeology. For further discussion, in this context, see 
Östman, “Philosophical Archeology as Method in the Humanities. A Comment on Cultural Memory and the 
Problem of History,” 81–84. Östman extracts, regarding Foucault’s methodology, the following: (1) the 
Archive is not a form of storage which is given a priori; (2) archeology is not the gathering of cultural traces; 
(3) archeology examines language as lingual events in reality, that is, conditions of possibilities; (4) the 
Archive is similar to the paradigm—neither a priori nor a posteriori but contemporary; and (5) archeology 
considers texts (or cultural artifacts at large) as monuments rather than documents. 
176 Agamben directly discusses Foucault’s notion of the Archive in Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, 
143–6. 
177 Lawlor, The Cambridge Foucault Lexicon, 14. 
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and theories of particular sciences”),178 also has epistemological repercussions.179 
 At the level of individuals, the episteme “provides a place from which subjects 
speak and know,”180 by limiting their potential for development. In The Archeology of 
Knowledge (1969), Foucault gives a methodological reflection designed to provide 
historical accounts that “are not centered around the activities of human subjects and ... 
have no place for a transcendental subject that is the source of historical meaning.”181 
 In his account of the “Foucauldian subject,” Alain de Libera maintains that an 
unequivocal link exists between Foucault’s rejection of the subject and his views on 
history; therefore criticizing (in the footsteps of Foucault) the role played by the 
sovereignty of consciousness (and by the sovereignty of subject) in history, and opposing 
the idea of continuous history. He quotes from The Archeology of Knowledge at length: 
 
Continuous history is the indispensable correlative of the founding function 
of the subject: the guarantee that everything that has eluded him may be 
restored to him; the certainty that time will disperse nothing without 
restoring it in a reconstituted unity; the promise that one day the subject ― 
in the form of historical consciousness ― will once again be able to 
appropriate, to bring back under his sway, all those things that are kept at a 
distance by difference, and find in them what might be called his abode. 
Making historical analysis the discourse of the continuous and making 
human consciousness the original subject of all historical development and 
all action are the two sides of the same system of thought. In this system, 
time is conceived in terms of totalization and revolutions are never more 
than moments of consciousness. In various forms, this theme has played a 
constant role since the nineteenth century: to preserve, against all 
decentrings, the sovereignty of the subject, and the twin figures of 
anthropology and humanism.182 
 
Thus, according to de Libera, Foucault’s archeology not only aims to free history from the 
grip of the twin figures, that is, the constituent consciousness, but also challenges the 
 
178 Ibid. 
179 “Foucault’s account of knowledge ... provides an alternative to the Cartesian assumptions of 
privileged subjectivity and fixed rationality. By situating knowledge in a setting of social practices, Foucault 
is able to provide a framework that makes discontinuity a possible fact and subjectivity a constituted item. It 
is this alternative conception of knowledge that is Foucault's true contribution to epistemic theory.” 
(Wartenberg, “Foucault’s Archeological Method: A Response to Hacking and Rorty,” 357.) 
180 Lawlor, The Cambridge Foucault Lexicon, 16. 
181 Ibid. 
182 de Libera, “Subject (Re–/decentred),” 15; Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge, 12. 
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transcendental dimension as such. 
[Continue Reading]
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 [Historical a priori] אֹ 
The second part of The Use of Bodies (titled “An Archeology of Ontology”), Agamben’s 
final publication in his celebrated, decades-long series Homo Sacer, proposes to ascertain 
the current possibility to access first philosophy, or as Agamben synonymously 
paraphrases it, ontology.183 184 First philosophy “opens and defines each time the space of 
human acting and knowing, of what the human being can do and of what it can know and 
say;”185 however, this space, the access to first philosophy, at least since Kant, has become 
so problematic that it is thinkable, as per Agamben, only in the form of an archeology. In 
Agamben’s studies, any archeological movement necessarily involves a relation, or is 
necessarily executed in relation, to language (that is beyond the obvious fact that a 
theoretical study is usually realized in and through language), thus ontology is considered 
by him as the originary place of the historical articulation between language and world, 
and preserves in itself the memory of the anthropogenesis (the becoming human of the 
human being), of the moment when that articulation was produced.186 Anthropogenesis is 
not a completed event of the past, but rather the event that never stops happening, a 
continuous process of the becoming human and remaining (or becoming) inhuman of the 
human being. First philosophy is the memory and repetition of this event: “it watches over 
the historical a priori of Homo sapiens, and it is to this historical a priori that archeological 
 
183 Ancient and medieval philosophy defined Metaphysics according to its subject matter, thus 
interchangeably considered it as the science which investigates “being as such,” “the first causes of things,” 
and “things that do not change.” The origin of the word “metaphysics” is uncertain but most probably was 
given by the editors of Aristotle’s corpus to a series of fourteen books he wrote in order to distinguish them 
from his previous writings on physics (or nature); hence books that come, and should be read, after (meta) 
those of physics which are characterized by the centrality of the concept of “change”, the prime characteristic 
of nature. Thus, Metaphysics for Aristotle deals with all things unchangeable, and he identified first 
philosophy with “being as such.” At the seventeenth century, a shift occurred in the definition of metaphysics’ 
subject matter, as subjects previously considered under physics were now considered as conceived under 
metaphysics, such as mind-body relation or free will. Metaphysics becomes a general category for various, 
exclusively unclassified, philosophical problems. Roughly at the same time, in order to overcome the 
conceptual and categorical perplexity of classification, Ontology becomes the science that particularly 
investigates “being as such.” 
184 This discussion, in fact, was already started in earlier works, especially in Agamben, The Open, 79–
80. 
185 Agamben, The Use of Bodies, 111; Agamben, The Omnibus Homo Sacer, 1127. 
186 Elsewhere, Agamben writes: “[B]eing is the dimension opened to humans in the anthropogenetic 
event of language; ... being is always, in Aristotle’s words, something that ‘is said.’” (Agamben, The 
Adventure, 42.) 
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research always seeks to reach back;”187 and additionally: 
 
[w]hat is in question ... in the Aristotelian ontological apparatus—and more 
generally, in every historical transformation of ontology ... is the 
articulation between language and world that anthropogenesis has disclosed 
as ‘history’ to the living beings of the species Homo sapiens. Severing the 
pure existent (the that it is) from the essence (the what it is) and inserting 
time and movement between them, the ontological apparatus reactualizes 
and repeats the anthropogenesis event, opens and defines each time the 
horizon of acting as well as knowing, by conditioning, in the sense that has 
been seen as a historical a priori, what human beings can do and what they 
can know and say.188 189 
 
Shortly thereafter Agamben remarks succinctly: “In the preface to Les mots et les choses 
(1966), Foucault uses the term ‘historical a priori’ to define that which, in a determinate 
historical epoch, conditions the possibilities of the formation and development of 
knowledges.”190 He continues (in a long footnote): 
 
187 Agamben, The Use of Bodies, 111; Agamben, The Omnibus Homo Sacer, 1127. 
188 Agamben, The Use of Bodies, 128; Agamben, The Omnibus Homo Sacer, 1143. 
189 Why do we have the idea of historical a priori? Why does philosophy seem to need the historical a 
priori? And additionally, why is the historical a priori linked to language? In Agamben’s thought, the 
connection between the two indicates a definition of what is at stake in philosophy. The connection exists 
because philosophy is not simply a set of conceptual statements (doctrine, cognitive formulation), but is 
constitutively linked with the anthropogenesis, with the becoming human of man, and this archi-event 
(anthropogenesis) is the historical a priori of philosophy. First philosophy (or Metaphysics) has to do with 
the becoming speaking of the animal homo. Philosophy is a remembrance, each time, of the articulation 
between man and language and between language and the world. The word “remembrance” does not mean a 
memory in the common sense, but a repetition, a renewed experience, of the junction between language and 
man and between animal and man (between the inhuman and man; between becoming human in man). 
Anthropogenesis is the “archi” historical a priori since it is always in the process, we can never consider it 
as completed, we are always in the process of becoming human therefore we are always animals. Thinking 
(or philosophy) for Agamben means to experience anew the connection between becoming human and 
remaining inhuman (and therefore this connection is kept, in philosophy, in question). Thus, philosophical 
archeology is immanent and constitutive to philosophy; it means going back (archeologically) to the 
repetition and remembrance of this event. 
190  Agamben, The Use of Bodies, 112; Agamben, The Omnibus Homo Sacer, 1127–28. The term 
“historical a priori” (which appears for the first time, in Foucault, in History of Madness (1961) albeit as 
“concrete a priori”) is used in The Order of Things to demonstrate that the prominent nineteenth-century 
discourses on life, labour, and language (biology, Marxism and linguistics, respectively) all emerge in the 
context of the same historical a priori: “the search for new practices of analysis in the wake of the epistemic 
breakdown of representation in the early modern period.” (Lawlor, The Cambridge Foucault Lexicon, 201.) 
 More generally, Foucault is consistent in his conception and use of the term “historical a priori,” which 
is essentially used as part of Foucault’s critique of our modern conception of history as a continuous, 
dialectical, and above all, progressive process, otherwise referred to as the “philosophical myth of history.” 
(Aldea and Allen, “History, Critique, and Freedom: The Historical a priori in Husserl and Foucault,” 7.) 
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The expression is problematic, because it brings together two elements that 
are at least apparently contradictory: the a priori, which entails a 
paradigmatic and transcendental dimension, and history, which refers to an 
eminently factual reality. It is possible that Foucault had drawn the term 
from Husserl’s Origin of Geometry, which Derrida had translated into 
French in 1962, but certainly not the concept, because while in Husserl the 
historisches Apriori designates a sort of universal a priori of history, it 
instead always refers in Foucault to a determinate knowledge and to a 
determinate time.191 
 
The footnote continues— 
 
And yet, if it does not in any way refer back to an archetypal dimension 
beyond history but remains immanent to it, its contradictory formulation 
brings to expression the fact that every historical study inevitably runs up 
against a constitutive dishomogeneity: that between the ensemble of facts 
and documents on which it labors and a level that we can define as 
archeological, which though not transcending it, remains irreducible to it 
and permits its comprehension. Overbeck (as was articulated, somewhat 
similarly, earlier) has expressed this heterogeneity by means of the 
distinction, in every study, between prehistory (Urgeschichte) and history 
(Geschichte), where prehistory does not designate what we usually 
understand by this term—that is, something chronologically archaic 
(uralt)—but rather the history of the point of emergence 
(Entstehungsgeschichte), in which the researcher must settle accounts with 
an originary phenomenon (an Urphänomen in Goethe’s sense) and at the 
 
 “Although knowledge’s pose of objectivity conceals the historical nature of Man from our normal view, 
Foucault’s archeology is intended to provide a clear perception ... that allows us to see the entire framework 
of social institutions tied to the human sciences as a transient historical development. Foucault’s view of the 
repressive nature of modern society makes this awareness of transience a liberating one.” (Wartenberg, 
“Foucault's Archeological Method: A Response to Hacking and Rorty,” 361.) 
191  Agamben, The Use of Bodies, 112; Agamben, The Omnibus Homo Sacer, 1127–28. It can be argued 
that Foucault’s conception of the historical a priori derives, not only from new approaches to the history of 
science developed by Bachelard and Canguillhem, and from Husserlian phenomenology, but also (and 
essentially) from the historical turn that German philosophy took around the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, beginning with Kant’s idea of “philosophical history of philosophy” [first explicated in the first 
edition to the Critique of Pure Reason (though by the wording “history of pure reason”) and later in his essay 
of the “Progress of Metaphysics”] and subsequent developments by Karl Leonhard Reinhold and Hegel. 
 Foucault’s archeology is similar to the philosophical archeology that Kant proposes in the sense that 
“instead of appealing to universal and necessary principles to explain the historical development of 
philosophy, Foucault reconstructs the order of scientific knowledge in different historical periods.” 
(McQuillan, “Philosophical Archeology and the Historical A Priori: From Kant to Foucault,” 153.) This 
Foucauldian archeological approach is a trace back to a small set of principles, and has resonance with Kant’s 
essay on the “Progress of Metaphysics,” which suggests some a priori principles that make certain ways of 
thinking necessary. 
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same time with the tradition that, while it seems to transmit the past to us, 
ceaselessly covers up the fact of its emergence and renders it inaccessible. 
One can define philosophical archeology as the attempt to bring to light the 
various historical a prioris that condition the history of humanity and define 
its epochs. It is possible, in this sense, to construct a hierarchy of the various 
historical a prioris, which ascends in time toward more and more general 
forms. Ontology or first philosophy has constituted for centuries the 
fundamental historical a priori of Western thought.192 
 
According to Agamben, from an archeological perspective that herein attempts to reopen 
access to a first philosophy, the fact is that it is precisely the impossibility of a first 
philosophy that has become the historical a priori of the present time, beginning with Kant. 
This impossibility (which Kant called Metaphysics) is the true Copernican turn of Kantian 
critique (rather than the position of the subject).193 Foucault, claims Agamben, had tried to 
rescue the survival of the impossibility of metaphysics with the stronghold of the 
transcendental (that is, “Being”), but the transcendental “necessarily entails a displacement 
of the historical a priori from the anthropogenesis event (the articulation between language 
and world) to knowledge, from a being that is no longer animal but not yet human to a 
knowing subject.”194 First philosophy becomes philosophy of knowledge. 
 
192 Agamben, The Use of Bodies, 112; Agamben, The Omnibus Homo Sacer, 1127–28. 
193  Philosophy is not usually conceived in terms of the “archi” historical a priori, with the becoming 
human of man, mainly due to the current primacy of the cognitive paradigm in Western culture. Especially 
since Kant, philosophy has become a doctrine of knowledge or condition of knowledge, as if what is at stake 
in philosophy is the definition of the possibility of knowledge. We can think of the historical a priori as a 
specificity of individual philosophers. For example, Kant’s historical a priori is the impossibility of 
metaphysics (or the impossibility of first philosophy). Kant starts from the impossibility of metaphysics and 
tries in some way to make it possible again, but in order to do so he has to confine metaphysics to the 
transcendental, exclude it from any empirical and historical reality. This is the idea of the “Noumenon”—the 
space of metaphysics is a void space, transcendental space. Thus, by trying to save metaphysics, he in a way 
eliminated it, because philosophy after Kant was under the assumption that Kant had found a fortress in the 
transcendental, but this fortress eventually turned out to be a trap (as post-Kantian philosophers remained 
trapped in this fortress). Trying to escape from conceiving metaphysics as a concrete empirical science, Kant 
transformed metaphysics into the transcendental, but remained trapped in what he thought was a fortress. 
Philosophy, in the second half of the nineteenth century, until Heidegger, is an attempt to escape from the 
transcendental towards Ontology (for example, the work of Nietzsche, also with his attention to language, as 
well as consecutively, the linguistic turn as the historical a priori which substitutes for the transcendental). 
 In a way (as Agamben suggests us), our task today is to get rid of the transcendental and understand it 
in a different way. From a Kantian point of view, the experience of the transcendental is that of a void space 
that one cannot make any empirical statement about; on the contrary, we can say that the experience of 
language is an archeology, a concrete investigation of language, etc. No longer is the metaphysical space a 
void space, but now archeology can be considered as a proper metaphysical field. 
194 Agamben, The Use of Bodies, 112; Agamben, The Omnibus Homo Sacer, 1128. 
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 Philosophers such as Nietzsche, Benjamin, Foucault, and Benveniste sought a way 
out of the transcendental by shifting the historical a priori back from knowledge to 
language, by isolating each time a dimension that called into question the pure fact of 
language, the pure being given of the enunciated, before or beyond their semantic content. 
“The speaking being or enunciator has thus been substituted for Kant’s transcendental 
subject, and language has taken the place of being as historical a priori.”195 
 Moreover, according to Agamben, language has superimposed itself over being. 
Language no longer functions as a historical a priori that determines and conditions the 
historical possibilities of speaking human beings, but becomes totally identified with being, 
puts itself forward as a neutral ahistorical or post-historical effectuality that no longer 
conditions any recognizable sense of historical becoming or any epochal articulation of 
time. This means that our time is not determined by any historical a priori; in other words, 
we find ourselves at a post-historical time. From this perspective, Agamben’s attempt is to 
trace out an archeology of ontology, or to make a genealogy of the ontological apparatus 
that has functioned as the historical a priori of the West.196 
[Continue Reading]
 
195 Agamben, The Use of Bodies, 113; Agamben, The Omnibus Homo Sacer, 1129. 
196 “The Aristotelian ontological apparatus, which has for almost two millennia guaranteed the life and 
politics of the West, can no longer functions as a historical a priori, to the extent to which anthropogenesis, 
which it sought to fix in terms of an articulation between language and being, is no longer reflected in it. 
Having arrived at the outermost point of its secularization, the projection of ontology (or theology) into 
history seems to have become impossible.” (Agamben, The Use of Bodies, 133; Agamben, The Omnibus 
Homo Sacer, 1147.) 
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 [The Contemporary] אֹ 
An early indication for thinking about the time structure of philosophical archeology can 
perhaps be found in an earlier text by Agamben titled What is the Contemporary?197 
Constructing his arguments on the basis of Nietzsche’s ideas of historical time, and 
specifically on Nietzsche’s understanding of the contemporary as the untimely, Agamben 
writes that those who are truly contemporary, who truly belong to their time, are those who 
neither perfectly coincide with it nor adjust themselves to its demands; but precisely 
because of this condition, they are more capable than others of perceiving and grasping 
their own time. Contemporariness is, then, a singular relationship with one’s own time, 
which adheres to it and, at the same time, keeps a distance from it. Those who coincide too 
well with their time, those who are perfectly tied to it in every respect, are not 
contemporaries precisely because they do not manage to see it, they are not able to firmly 
hold their gaze on it. 
 Those who are contemporary, according to Agamben, are the ones who firmly hold 
their gaze on their own time so as to perceive not its light but rather its darkness. To 
perceive this darkness is not a form of inertia or passivity, but rather it implies an activity 
and a singular ability. This ability amounts to a neutralization of the light that comes from 
present time in order to discover its obscurity, its special darkness. The ones who can call 
themselves contemporary are those who do not allow themselves to be blinded by the lights 
of the century, and so manage to get a glimpse of the shadows cast by those lights, of their 
intimate obscurity. But there is a second, reverse and complementary movement or 
perception: it is to perceive, in the darkness of the present, the light that strives to reach us 
but cannot—this is what it means to be contemporary. It is, first and foremost, a question 
of courage because it necessitates the ability not only to firmly fix one’s gaze on the 
darkness of the era, but also to perceive in this darkness a light that, while directed towards 
us, infinitely distances itself from us. Our time, the present, is in fact not only the most 
distant but that which cannot in any way reach us. Attempting to grasp it requires courage, 
and indeed as Agamben writes elsewhere (though in the broad context of the Church, in 
 
197 Agamben, What Is an Apparatus? and Other Essays, 39–55. 
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reference to Benedict XVI’s resignation of office—only the second resignation in the 
history of the Catholic Church): “[C]ourage is nothing but the capacity to keep oneself 
connected with one’s own end.”198 
 There is another aspect, according to Agamben, to this special relationship with the 
past in which we can see how contemporariness carves itself into the present “by marking 
it above all as archaic. Only he who perceives the indices and signatures of the archaic in 
the most modern and recent can be contemporary.”199 Being archaic amounts to being 
close to the arche, that is to say, the special type of origin that was already herein discussed, 
an origin that is “contemporary with historical becoming and does not cease to operate 
within it, just as the embryo continues to be active in the tissues of the mature organism, 
and the child in the psychic life of the adult. Both this distancing and nearness, that define 
temporariness, have their foundation in this proximity to the origin that nowhere pulses 
with more force than in the present.”200 In order to “enter” the present, we must perform 
archeology, a practice that does not, however, regress to a historical past in a mere 
genealogical fashion, but returns to that part within the present that we are absolutely 
incapable of living: 
 
What remains un-lived is therefore incessantly sucked back towards the 
origin without ever being able to reach it. The present is nothing other than 
this un-lived element in everything that is lived. That which impedes access 
to the present is precisely the mass of what for some reason (its traumatic 
character, its excessive nearness) we have not managed to live. The 
attention to this ‘un-lived’ is the life of the contemporary. And to be 
contemporary means, in this sense, to return to a present where we have 
never been.201 
 
However, we should not naively assume a supposedly one directional, archeological 
movement in time. Our conception of contemporariness must also assume time’s ability to 
re-penetrate or refold back onto itself as if formed by porous structure, that is, being able 
to think time as splitting into several times, thus introducing to it an essential dis-
 
198 Agamben, The Mystery of Evil: Benedict XVI and the End of Days, 16. 
199 Agamben, What Is an Apparatus? and Other Essays, 50. 
200 Ibid. 
201 Ibid, 51–52. 
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homogeneity, a kind of caesura in which time is being inscribed. But, claims Agamben, 
“precisely by means of this caesura, this interpolation of the present into the inert 
homogeneity of linear time, the contemporary puts to work a special relationship between 
the different times. If, as we have seen, it is the contemporary who has broken the vertebrae 
of his time, then he also makes of this fracture a meeting place, or an encounter between 
times and generations.”202 Thus the contemporary is not only the one who manages (via 
the double, two-sided movement in time) to capture, in the present, the darkness and the 
light that can never reach its destiny, but is also: 
 
the one who, dividing and interpolating time, is capable of transforming it 
and putting it in relation with other times. He is able to read history in 
unforeseen ways, to ‘cite it’ according to a necessity that does not arise in 
any way from his will, but from an exigency to which he cannot not respond. 
It is as if this invisible light that is the darkness of the present cast its shadow 
on the past so that the past, touched by this shadow, acquired the ability to 
respond to the darkness of the now.203 
 
[Continue Reading]
 
202 Ibid, 52. Agamben, as we will see, identifies Paul’s messianic time (the “time of the now,” the being-
contemporary with the Messiah) as the paradigm par excellence for this (chronologically indeterminate) 
encounter. 
203 Ibid, 53. 
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Part II—(Messianic) Time—History—Aesthetics: from Saint Paul to Walter 
Benjamin 
 
1.2.1 
 [Messianic Time] אֹ 
Agamben’s philosophical archeology, as it is conceived with its postulations and purposes, 
its paradoxical necessity and precarious logic, its temporal structure and spatial 
architecture, archai and multiple nows, constitutes a comprehensive conception of history 
that is based on, and determined by, a certain understanding of time deeper and more 
elaborated than revealed thus far. Paraphrasing Agamben’s own words, we can therefore 
ask: what is the Agambenian conception of time that is profoundly implicit in the 
Agambenian conception of history? 
 
In Infancy and History: On the Destruction of Experience, Agamben addresses this very 
question to Marx in an attempt to clarify why historical materialism has failed to elaborate 
a conception of time that compares with its concept of history, and as a result, retained a 
conservative temporal framework which supposedly withheld the fulfillment of a 
promised, yearned revolution. Based on the assumption that every conception of history is 
accompanied by a certain experience of time that conditions it, and likewise that every 
culture adheres to a particular experience of time that requires a corresponding alteration 
of this experience once a new culture or revolution is undergoing, Agamben claims that 
Marx’s dictum of “changing the world” also required the changing of time, a change that 
unfortunately never occurred since Marx made recourse to ancient theses and the concept 
of time dominant in Western culture. Eventually Marx harboured a revolutionary concept 
of history and a traditional experience of time: “The vulgar representation of time as a 
precise and homogenous continuum has thus diluted the Marxist concept of history.”204 
 
Thereafter, in order to show how Marx reached his conception of time, the (vulgarly 
 
204 Agamben, Infancy and History, 91. 
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represented) time of the West is historically drafted (albeit briefly) by Agamben.205 He 
describes the evolution of the Western conception of time beginning with the Greco-Roman 
epoch, which conceived of time as circular and continuous: “Circular movement, which 
guarantees the unchanged preservation of things through their repetition and continual 
return, is the most direct and most perfect expression (and therefore the closest to the 
divine) of the zenith of the hierarchy: absolute immobility.”206 For example, in Plato’s 
Timaeus, time is measured by the cyclical revolution of the celestial spheres and defined 
as a moving image of eternity. Aristotle, in the Physics, confirms the circular nature of time 
which has no direction, no beginning, middle, or end; and in the Problemata, Aristotle 
concludes that from this perspective we cannot say whether one lives before or after, for 
example, the Trojan War. 
 However, the fundamental character of the Greek experience of time, which for two 
millennia dominated the Western representation of time, is its precise, infinite, quantified 
continuum. Aristotle defines time as “quantity of movement ... and its continuity is assured 
by its division into discrete instants [the now], analogous to the geometric point. ... The 
instant ... is a pure limit which both joins and divides past and future. As such, it is always 
elusive, ... in dividing time infinitely, the now is always ‘other’; yet in uniting past and 
future and ensuring continuity, it is always the same.”207 This is the instant’s paradoxically 
nullified character, and the basis for the radical “otherness” of time and for its “destructive” 
character. 
 Western man’s incapacity to master time and its obsession with handling it, 
according to Agamben, originate from this Greek conception of time as a quantified and 
infinite continuum of precise fleeting instants; thus man, based on this representation of 
time, has no real experience of historicity.208 
 Greek philosophy deals with time often through Physics—things in the world are 
“inside” time (that is objective and natural), each thing inhabits a place, so it inhabits time. 
 Time (with its destructive character), for the Greeks, destroys things. Thus, 
 
205 For a tangential discussion, see Kracauer, History: The Last Things Before the Last, 139–63. 
206 Agamben, Infancy and History, 92. 
207 Ibid, 93. 
208 See also Kracauer, History: The Last Things Before the Last, 195–202. 
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Herodotus in Histories, which marks the beginning of the modern conception of time, 
writes that he “puts forth the fruit of his researches, so that time may not erase men’s 
undertakings,”209 and by that confirms the ahistorical nature of the ancient concept of time. 
 
The next major metamorphosis in the conception of Western time, analyzes Agamben, was 
initiated with the rise of Christianity. The Christian experience of time is the antithesis to 
the Greco-Roman one, as it conceives of time as a straight line. The world is created within 
time, from Genesis to the Apocalypse, while (according to French historian Henri‒Charles 
Puech) “[i]ts duration comprises neither the eternal nor the infinite, and the events which 
unfold within it will never be repeated.”210 Moreover, this conception of time has direction 
and purpose, and a central point of reference, that is, the incarnation of Christ. The eternal 
repetition of Paganism, where nothing is new, is replaced with the idea that everything 
happens only once, that every event is unique and irreplaceable. The history of humanity 
is the history of salvation and the progressive realization of redemption whose foundation 
is God. 
 Christianity, claims Agamben, thus lays the foundation for the experience of 
historicity, although the (ancient) idea of time as continuous and quantifiable has not been 
abolished, just displaced from the movements of the celestial stars to that of man’s interior 
duration. Nonetheless, “time thus interiorized remains the continuous succession of precise 
instants of Greek thought.”211 The ancient circular representation of Greek metaphysics 
returns to Christian thought: eternity, the regime of divinity, with its static circle, tends to 
negate the human experience of time; the discrete, fleeting instance intercepts the wheel of 
eternity. 
 
A further development in the conception and representation of time, as Agamben describes 
it, was introduced by the modern age. The modern conception of time is a secularization 
of rectilinear, irreversible Christian time, albeit devoid of the notion of an end or any 
meaning except for regulating our sense of before and after. This homogeneous, rectilinear, 
 
209 Quoted in Agamben, Infancy and History, 94. 
210 Quoted in Agamben, Infancy and History, 94. 
211 Ibid, 95. 
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and empty representation of time is a result of modern mechanics, which, according to 
Agamben, prefers rectilinear over circular motion. Notions of before and after were vague 
and empty for antiquity and for the modern they seem to have meaning in and of 
themselves. 
As Nietzsche grasped: 
 
the idea governing the nineteenth-century concept of history is that of 
‘process’. Only process as a whole has meaning, never the precise fleeting 
now; but since this process is really no more than a simple succession of 
now in term of before and after, and the history of salvation has meanwhile 
become pure chronology, a semblance of meaning can be saved only by 
introducing the idea [...] of a continuous, infinite progress.212 
 
Under the influence of the natural sciences, progress becomes the guiding category of 
historical knowledge, and behind the apparent triumph of historicism213 in the nineteenth-
century lies a hidden negation of history that is modelled on the natural sciences.214 
 
The last, crucial transformation (prior to Marx) occurred, as one can expect, with Hegel. 
Hegel based his idea of time on the Aristotelian model of the precise instant, conceiving 
the now as a point. This now (“which is nothing other than the passage of its being into 
nothingness” and vice versa) is eternity as true present. “The conjunction of spatial 
representation and temporal experience which dominates the Western concept of time is 
developed in Hegel as a conception of time as negation and dialectical dominion of 
space.”215 For Hegel, the instance (or time) is a negation of negation. “Time,” he writes, 
 
212 Ibid, 96–97. 
213 “Historicism” refers to the study of the past in the past’s terms; it seeks to understand the meaning 
and value of the past as it would have been understood at the time it happened. By contrast, “Presentism” 
(See Hartog, Regimes of Historicity: Presentism and Experience of Time) means to interpret and evaluate the 
past in terms of presently accepted values and understanding. Presentism holds that it is not possible to 
understand events in terms of their “historicity,” while historicism holds that events can and should be 
understood in terms of their historicity. Historicity refers to the actuality and authenticity of events in the 
past. We can date an event in the past but our understanding of its meaning will be bound to the present point 
of departure from which we seek to understand it. 
214 Lévi-Strauss thus argued for an idea of the discontinuous nature of historiography, against any 
objective historical continuity. He rejected the equation of history and humanity. This does not mean the 
abandonment of history but rather the achievement of a more authentic concept of historicity. 
215 Agamben, Infancy and History, 96–97. 
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“is the thing existing which is not when it is, and is when it is not: a half-glimpsed 
becoming.”216 In the Hegelian system, time is the necessity and destiny of the unfulfilled 
spirit, which must fall into time, and history is essentially a gradual process. “Like time, 
whose essence is pure negation, history can never be grasped in the instant, but only as 
total social process.”217 218 
 
Marx’s conception of history is different. He understands history not as something into 
which man falls, but as man’s original dimension as species-being, as being with the 
capability of generation, producing itself from the start as a universal individual. History 
is not determined (as in Hegel and the historicism that derives from him) by an experience 
of linear time as negation of negation, but by praxis, “concrete activity as essence and 
origin of man.”219 Praxis is the founding act of history, the means by which the human 
essence becomes man’s nature and nature becomes man. History is man’s nature—man’s 
original belonging to himself. “Man is not a historical being because he falls into time, but 
precisely the opposite; it is only because he is a historical being that he can fall into time, 
temporalizing himself.”220 
 
Agamben concludes the historical layout by claiming that although Marx never elaborated 
a theory of time adequate to his conception of history, it is clear that it cannot be reconciled 
with the Aristotelian and Hegelian concept of time as a continuous and infinite succession 
of precise instants. The fundamental contradiction of modern man is that he has yet to 
develop an experience of time adequate to his idea of history, thus man is split between his 
 
216 Quoted in Agamben, Infancy and History, 98. 
217 Ibid, 99. 
218 In Agamben’s book Language and Death, the concept of negativity in Hegel’s thought is articulated. 
In a manuscript of 1803/04 and 1805/06, writes Agamben, Hegel describes the re-emergence of the spirit into 
light in the figure of consciousness. In the senses and in the imagination, consciousness has not yet come out 
into the light—it is still immersed in its “night.” He writes: “Man is the night, this pure nothing that contains 
everything in its simplicity, a realm endlessly rich in representations and images.... In phantasmagoric 
representations he is surrounded by night; suddenly a bloody head juts forth here, there another white figure, 
and just as suddenly they disappear. One glimpses this night when one looks into the eyes of another human—
into a night, which becomes frightening; here each of us is suspended confronting the night of the world.” 
(Agamben, Language and Death, 41–42.) 
219 Agamben, Infancy and History, 99. 
220 Ibid. 
 
 
75 
being-in-time (as an elusive flow of instants) and his being-in-history (as the original 
dimension of man). The modern conception of history is twofold: diachronic reality and 
synchronic structure; and this double structure exemplifies the impossibility for man to 
take possession of his own historical nature. 
 
In the timeframe depicted by Agamben, there were substantial attempts to criticize and 
challenge the common, dominant conceptions of time (respectively for each epoch), in 
particular the characterization of time as a “point” 221  alongside its properties of 
“continuity” and “quantifiability.” Agamben mentions just a few of these attempts, perhaps 
the ones most pertinent to his own thinking: 
 (1) In Gnosticism there appears an experience of time that is in radical opposition 
to both the Greek circular experience and the straight line of Christianity. It posits a concept 
whose spatial model can be represented by a broken line, thus striking against Antiquity’s 
unaltered duration, precise and continuous time. Based on Gnosticism’s (that is, as a 
religion) differentiation from both Greek cosmology and Christian redemption, the time of 
Gnosticism is an incoherent and inhomogeneous time: in an experience of interrupted time, 
when man (in a sudden act of consciousness) takes possession of its own condition of being 
resurrected, the Gnostic attitude is revolutionary as it “refuses the past valuing in it, through 
an exemplary sense of the present, precisely what was condemned as negative, ... and 
expecting nothing from the future.”222 
 (2) In Stoicism, too, we find a different conception of time, one that refuses the 
astronomical time of Plato’s Timaeus, an image of eternity, and the Aristotle’s notion of 
the mathematical instant. Against a homogeneous, infinite and quantified time that divides 
the present into discrete instants (thus producing an unreal time and an experience of 
deferral), the Stoics think of the experience of time as something neither objective nor 
removed from our control, but derived from the actions of man. Its model is the kairos, 
 
221 The feature of the point (as a metaphysical-geometric concept) dominates Western thought in terms 
of the representation of time, and then is taken to be, as if in itself, the real time of experience. The concept 
of the instant as a “point” in time enables the opening through which the eternity of metaphysics insinuates 
itself into the human experience of time. Coming into conflict with this concept of the instant is the key to 
conceive a new idea of time. 
222 Agamben, Infancy and History, 101. 
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“the abrupt and sudden conjunction where decision grasps opportunity and life is fulfilled 
in the moment.”223 224 
 (3) In Heidegger, the critique of time as continuous and quantified is subjected to a 
radical critique in terms of repetition-destruction, which invades Western metaphysics as a 
whole. The originality of Sein und Zeit is that of the foundation of historicity alongside a 
more authentic experience of time. At the core of this experience there is no longer the 
precise, fleeting instant throughout linear time, “but the moment of the authentic decision 
in which the Dasein experiences its own finiteness, ... throwing itself forward in care, ... 
freely assum[ing] the destiny of its primordial historicity. Man does not fall into time, ‘but 
exists as primordial temporalization’.”225 
 
Man can experience a new concept of time, in our time, according to Agamben. He gives 
a preliminary hint for this cognitive change—it might be (as an ancient Western myth 
makes it humankind’s original home) pleasure. Pleasure was understood by Aristotle as 
heterogeneous in relation to the experience of quantified, continuous time. The form of 
pleasure is perfect, whole, and complete, and does not occur in a dimension of time. Based 
on the postulate that the Western experience of time is split between eternity and 
continuous linear time, the dividing point through which the two relate is the instant as a 
discrete, elusive point. Pleasure is outside of any measurable duration but likewise its place 
is not in eternity. Against this conception there must be the true site of pleasure that is 
 
223 Ibid. 
224  Paul Chan portrays this concept clearly in his essay “A Time Apart.” He writes that cairós (or kairos) 
is a “time charged with promise and significance. ... time that saturates time,” as opposed to chronos, our 
familiar conception of time as measure, which is “a quantity of duration that changes in a uniform and serial 
order.” It is an empty time in the sense of time “without content or meaning beyond its own linear 
progressing.” Kairos designates the idea that time can be fulfilled and made anew through a rupture that 
crosses through it, radicalizing everything that happens thereafter. The relationship between kairos and 
chronos is not that of opposition, but “chronos is that in which there is kairos, and kairos is that in which 
there is little chronos,” thus chronos transforms into kairos by becoming a compressed form of itself: “In 
kairos, time is not kept: it is unleashed.” 
 Kairos also means the right time to act, an opportune moment, that becomes possible only “when time 
holds the most potential for change. ... when a crisis or rapture opens up and is catalysed with human will to 
create new potentialities.” Time holds import, writes Chan, only when something ends, thus apprehending 
one’s own end becomes a crucial task in the life of mortals. The fact that the end is ever near “charges every 
moment with promise and significance,” and propels the human “to find a shape of one’s own, before it is 
too late.” 
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neither precise, continuous time, nor eternity, but history. It is only as a source to happiness 
“that history can have a meaning for man. ... For history is not ... man’s servitude to 
continuous linear time, but man’s liberation from it: the time of history and the cairós in 
which man, by his initiative, grasps favourable opportunity and chooses his own freedom 
in the moment.”226 The full, discontinuous, finite, and complete time of pleasure is set 
against the empty, continuous, and infinite time of vulgar historicism; the chronological 
time of pseudo-history is set against the cairological time of authentic history.227 
 In a final return to Marx, true historical materialism (ideally) objects to continuous 
progress along finite linear time, and instead is ready to stop time because it acknowledges 
that pleasure is man’s original home. This is the experience of time in authentic revolutions, 
experienced as the halting of time and the interruption of chronology. Yet how can one 
conceive pleasure as a new conception of time, outside of both measurable duration and 
eternity? What is the pleromatic and cairological time of pleasure, appearing as the 
liberating time of history? What exactly does Agamben mean by “the halting of time”? 
 
*** 
 
Agamben conceives of time (the authentic, liberating time of history) as exemplified by 
the idea of messianic time. Interpreted as the paradigm of historical time par excellence, 
messianic time is discussed, in Agamben’s corpus at large, based on a hybridization of two 
 
226 Ibid, 104. 
227 History for Agamben is further (and always) thought through the prism of language. In this sense, 
history means the exposition of a fracture produced through the discontinuity between language and speech, 
the semiotic and the semantic (in Benveniste’s terms), or sign system and discourse (in Foucault’s terms). 
Only because of this discontinuity man is a historical being. A human becomes a historical subject by 
removing itself from its wordless experience; this speechless moment remains in discourse as its condition 
of possibility, as the passage that shows the “fall” from pure language to the babble of speech. The transition 
from pure language to discourse marks a limit, which is history. By entering history man exposes the 
discontinuity of language and time, thus history is not a linear progression but made out of infinite gaps. 
Agamben’s use of paradigms shows this—the paradigm is neither diachrony nor synchrony but a crossing of 
the two. Like Foucault’s panopticon (which illustrates, at the same time, both the general functioning of 
Panopticism and the threshold of modernity), Agamben’s paradigms are analogical, moving from one 
singularity to the next. Their historicity resides in their immanent exposition as belonging to a group of 
historically specific singularities and, at the same time, their suspension of such belonging. History is a 
gathering, a relation that holds together individual images at an (ontological) zone of perfect equilibrium 
between generality and particularity. By grasping history’s discontinuities, historical inquiry sutures the 
phenomena that unfold through time, transforming the present into an emergent structure with an intelligible 
relation to its past. (Murray and Whyte, ed., The Agamben Dictionary, 92–93.) 
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illuminating historical manifestations of it: the one, in contemporary thought, is positioned 
in Benjamin; the other, as its origin, is traced back to an apostolic text of Paul. 
 In Benjamin’s “Theses on the Philosophy of History” one finds the idea of Jewish 
messianic intuition. In this text, Benjamin criticizes the conception of time that is based 
upon continuous and quantified properties, seeking a concept of history where instead of 
the nullified present of the metaphysical tradition, one can posit “a present which is not a 
tradition, but in which time stands still and has come to a stop.”228 Against the notion of 
historical progress, Benjamin puts forward the idea that makes the continuum of history 
explode; against the empty, quantified instant, he advances “the time of the now” 
constructed as a messianic cessation of happening. This “full time” is, for Benjamin, “the 
true site of historical construction.” 229  The messianic time of Judaism becomes (for 
Benjamin and others) a model for the conception of history. At this point it should be noted 
that the messianic is not a person, but an idea. The (Jewish) messianic concept means a 
defiance—it proclaims that the arbitrary historical circumstance that we find ourselves in 
is merely a coincidence and a temporary state. From creation to salvation, the belief is that 
everything could turn out otherwise; even if the present experience is difficult, it is not the 
end. The hope, the future, and the open horizon of potentiality signify the messianic idea. 
 
*** 
 
We will come full circle back to Benjamin’s understanding of the essence of history, but 
in order to do that, we first need to turn to that which Agamben identifies as the origin of 
Benjamin’s conception positioned, as said above, in Paul. Agamben dedicates The Time 
that Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans specifically to the idea of 
messianic time. The book is based on a seminar given by Agamben in which, throughout 
its six days course, each day was dedicated to an individual part of the Epistle to the 
Roman’s opening sentence: “Paulos doulos Christou Iēsou, klētos apostolos aphōrismenos 
eis euaggelion Theou” (Paul, a servant of Christ Jesus, called to be an apostle and set apart 
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for the gospel of God.)230 
 
The first day is dedicated to “Paulos doulos Christou Iēsou” (Paul, a servant of Christ 
Jesus) and opens with Agamben’s declaration that the book attempts, in part, to restore 
Paul’s Letters to the status of the fundamental messianic text for the Western tradition, 
since anti-messianic tendencies were operating (through translation and commentary acts) 
within the Church and the Synagogue in the past two thousand years. Both the Church and 
the Synagogue, according to Agamben, had a mutual interest to cancel out Paul’s Judaism, 
to “expunge it from its originary messianic context.”231 For example, Jewish studies were 
until recently dominated, in regard to Paul, by Martin Buber’s book Two Types of Faith 
(1951), which advances a thesis that opposes the Jewish emunah (objective trust in the 
community, the faith of Jesus) to the Greek pistis (subjective recognition of a faith one 
judges to be true, the faith in Jesus), which is Paul’s faith. However, in recent years, 
scholars have re-examined Paul’s Jewish context and evaluated his letters as “the oldest 
and most demanding messianic texts of the Jewish tradition.” 232  In order to closely 
examine and demonstrate Paul’s Jewish messianic context, one needs to realize messianic 
institution’s paradoxical task of confronting an aporia concerning the very “structure of 
messianic time”—in order to understand the Pauline message, one needs to be able to fully 
experience such time; thus, we need to understand the meaning and internal form of the 
time he defines as ho nym kairos, “the time of the now,” then raise the question of how 
messianic community is possible. 
 The first step Agamben takes in the unfoldment of ho nym kairos (the time of the 
now) is to contextualize it in terms of language. Paul’s language (of the Letters) is Greek 
rather than translated Aramaic (as in Matthew and Mark); not belonging to any school or 
model, it “flows directly out of his heart” and is a “classic of Hellenism.” Paul was part of 
a Jewish diaspora community that thought and spoke in Judeo-Greek (as is the case with 
Ladino and Yiddish), read and cited the Torah in the Septuagint. The community was 
 
230 Romans 1:1 (New International Version). 
231 Agamben, The Time that Remains, 2. 
232 Ibid, 3. Among these scholars, Jacob Taubes (with his posthumous book The Political Theology of 
Paul) might be the most dominant voice for Agamben. Thus, The Time that Remains is dedicated in 
memoriam to Taubes. 
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subject to distrust since it was imbued with Greek culture and read the Torah in the 
language of Aristotle and Plato. “Yet,” claims Agamben, “there is nothing more genuinely 
Jewish than to inhabit a language of exile and to labor it from within, up to the point of 
confounding its very identity and turning it into more than just a grammatical language: 
making it a minor language, a jargon, or a poetic language. And yet, in each case it is also 
a mother tongue.”233 Being neither Greek nor Hebrew; neither lashon-ha-qodesh (Hebrew 
for “sacred language”) nor a secular idiom, is what makes Paul’s language so interesting 
and what allows for its relation to the structure of messianic time. 
 For Paul, as will become clear, the contraction of time (the “remaining” time) 
represents the messianic situation par excellence, the only real time. Agamben’s hypothesis 
supposes that the words of the incipit (first verse only, comprised of ten words in total: 
“Paulos doulos Christou Iēsou, klētos apostolos aphōrismenos eis euaggelion Theou”) 
contract within themselves the complete text of the Letter, recapitulate it (recapitulation is 
an essential term of the vocabulary of messianism). Thus, the understanding of the incipit 
guarantees the understanding of the text as a whole. 
 Language plays a significant role not only in the illumination of the opening 
sentence of the Romans but also for each individual word Paul makes use of. In the Hebrew 
context, the archetype for metanomasia (the changing of a name of a character) is found in 
Genesis 17:5, where God intervenes and changes the name of Abraham and Sarah by 
adding a single letter. Paul also changes his own name, from Saulos to Paulos, having, so 
it seems, a “new harmony” in mind—from Saulos, which is a regal name, to Paulos, which 
is insignificant, from grandeur to smallness (Paul in Latin means “small, of little 
significance”), defining himself as “the least of the apostles.” Paul is a surname, the 
messianic signum (surname; ho kai in Greek, or qui et in Latin, is the formula that normally 
introduces a surname, “who is also called”) that the apostle takes upon himself as he fully 
assumes the messianic vocation. Agamben writes: “Metanomasia realizes the intransigent 
messianic principle articulated firmly by the apostle, in which those things that are weak 
and insignificant will, in the days of the Messiah, prevail over those things the world 
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considers to be strong and important.”234 The messianic separates the proper name from 
its bearer, thus we have only nickname or surname; Paul is also linked to the word doulos, 
“slave,” in the sense that slaves did not have any juridical status in antiquity, thus did not 
have a proper name. The apostle, like a slave, transformed from a free man into “the slave 
of the Messiah,” loses his name, thus calls himself by a simple surname. 
 Tracing the semantic history of the term doulos (servant, slave, the “slave of the 
Messiah”), New Testament lexicographers are habitually contrasting its juridical meaning 
(acquired in the classical world) to its religious connotation exemplified by the Hebrew 
word “Eved” (acquired in the Semitic world). In Paul, however, doulos refers to a profane 
juridical condition and the transformation this condition undergoes in relation to the 
messianic event. Doulos is opposed to eleutheros (free): “‘Slave of the Messiah’ defines 
the new messianic condition for Paul, the principle of a particular transformation of all 
juridical condition.”235  
 In the attempt to cancel out Paul’s Judaism, Agamben claims, language too plays a 
crucial role. From the Vulgate onwards, he writes, several terms are not translated from the 
Greek but are substituted with a loan translation: apostle for apostolos; evangel for 
euggelion; and Christ for Christos. One should remember that christos is not a proper name 
but is, already in the Septuagint, the Greek translation of the Hebrew term mashiah, 
Messiah. Paul is not familiar with Jesus Christ but rather with Jesus Messiah, and he never 
uses the term christianos (which at any rate only means “messianic”): “A millenary 
tradition that left the word christos untranslated ends by making the term Messiah 
disappear from Paul’s text ... We will therefore always translate christos as ‘Messiah’.”236 
 Agamben concludes the first (lecture) day as follows: “Our seminar ... seeks to 
understand the meaning of the word christos, that is ‘Messiah’. What does it mean to live 
in the Messiah, and what is the messianic life? What is the structure of messianic time?”237 
 
The second day revolves around the word Klētos. Klētos means “calling.” It is positioned 
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at the centre of the verse, as a conceptual pivot, since the messianic calling is a central 
event in Paul’s individual history. Klēsis (vocation, calling) indicates the particular 
transformation that every juridical status and worldly condition undergoes because of its 
relation to the messianic event. It is a change, almost an internal shifting of each and every 
single worldly condition by virtue of being “called.” According to the apostle, this 
movement means a nullification (by vocation). 
 Paul’s messianic life concerns the formula Hōs mē (“as not”), which is the ultimate 
meaning of Klēsis. Vocation calls for nothing and to no place, “the messianic vocation is 
the revocation of every vocation,”238 the vocation calls the vocation itself, as if it were an 
urgency that worked it from within and hollowed it out, nullifying it in the very gesture of 
maintaining and dwelling in it. This is what it means to live in messianic Klēsis.239 
 The meaning of comparison (or of the comparative), expressed by the particle Hōs, 
was for medieval grammarians not something of an expression of identity or simple 
resemblance, but rather was interpreted240 “as an (intensive and remissive) tension that sets 
one concept against another.”241 The Pauline Hōs mē is a special type of tensor; it does not 
push a concept’s semantic field into that of another, but sets it against itself in the form of 
the “as not.” Thus, the messianic tension does not tend towards elsewhere, nor exhaust 
itself in the difference between two things; according to the principle of messianic Klēsis, 
a condition is set in relation to itself, thus it revokes the condition and undermines it without 
altering its form—the messianic “makes it pass, ... prepares its end.”242 
 In Paul, the messianic nullification performed by Hōs mē is completely inherent 
within Klēsis and does not happen to it at a second time, nor does it add anything to it. The 
messianic vocation is a zone of absolute indiscernibility between immanence and 
 
238 Ibid, 23. 
239 One of the important repercussions of vocation is that the voiding and transforming of every 
vocation frees it for a new usage. An ultimate experience (and experience of the last things) would entail 
experiencing penultimate things (which make up our everyday human and social condition) differently. Thus 
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Kingdom, 19.) 
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transcendence, between the world and the future world. “Factical Klēsis,” writes Agamben, 
“set in relation to itself via the messianic vocation, is not replaced by something else, but 
is rendered inoperative.”243 
 Paul uses the term chrēsai, “make use,” in order to define messianic life in the form 
of the as not, thus to live messianically means “to use” Klēsis. Conversely, messianic Klēsis 
is something to use, not to possess. Paul contrasts messianic usus with dominium; thus, to 
remain in the calling in the form of the as not means never to make the calling an object of 
ownership, only of use. The messianic vocation is not a right nor an identity; it is a generic 
potentiality that can be used without ever being owned. To be messianic, to live in the 
Messiah, signifies the expropriation of any juridical-factical property (for example, 
free/slave, man/woman) under the form of the as not. As Agamben concludes the second 
day: “The coming of the Messiah means that all things, even the subjects who contemplate 
it, are caught up in the as not, called and revoked at one and the same time. No subject 
could watch it or act as if at a given point. The messianic vocation dislocates and, above 
all, nullifies the entire subject.”244 
 
The third day reflects on the idea of separation, as exemplified by the word aphōrismenos, 
while relating this idea to Paul’s dialectic and the messianic event. Aphōrismenos is the 
past participle of aphorizō which means “separated.” Paul’s use of the word seems to be 
paradoxical since, on one hand, he characterizes his vocation in these words, referring to 
himself as the separated one, though on the other hand simultaneously calls for 
universalism, announcing the messianic end of all separation between Jews and pagans. 
How is it possible that Paul’s messianic announcement of non-division coexists with his 
self-definition as a “separated” one? 
 In order to understand the exact meaning of aphōrismenos, Agamben articulates 
the need to correctly situate the fundamental problem of universalism (or Paul’s supposed 
universalism and the “Catholic” vocation of the messianic community). Aphōrismenos, he 
writes, is the Greek translation to the Hebrew term parush or the Aramaic p’rish 
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(“Pharisee”). Paul denounces himself, being a Jew, as a “Pharisee,” that is, as someone 
who was separated. Pharisees were separated ones who “in distinguishing themselves from 
the mass while being essentially laypeople, insisted on scrupulous attention to rules of 
sacerdotal purity.”245 This is how they “separated” themselves from both pagans and am-
ha’aretz (“the ignorant farmers who do not follow the law”). Pharisaism became a 
dominant class within Judaism around the end of the first century BCE, and distinguished 
itself from other factions by claiming that the law did not solely consist of the Torah (that 
is, as a written law) but also as the oral Torah (that is, in a tradition conceived as a “dividing 
wall” surrounding the Torah that prevents contact with any impurity). 
 By defining himself as aphōrismenos (“separated”), Paul alludes to his status as a 
“Pharisee,” referring and negating it in the name of another separation—no longer a 
separation according to the nomos (law), but to the messianic proclamation: “The wall that 
the messianic proclamation brings down, the one announced in aphōrismenos, is the same 
wall that the Pharisee had once maintained around the Torah in order to protect it from the 
am-ha’aretz and the goyim, the non-Jews.”246 
 The principle of the law is thus division. The fundamental partition of Jewish law 
is the one between Jews and non-Jews (in Paul’s words between Ioudaioi and ethnē). In 
the Torah, the concept of “people” is already divided between am and goy (the Septuagint 
translates am with laos and goyim with ethnē). The term yehudi (the Greek Ioudaios), 
which was once designated to the inhabitants of the kingdom of Juda, extends to all the 
members of the am. The term ivri (the Greek is Hebraios), which initially had a juridical 
overtone to it, designates in the rabbinical literature lashon ha-qodesh (“sacred language”) 
but was later on extended to the whole of Israel. Paul uses all three terms: Israel, Hebraios, 
and Ioudaios; thus, one can say that the name itself divides, that “the law constituting Israel 
as am is the principle of incessant division.”247 
 What is Paul’s strategy when confronting this fundamental division? How, from 
the messianic perspective, does he manage to neutralize the partitions of the law? This 
problem, according to Agamben, cannot be separated from the Pauline critique of the law, 
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in which its aporias culminate in the messianic theologoumena. Confronting these 
partitions, Paul puts another division to work that does not coincide with the preceding 
ones, but that is not exterior to them either. The messianic aphorism works on the divisions 
of the laws themselves, imposing upon them a further cut, the cut of “flesh/breath.” Paul 
takes the fundamental division of the law, Jew/non-Jew, leaving no remainder or remnant, 
and further divides it in two via a new division, that of flesh/breath, a (new) division that 
divides the division itself. However, the messianic division introduces a remnant into the 
law’s overall division of the people, and Jews and non-Jews are constitutively “not all.” 
The significance of the “division of divisions” is that it involves an operation that divides 
the divisions of the law themselves, and renders them inoperative without ever reaching a 
final ground: “The messianic vocation separates every Klēsis from itself, engendering a 
tension within itself, without ever providing it with some other identity.”248 
 In order to illuminate this division, Agamben cites Maurice Blanchot, who writes: 
“Man is the indestructible that can be infinitely destroyed.”249 This paradoxical saying 
means that if man is indestructible, there is no human essence to destroy or recover, but if, 
at the same time, man can be infinitely destroyed, it also means that something other than 
this destruction remains, and that “man is this remnant.” In regard to Paul, there is no sense 
in speaking about universalism (thought of as a principle above cuts and divisions, and the 
individual as the ultimate limit of each division)—there is neither beginning nor end in 
Paul, only division of division, and then a remnant. 
 Paul receives the concept of the remnant from the prophetic tradition. The 
corresponding term in Hebrew is she’ar and she’erit. In this tradition the prophets address, 
supposedly, the whole of Israel but claim that only a remnant will be saved. The “remnant 
of Israel” is not a numeric remainder or portion, nor is it identical to Israel in the sense of 
survivals of a human catastrophe. The remnant “is closer to being a consistency or figure 
that Israel assumes in relation to election or to the messianic event. It is therefore neither 
the all, nor a part of the all, but the impossibility for the part and the all to coincide with 
themselves or with each other. At a decisive instant, the elected people, every people, will 
 
248 Ibid, 53. 
249 Quoted in Agamben, The Time that Remains, 53. 
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necessarily situate itself as a remnant, as not-all.”250 
 This is the ultimate meaning of Paul’s aphorism (the messianic–prophetic concept 
of the remnant, his division of divisions): it is not a concept turning toward the future, but 
a present experience that defines the messianic “now”: “In the time of the now a remnant 
is produced.”251 
 Paul’s dialectic brings three elements together without mediation. First, the all 
(pas), is the expression proper to the eschatological telos. At the end of time, as it is said, 
God will be “all in all.” Second, the part (meros) defines the secular world, the time under 
the law. Everything here is divided, is “in part.” Third, the messianic remnant that does not 
go beyond the part (as it results from the part’s division) is initially linked to this division. 
The messianic world, being the secular world, means that it is still in some way partial. 
“Nevertheless,” writes Agamben, “the remnant is precisely what prevents divisions from 
being exhaustive and excludes the parts and the all from the possibility of coinciding with 
themselves. The remnant is not so much the object of salvation as its instrument, that which 
properly makes salvation possible. ... The remnant is therefore both an excess of the all 
with regard to the part, and of the part with regard to the all.”252 In the telos, when God 
will be “all in all,” the messianic remnant will exhaust its meaning, but in “the time of the 
now,” the only real time, there is nothing other than the remnant. Thus, the messianic 
remnant is the unredeemable that makes salvation possible. 
 
On the fourth day, Agamben addresses the term apostolos (which, according to Agamben, 
is grammatically dependent upon aphōrismenos and defines its specific function). The 
meaning of apostolos comes from the Greek verb apostellō, to send forth. The apostle is 
an emissary of the Messiah Jesus and the will of God for the messianic announcement. The 
Hebrew antecedent found in lexicons is Shaliah253—a man who holds a mandate and is 
sent on his specific assignment (Sheluhim, in plural, are those who are sent to the Diaspora). 
 Why does Paul define himself as an apostle rather than a prophet? The explanation 
 
250 Ibid, 55. 
251 Ibid. 
252 Ibid, 57. 
253 The term Shaliah is essentially a juridical notion that in Judaism acquires a religious meaning. 
 
 
87 
to Paul’s self-definition, according to Agamben, lies in the differences between the two 
figures. The legacy of the prophet (the navi) in Judaism, and in general in Antiquity, 
extends over the threshold of modernity and never completely vanished.254 The prophet 
has an unmediated relation to the “ruah Yahweh” (“the breath of Yahweh”) and speaks on 
his behalf; the apostle, on the other hand, on his mission, searches independently for the 
words of the message. This is the first difference between them. 
 The second difference concerns their relation to the future: the prophet always 
speaks about a time to come, a time not yet present, while the apostle declares from the 
arrival of the Messiah, when prophecy is kept silent as it is now truly fulfilled. The time of 
the apostle is thus the present, and is the reason why Paul’s technical term for the messianic 
event is ho nyn kairos, “the time of the now.”255 
 The apostle must be distinguished from another figure, the visionary, with whom 
he is often confused, just as messianic time is often confused with eschatological time. The 
messianic announcement is often confused not so much with prophecy (which concerns 
the future) but with apocalypse (which contemplates the end of times). The apostle, 
however, does not live in the time of the eschaton (the end of time). The difference then 
between messianism and apocalypse, between the apostle and the visionary, is that the 
visionary sees the day of judgement, the last day, and describes what he sees, whereas the 
messianic is not the end of time but the time of the end.256 The messianic is the relation of 
every moment, every kairos, to the end of time and eternity. The apostle is not interested 
in the last day, but in the time that contracts itself and begins to end; or, in other words, the 
time that remains between time and its end. The messianic time, the time that the apostle 
lives in and is interested in, is neither the ordinary present (olam hazzeh, chronological 
time, the time between creation and the last day) nor the time that will come after the end 
of the world (olam habba, the time after the world, the apocalyptic eschaton).257 The 
 
254 For instance, Aby Warburg marked both Nietzsche and Burckhardt as opposite kinds of navi, the 
first towards the future and the latter towards the past; Foucault defines the prophet as one of the four figures 
of truth-tellers. 
255 In Judaism, prophecy is “something like a force or a tension that is in constant struggle with other 
forces that seek to limit it in its modalities, primarily in its time.” (Agamben, The Time that Remains, 60.) 
The first profound legitimate prophecy thus is time-marked with the destruction of the Temple in 587 BCE. 
256 See also Agamben, The Church and the Kingdom, 8. 
257 Greek-speaking Jews distinguished between aiones: ho aion touto (this aeon) and ho aion mellon 
(the coming aeon). (Agamben, “The Time that Is Left,” 2.) 
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apostle is interested in the remnant, in the time that remains between the two times, “when 
the division of time is itself divided.”258 Therefore, messianic time should not be mistaken 
for eschatological time, thus making the specificity of what constitutes messianic time 
unthinkable. As opposed to attempts to understand the Christian conception of time (time 
oriented toward eschatological salvation, toward final end) as antithetical to modernity’s 
conception of time and history, Paul’s messianic time puts into question the very possibility 
of a clear division between the two worlds. 
 Additionally, the time between the Resurrection and the end of time (that is, the 
time that remains, the messianic time) means a radical transformation of our experience of 
time—it cannot be conceived in chronological terms but as time within (chronological) 
time, a time that transforms chronological time from within. Agamben writes (elsewhere): 
“On the one hand it is the time that time takes to end. But on the other hand it is the time 
that remains, the time which we need to end time, to confront our customary image of time 
and to liberate ourselves from it.”259 The time in which we believe we live in makes us 
powerless spectators of our own lives; the messianic time, however, is the time we 
ourselves are, when we grasp that we are nothing but that time. This is the only real time 
and to experience it we need to go through a transformation of ourselves and of our ways 
of living. 
 Agamben’s next step confronts the crucial need for an adequate representation of 
messianic time. How should this time be represented? The secular time, the chronos, spans 
from creation to the messianic event, that is, the resurrection of Jesus in which thereafter 
time contracts itself and begins to end. This contracted time, which Paul calls “the time of 
the now,” lasts until the parousia,260 the full presence of the Messiah, which coincides with 
the end of time (and which is nonetheless a point in time that remains indeterminate even 
if it is imminent). According to this description, messianic time does not however coincide 
with either the end of time nor with the secular chronological time (but is not outside the 
chronological time either). Messianic time is that part in secular time that undergoes an 
 
258 Agamben, The Time that Remains, 62. 
259 Agamben, The Church and the Kingdom, 12. 
260 “In Greek, parousia simply means presence (par-ousia literally signifies to be next to; in this way, 
being is besides itself in the present).” (Agamben, The Time that Remains, 70.) 
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entirely transformative contraction. Thus, messianic time might be better represented as a 
“caesura which, in its dividing the division between two times, introduces a remainder into 
it that exceeds the division.”261 In this schema, messianic time is part of secular time (but 
exceeds it chronologically), and at the same time, is part of eternity (but exceeds the future 
time). It is situated as a remainder with regard to the division between the two worlds. The 
problem with this representation of time is that it is based on spatial order (in the form of 
lines, points, and segments) that renders unthinkable the lived experience of time (the 
confusion between eschaton and messianic time is a prime example for that): spatial 
representations represent perfectly but make it also unthinkable; whereas reflecting upon 
the lived (or real) experience of time makes it thinkable but unrepresentable. Where does 
this gap between representation and thought, image and experience, come from? Is another 
representation of time possible? 
 
In order to resolve this perplexity, Agamben draws on the idea of operational time 
(formulated in full by the French linguist and philologist Gustave Guillaume in his work 
Temps et verbe, which deals, in this sense, in the temporality of verbs). According to this 
idea, “the human mind experiences time, but it does not possess the representation of it, 
and must, in representing it, take recourse to constructions of a spatial order.”262 The 
representation of time as an infinite line made out of two segments (past and future) 
separated by the cutting of the present (a representation he names “time-image”) is 
inadequate, according to Guillaume, since it presents time as if it were always constructed, 
but does not show time in the act of being constructed in thought. One needs to represent 
something not only in its achieved state but also in its various phases through which thought 
had to pass constructing it, thus: “Guillaume defines ‘operational time’ as the time the mind 
takes to realize a time-image.”263 As per Guillaume, language (which he investigates from 
the point of view of the Aristotelian distinction between potential and act) can organize the 
constructed image by referring it back to the operational time in which it was constructed; 
and in regard to the chronological representation of time, the process of forming the time-
 
261 Agamben, The Time that Remains, 64. 
262 Quoted in Agamben, The Time that Remains, 65. 
263 Ibid, 65–66. 
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image can be cast back onto the time-image itself (adding a projection to this process). The 
result is a chronogenetic time, “a time which includes its own genesis,” 264  a new 
representation of time that is no longer linear but three-dimensional (pure state of 
potentiality, process of formation, and the state of final construction). 
 In his introduction to Guillaume’s book, Canadian linguistic Walter Hirtle 
maintains that in his attempt to reach a deeper level of language, Guillaume determines an 
insight that provided the cornerstone for all of his later theorizing, that is, “that something 
is potential before it is actual.”265 This led Guillaume to theorize about how we think the 
possible and the real, realizing that in order to represent an event (in subjunctive mood) 
one needs to give it precedence, must think it prior to thinking it as real (in indicative 
mood). The only time this becomes possible is the “‘thinking time’ required by the mental 
process of representing a verb.”266 Thus, the system of mood, as Guillaume names it, 
means that is it essentially a single, subconscious operation of thought, determined by the 
underlying principle of analysis: operative time. The grammatical system is a mechanism 
in the mind that produces successive morphemes (i.e., the smallest grammatical unit that 
carries meaning, in a certain language) at different moments in the operation of thought, 
“as a potential meaning determined by its relative position in the operation involved.”267 
Each morpheme is defined according to its position in the micro-stretch of time required 
for a mental process to unroll. The operative time of the system determines the “notional 
chronology” of the morphemes involved and their respective potential meaning as the 
consequences of their position within the system. The processes of language, for 
Guillaume, thus determines everything that can be understood regarding it. Language 
resides in the depth of the mind as an organized set of possible processes. The potential 
and the actual in language thus link in a subconscious morphogenetic process in order to 
produce a word, showing that a word (once described as a “miniature of art”) must be 
assembled by the speaker before being used in a sentence. Guillaume’s perspective of 
operative time enabled him a holistic view of language in which the potential and the actual 
 
264 Agamben, “The Time that Is Left,” 5. 
265 Quoted in Guillaume, Foundations for a Science of Language, xiii. 
266 Ibid. 
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are parts of a single phenomenon. Exploring further the passage from the potential to the 
actual, from system to sentence, Guillaume analyses the grammatical systems within the 
word, specifically those concerned with representing time within verbs (which he termed 
chronogenesis). His studies indicated that “all the individual grammatical systems of a 
language can be seen as particular cases of one general system of representation.”268 He 
thus looked for the most general system that provides the underlying structural mechanism 
of the word, and finally found it in the most transparent of all words—the article. The 
mental operation underlying the system of the article consists of double movement: the 
first, from the universal to the particular; the second, following on the first in operative 
“thinking,” from the particular to the universal. To each movement corresponds a sign: for 
the first (contractive movement), the indefinite article (un, a); for the second (expansive 
movement), the definite article (le, the). This form of the movements or this mechanism, 
for Guillaume, “could provide a representation of any variable relationship based on 
quantity ... and he evoked it to depict the relation within the verb between time as an infinite 
stretch and time as a finite stretch (the present).” 269  This all-embracing language 
mechanism reflects one of the basic capabilities of human thought: the ability to generalize 
and to particularize. 
 Guillaume further writes: “Science is founded on the insight that the world of 
appearances tells of hidden things, things which appearances reflect but do not resemble. 
One such insight is that what seems to be disorder in language hides an underlying order 
— a wonderful order.”270 Guillaume speaks in terms of spatiality both in regard to things 
and order, thus it comes as no surprise to encounter his claim that “already to be found in 
Temps et verbe is the idea that time is constructed in terms of space on n dimensions.”271 
The monograph exemplifies, according to Guillaume, the construction of time on the model 
of space, according to the principle that time is not representable by itself but requires to 
base its representations on spatial characteristics. The representation of time, the 
chronogenesis, is a spatialization of time. When the human mind does not carry out the 
 
268 Ibid, xiv. 
269 Ibid, xvi. 
270 Guillaume, Foundations for a Science of Language, 3. 
271 Ibid, 6. Guillaume will continue developing the concept of the spatialization of time in his work 
L’architectonique du temps dans les langues classiques. 
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representation of time according to these measures, time has no representation; it does not 
mean that it does not exist but rather that it exists in thought only as our experience does: 
“The human mind ... has the experience of time, but has no representation of it (it must, 
therefore, invent this representation, which will be a spatialization, representability being 
a property of space, and of space alone).”272 
 
Once applied to the problem of messianic time, the paradigm of operational time implies 
another time that is not entirely consumed by the “previous” representation of time,273 as 
if man produces, in regard to chronological time, an additional time that prevents him from 
perfectly coinciding with the time out of which he is able to make images and 
representations. The idea of operational time demonstrates our inability to coincide with 
our image of time since it effects a gap between our experience and conception of the 
present moment. This is not a time added from the outside of chronological time nor a time-
supplement; it is a time within time, an interior time that measures the disconnection (and 
being out of synch, being non-coincidental) from our representation of time, 274  “but 
precisely because of this, allows for the possibility of my achieving and taking hold of 
it.”275 The space that the messianic time opens between ourselves and our representations 
of time permits us access to this transformative force at every instant, and thus we take 
hold of chronological time in a manner determined by the messianic event. 
 Agamben proceeds and offers a first definition of messianic time: “[M]essianic time 
is the time that time takes to come to an end, or, more precisely, the time we take to bring 
to an end, to achieve our representation of time.”276 It is an operational time pressing from 
within chronological time, working and transforming it internally, “the time we need to 
 
272 Ibid. 
273 Messianic time, being the time it takes for a temporal representation to be accomplished, opposes 
secular time, which is a homogenous time comprised of completed “time-images” or representations. Secular 
time contains within itself a second time that is required for the completion of the construction of 
representation, yet remains unaccounted for. 
274 The disjointedness of messianic time indicates presence by marking our non-coincidence with it. 
Moreover, the gap that operational time measures further marks the non-coincidence also of thought with 
language, that is, the impossibility of an absolute sustained self-presence. Thus, messianic time is the measure 
of the disconnection of both oneself from one’s image of time and subjective language. (Doussan, “Time and 
Presence in Agamben’s Critique of Deconstruction,” 198.) 
275 Agamben, The Time that Remains, 67. 
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make time end: the time that is left us [il tempo che ci resta].277 Operational time, the time 
that remains, is what’s left of time (as a remnant) once it has exhausted itself in the actual. 
Whereas our representation of chronological time separates us from ourselves as impotent 
spectators, messianic time, an operational time in which we take hold of ourselves, is the 
time that we ourselves have, “the only real time, the only time we have.”278 
 Agamben reaches a point in the analysis where he can now better articulate the 
structure of messianic time in Paul. The messianic event is decomposed into two times: 
resurrection and parousia (the second coming of Jesus, and the full presence of the Messiah, 
both occur at the end of time). This decomposition implies the paradoxical tension between 
an already and a not yet that defines the Pauline conception of salvation, meaning that the 
messianic event has already happened (salvation has already been achieved), but in order 
to truly be fulfilled requires an additional time (thus not yet). This unusual scission 
introduces a constitutive delay or deferment into the messianic. 279  The Pauline 
decomposition of presence thus finds its true meaning from the perspective of operational 
time: as operational time, as the amount of time needed to end representations of time, the 
messianic ho nyn kairos (“the time of the now”) can never fully coincide with a 
chronological moment internal to its representation (the end of time as a time-image 
represented by a final point on a continuous line of chronology). But as an image devoid 
of time, it can never be grasped and thus tends to infinitely defer itself. The fallacious and 
inadequate representation of the end lies in changing operational time into a supplementary 
time added onto chronological time in order to infinitely postpone the end. Parousia does 
 
277 Ibid, 68. Elsewhere appears a slightly different translation of the Italian: “the time which is left to 
us.” (Agamben, “The Time that Is Left,” 5.) 
278 Ibid. Paul twice uses the expression ton kairon exagorazomenoi, “buying up time,” to convey the 
temporal condition of messianic time. 
279 Agamben mentions Gershom Scholem’s interpretation of messianic time according to which the 
messianic antinomy is defined as “a life lived in deferment” in which nothing can be achieved, that is, as if 
the messianic event is a transitional time that belongs to both eras and thus tends to be prolonged into infinity 
and renders unreachable the end that it supposedly produces. (Agamben, The Time that Remains, 70.) 
Scholem’s thesis (appearing in his essay “Towards an Understanding of the Messianic Idea of Judaism” of 
1959) is also referred to by Agamben in “The Messiah and the Sovereign: Problem of Law in Walter 
Benjamin,” where Agamben cites the following: “[M]essianism is animated by two opposed tensions: the 
first is restorative tendency aiming at restitutio in integrum [total reinstatement] of the origin; the second is 
a utopian impulse turned instead toward the future and renewal.” (Agamben, Potentialities, 166.) These 
opposed forces explain the antinomies of messianism and its essential character (“a life lived in deferral and 
delay”) in which nothing can be brought to fulfillment and nothing accomplished once and for all; thus 
messianism possesses a tension that never finds true release. 
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not mean the “second coming” of Jesus (a second messianic event that follows and 
subsumes the first one), it does not signal a supplement added to something in order to 
complete it nor a supplement that follows that can never reach fulfillment. Parousia for 
Paul highlights the innermost structure of the messianic event, inasmuch as it is comprised 
of two heterogenous times (kairos and chronos, operational time and represented time)280 
that are coextensive but that cannot be added together. Agamben writes: 
 
Messianic presence lies besides itself, since, without ever coinciding with a 
chronological instant, and without ever adding itself onto it, it seizes hold 
of this instant and brings it forth to fulfillment. ... The Messiah has already 
arrived, the messianic event has already happened, but its presence contains 
within itself another time, which stretches its parousia, not in order to defer 
it, but, on the contrary, to make it graspable. For this reason, each instant 
may be, to use Benjamin’s words, the ‘small door through which the 
Messiah enters.’ The Messiah always already had his time, meaning he 
simultaneously makes time his and brings it to fulfillment.281 
 
Moreover, Paul expresses messianic time via two complementary notions: Typos and 
Recapitulation. Typos means figure,282 prefiguration or foreshadowing, and is used by 
Paul to establish a typological relation between every event from past time and ho nyn 
kairos, messianic time. The important thing, however, is not this symmetry but the 
transformation of time implied by this typological relation. The problem here is mainly 
concerned with a tension that clasps together and transforms past and future in an 
inseparable constellation. The messianic is not just one of two terms in this typological 
relation, it is the relation itself. The two ends of the olam hazzeh and the olam habba are 
contracted into each other without ever coinciding—this contraction is messianic time.283 
For Paul, the messianic is not a third era situated between two times but rather a caesura 
 
280 Kairos and chronos are opposed to each other as they are qualitatively heterogeneous. The relation 
between them is characterized in the Corpus Hippocraticum: “[C]hronos is that in which there is kairos, and 
kairos is that in which there is little chronos.” (Agamben, The Time that Remains, 68–69.) Kairos (banally 
translated as “occasion”) does not have another time at its disposal; when we seize kairos we do not have 
another time, but a contracted and abridged chronos. 
281 Agamben, The Time that Remains, 70–71. 
282 Of the concept of “figure” in relation to language, see Agamben, The Coming Community, 59. 
283 Paul speaks about “for us, for whom the extremities of the times have met, are face to face” (quoted 
in Agamben, “The Time that Is Left,” 9), that is, the two extremities of the olam hazzeh and the olam habba 
contact one another, “their face-to-face is messianic time.” (Agamben, “The Time that Is Left,” 9.) 
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that divides the division between times and introduces a remnant, a zone of undecidability, 
in which the past is dislocated into the present and the present is extended into the past. 
Messianic time, according to Agamben, is neither the complete nor the incomplete, neither 
the past nor the future, but the inversion of both.284 This inverse movement is perfectly 
rendered in the Pauline typological relation as an area of tension in which two times enter 
into a constellation that the apostle called ho nyn kairos. The past (the complete) 
rediscovers actuality and becomes unfulfilled, and the present (the incomplete) acquires a 
kind of fulfillment. 
 A recapitulation of all things, from creation to the messianic “now,” is what 
messianic time does. This recapitulation of the past produces a plērōma, a saturation and 
fulfillment of kairoi (messianic kairoi are full of chronos, but abbreviated, summary 
chronos) that anticipates eschatological plērōma when God “will be all in all.” Messianic 
plērōma is therefore an abridgement and anticipation of eschatological fulfillment. The 
plērōma of kairoi is understood as the relation of each instant to the Messiah (each kairoi 
is immediate to God and not just the final result of a process, as in the case, writes 
Agamben, with the model Marxism inherited from Hegel). Each time is the messianic now, 
whereas the messianic is not the chronological end of time “but the present as the exigency 
of fulfillment, what gives itself ‘as an end’.”285 
 The widespread view of messianic time as oriented solely toward the future is 
fallacious. For Paul, the moment of salvation is not solely about the future, but on the 
contrary, recapitulation means that ho nyn kairos is a contraction of past and present, that 
the entire past is summarily contained in the present, that we will have to “settle our debts, 
at the decisive moment, first and foremost with the past.”286 The Pauline gesture has a 
double movement as it produces a tension (toward what lies ahead) on and out of what lies 
behind. This is why Paul, caught in this double tension, can neither seize hold of himself 
 
284 Agamben’s idea of “inversion” is based upon Gershom Scholem’s text (dedicated to Benjamin) 
where Scholem maintains that messianic time is the time of inverse waw (waw is a Hebrew letter that, when 
added to a verb, “inverts” it from future to past time and vice versa.) See Scholem, “95 Thesen über Judentum 
und Zionismus.” 
285 Agamben, The Time that Remains, 76. 
286 Ibid, 78. 
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nor be fulfilled.287 
 In the “Epistle to the Ephesians” (Eph 1:10), Paul writes: “[F]or the economy of the 
plenitude of time, all things, both in heaven and on earth, recapitulate themselves in the 
messiah.”288 Messianic time thus recapitulates all times, summates the whole history, now 
appears in the messianic now. The whole past is summarized and unfolds itself as a 
“figure,” not in the sense of simple foreshadowing but as “a constellation and a contraction 
of the two times, so that the whole past, the whole of history is, so to say, summarily 
contained in the present, and the claim of a remnant to posit itself as a whole finds here its 
foundation.”289 The summarized past of the messianic pertains to a special kind of memory 
where at its core one finds “the economy of salvation,” that is, a past that is exclusively 
individual past, thus a past that potentially opens up for man a new (past) possibility that 
enables him to “take leave from this past.” 
 
The last two days of the seminar (fifth and sixth) unfold the phrase ending eis euaggelion 
Theou (“for the gospel of God”). In Paul, the Greek punctuation eis, which signals a general 
movement toward something, can take on a terminological quality. Euaggelion (like the 
Hebrew bsora) means the “announcement” and “joyful message” announced by the 
euaggelos, the messenger of joy. The term signifies both the announcement and its content. 
 As we saw earlier, the temporal structure implied by the apostle’s euaggelion differs 
from that of the prophet—the announcement refers not to a future event but to a present 
fact. Thus, there is an underlying connection between the trio announcement-faith-presence 
(euaggelion-pistis-parousia), exemplified by Origen’s writing: “Euaggelion is either a 
discourse [logos] which contains the presence [parousia] of a good for the believer, or a 
 
287 Elsewhere, Agamben writes that messianic time, the being-contemporary with the Messiah, is the 
example par excellence for the term we encountered earlier, that is, “contemporariness,” exemplified by the 
one who manages to use the fracture of time as a meeting place for times and generations: “Not only is this 
time [i.e., “the time of the now”] chronologically indeterminate (the parousia, the return of Christ that signals 
the end is certain and near, though not a calculable point), but it also has the singular capacity of putting 
every instant of the past in direct relationship with itself, of making every moment or episode of biblical 
history a prophecy or a prefiguration (Paul prefers the term typos, figure) of the present (thus Adam, through 
whom humanity received death and sin, is a ‘type’ or figure of the Messiah, who brings about redemption 
and life to human being).” (Agamben, What Is an Apparatus? and Other Essays, 53.) 
288 Quoted in Agamben, “The Time that Is Left,” 9. 
289 Agamben, “The Time that Is Left,” 10. 
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discourse which announces that an awaited good is present [pareinai].”290 What is a logos 
that can enact a presence for whomever hears it and believes in it? 
 Paul’s letter, according to Agamben, which contains the term euaggelion (and 
appears in the incipit and at the same time coincides with the content of the message 
announced) is thus the impossibility of distinguishing between the announcement and the 
content. At every point, the text of the letter is indistinguishable from the announcement 
and the announcement from the good announced. 
 This zone of indistinction is called pistis, faith, by Paul. “Paul defines,” writes 
Agamben, “the essential relation between euaggelion and pistis in the following terms: ‘the 
announcement is power [dynamis] for the salvation of he who believes [panti to 
pisteuonti]’” 291 —this definition implies that inasmuch as the announcement entails 
dynamis, potentiality (dynamis signifies power as much as it does possibility), it needs the 
complement of faith for it to be effectual. Being aware of the Greek opposition of 
potentiality (dynamis) and act (energeia), Paul often couples faith with energeia, being in 
act, so that faith (in relation to potentiality) is energumen, the principle of actuality and 
operativity. This principle is not external to the announcement, but the thing within it that 
makes potentiality active; at the same time, it may be presented as the very content of what 
is announced. Faith is the announcement’s being in act, its energeia. 
 Euaggelion is not merely a discourse—logos disconnected from what is announced 
and the subject that announces it. It is given as a Plērophoria (pleros, “full, fulfilled” + 
phoreō, “carrying,” “be transported”), something that is brought into fullness without any 
gap left over. It is not an announcement empty in itself, but nevertheless could be believed 
and verified. It is born in the faith of the one who utters it and who hears and lives in it 
exclusively. Agamben writes: “Faith consists in being fully persuaded of the necessary 
unity of promise and realization: ‘[Abraham] being fully persuaded that he who promised 
is equally capable of doing.’ The announcement is the form the promise assumes in the 
contraction of messianic time.”292 
 Paul uses the verb Katargeō, a compound of argeō (that derives from the adjective 
 
290 Quoted in Agamben, The Time that Remains, 89. 
291 Ibid, 90. 
292 Ibid, 91. 
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argos) meaning “inoperative, not-at-work (a-ergos), inactive.” The compound thus means 
“I make inoperative, I deactivate, I suspend the efficacy.” Before Paul, it was in use as the 
form argeō in the Septuagint as a translation of the Hebrew word that signifies rest on 
Saturday or the sabbatical suspension of work. In Greek, the positive equivalent of 
katargeō is energeō (“I put to work, I activate”). The etymological opposition with energeō 
demonstrates that katargeō signals a taking out of energeia, a taking out of the act. In the 
opposition (that Paul uses) between dynamis/energeia, potentiality/act, the messianic 
enacts an inversion, that is, a moment when potentiality passes over into actuality and meets 
up with its telos. It does not happen in the form of force or ergon, but in the form of 
astheneia, weakness. Paul formulates this principle of messianic inversion in the 
potential/act relation: “‘Power [or potentiality] realizes itself in weakness’ [dynamis en 
astheneia teleitai] (2 Cor 12:9); and “‘when I am weak, then am I powerful.’”293 
 In accordance with the Greek principle according to which privation (sterēsis) and 
im-potentiality (adynamia) maintain a kind of potentiality, Paul likewise believed that 
messianic power does not wear itself out in the ergon, but remains powerful in it in the 
form of weakness. Messianic dynamis is constitutively “weak” but precisely for this reason 
it enacts its effects. This is the messianic inversion of the potential/act relation. The 
messianic power is realized and acts in the form of weakness, not by annihilation or 
destruction, but by deactivation, by rendering inoperative, thus giving potentiality back (to 
whatever was worked on) in the form of inoperativity and ineffectiveness, and restoring it 
(the thing worked on) to the state of potentiality (in order, at the later stage, to fulfill it): 
“That which is deactivated, taken out of energeia, is not annulled, but conserved and held 
onto for its fulfillment. ... [K]atargēsis is not the destruction of being (aphanisis tes ousia), 
but the progression toward a better state.”294 
 Luther, writes Agamben, translates the Pauline verb katargein as Aufheben—the 
word that harbours the double meaning of abolishing and conserving found at the centre of 
Hegel dialectics. Thus, a genuinely messianic term becomes a key term for dialectics, and 
in this sense Hegel’s dialectic is nothing more than a secularization of Christian theology 
 
293 Quoted in Agamben, The Time that Remains, 97. 
294 Ibid, 98. 
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(i.e., Hegel used a messianic weapon against theology furnished by theology itself). If this 
genealogy of Aufhebung is correct, then not only does Hegelian thought involve 
hermeneutic struggle with the messianic (in the sense of it being a conscious interpretation 
and secularization of messianic theme), but so does modernity (as the epoch that is situated 
under the sign of the dialectical Aufhebung). Based on Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, 
which, through its discussion of Aufhebung exposes the structure of linguistic signification 
by showing that language is always already caught up in a history and a time, the 
connection and difference between the problem of aufhebung and messianic time is shown: 
while messianic time (as operational time) also introduces a disconnection and delay into 
represented time, it cannot be attached onto time as a supplement or as infinite deferment. 
The messianic, the ungraspable quality of the “now,” is the opening through which we 
seize hold of time, achieving our representation of time, making it end. The messianic 
exigency reemerges in Hegel in the problem of the plērōma of times and the end of 
history—he thinks the plērōma not as each instant’s relation to the Messiah (as Paul does, 
via the Torah), but as the final result of a global process. 
 Both important interpreters of Hegel, Alexandre Koyré and Alexandre Kojève (who 
think the possibility of the Hegelian system in terms of the end of history), end up flattening 
out the messianic into the eschatological, mixing the problem of messianic time with the 
problem of post-history (Kojève’s concept of déœuvrement, a good translation of Pauline 
katargein, “inoperativity,” appears in his definition of the post-historical condition of 
man).295 
 
295  Analogous conclusions could be drawn, according to Agamben, regarding the central concepts of 
twentieth-century (linguistic) thought: privative opposition, degree zero, the surplus of the signifier, as well 
as the trace and the originary supplement. Nikolai Trubetzkoy’s idea of privative opposition shows that, once 
the opposition is neutralized, the marked term loses its value whereas the unmarked term remains as the only 
relevant term, taking the role of archiphoneme (or zero-degree signification) and representing all distinctive 
characteristics common to both terms [for Trubetzkoy “neutralization” is Aufhebung since it implies the unity 
of opposites; in the Aufhebung the opposition is both lifted and preserved as the zero degree of difference 
which works by opposing itself to the mere absence of phoneme (the philosophical ground for this concept 
is found in Aristotelian ontology of privation). Lévi-Strauss will later on develop these concepts in his theory 
of the signifier’s constitutive surplus in its relation to the signified, a surplus that translates into free signifiers 
void of meaning in themselves, signs in the state of déœuvrement and Aufhebung that mark the necessity of 
a supplementary symbolic content]. 
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1.2.2 
The Time that Remains ends with a “threshold” (or Tornada as Agamben titles it). In this 
final passage, we come full circle (in our attempt to analyze messianic time, to formulate a 
concept of time that will condition a concept of history) back to Agamben’s positioning of 
the messianic concept in modern thought, particularly that of Benjamin. 
 Benjamin’s image of the hunchback dwarf, taken from the “Theses on the 
Philosophy of History,” assists him in portraying “the very text of the philosophy of history 
as a chessboard upon which a crucial theoretical battle unfolds, and which, we are to 
assume, is even lent a hand by a hidden theologian concealed between the lines of the 
text.”296 Who is this hunchback theologian? 
 In order to answer this question, according to Agamben, we have to better 
understand the role of citation in Benjamin’s work. Citation serves a strategic function; it 
is the mediator that enables secret meetings between past and present generations, as well 
as between past and present writings, thus citation is required to perform in secrecy. 
Sperren, in German, is translated as “spacing”—it refers to the method in typography of 
substituting italics with a script that places a space between each letter if that word is to be 
 
 Derrida critiques the primacy of presence in the metaphysical tradition by showing how metaphysics 
always already presupposes non-presence and signification. His idea of “originary supplement” is not 
something that is added externally to something else, but comes to supplement a lack and non-originary 
presence, both always already caught up in a signifying. The concept of the “trace” names the impossibility 
of a sign to be extinguished in the fullness of presence. The trace must be conceived as “before being,” the 
thing itself, always already as sign, the signified always already in the position of signifier. There is no 
nostalgia for origin since there is no origin; the origin is produced as a retroactive effect of non-origin and a 
trace. Although these concepts call into question the primacy of presence and signification, they do not 
question signification in general; they presuppose the impossibility of an extinguishing of the sign, they 
presuppose that there is still signification beyond presence and absence, that non-presence still signifies 
something, it posits itself as an “arch-trace,” a sort of archiphoneme between presence and absence. The 
arche-trace shows its link and difference from the Hegelian Aufhebung with its messianic theme. The 
movement of Aufhebung, which achieves signification, becomes a principle of infinite deferment. A 
signification that only signifies itself can never seize hold of itself, rather it is displaced and deferred in one 
and the same gesture, thus the trace is a suspended Aufhebung that will never come to know its full plērōma. 
Deconstruction thus is a suspension of the messianic. 
 A metaphysical concept which takes as its prime focus a moment of foundation and origin coexists with 
a messianic concept which focuses on a moment of fulfillment. Messianic and historic is the idea that 
fulfillment is possible by retrieving and revoking foundation. If we drop the messianic theme and focus only 
on the moment of foundation and origin (or their absence), we are left with empty, zero-degree signification 
with history as its infinite deferment. 
296 Agamben, The Time that Remains, 138. 
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highlighted. Benjamin himself uses this method, which, from a palaeographic standpoint, 
represents the opposite of how authors use abbreviations (in order to be read in full or 
because some words should not be read at all). As Agamben writes: “These spaced words 
are, in a certain way, hyperread: they are read twice, and, as Benjamin suggests, this double 
reading may be the palimpsest of citation.”297 In the second thesis, Benjamin writes: “Like 
every generation that precedes us, we have been endowed with a w e a k messianic 
power.”298 He refers, so it seems, back to Paul and his conception of the weakness of 
messianic power. Thus, the hidden Pauline text within the theses makes Benjamin’s use of 
words and typography a form of citation without quotation marks, “and it is precisely this 
hyperlegibility, this secret presence of the Pauline text in Benjamin’s Theses, that is 
signaled discretely by this spacing.”299 
 Now we can better identify the hunchback theologian who secretly guides the 
puppet of historical materialism in Benjamin’s text. Benjamin’s concept of the “image” 
(wherein the past and present are united in a constellation, and wherein the present 
recognizes the meaning of the past and the past finds its meaning and fulfilment) relates to 
Paul’s “typological relation,” where the past and the future enter a similar constellation, 
where a moment from the past must be recognized as the typos (figure) of the messianic 
now.300 The fact that Paul writes, “[H]e who is an image of the one who was to come,” 
causes Benjamin to speak of an image and not a figure; additionally, Benjamin’s own 
words “the true image of the past f l e e s by,” propels Agamben to claim that Benjamin 
took from Paul the idea that the image of the past runs the risk of disappearing completely 
 
297 Ibid, 139. 
298 Quoted in Agamben, The Time that Remains, 139. The word is spaced in Benjamin’s original 
(Handexemplar) manuscript in German, and merely italicized in the English translation (See Benjamin, 
“Theses on the Philosophy of History,” 254.) 
299 Agamben, The Time that Remains, 140.  
300 Typology will become, in the Middle Ages, an interpretive system in Christian thought wherein 
people, events, and passages of the Old Testament are seen as prefigurations of New Testament (in order to 
prove that the New is a fulfillment of the Old). 
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if the present fails to recognize itself in it.301 
 Benjamin’s concept of “the now of legibility” (or knowability) defines a genuinely 
hermeneutic principle (in opposition to the idea that any work may become the object of 
infinite interpretations at any given time) according to which every text contains a historical 
index indicating both its belonging to a determinate epoch, as well as its only coming forth 
to full legibility at a determinate historical moment. In The Arcades Project, writes 
Agamben, Benjamin included the following note (N3, 1) that confided his “most extreme 
messianic formulation,” a note that also serves Agamben as his final conclusion to the 
 
301  Elsewhere in reference to Paul, Agamben mentions Benjamin, who writes (as we recall) that 
“[e]very day, every instant, is the small gate through which the messiah enters.” (Quoted in Agamben, The 
Church and the Kingdom, 5.) The accurate quote, taken from Benjamin’s addendum to the “Theses on the 
Philosophy of History,” reads as follows: “For every second of time was the strait gate through which the 
Messiah might enter.” (Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” 264.) Benjamin’s conception of 
messianic time is an emphasis of the redemptive potentiality of the non-chronological present that, in the 
context of the Pauline epistles, bears a relation not only to Judaism but also to the Church. [On the Jewish 
indebtedness to Benjamin, see, among others: Stéphane Mosès, The Angel of History: Rosenzweig, Benjamin, 
Scholem (trans. Barbara Harshar), Standford: Stanford University Press, 2009; Eric Jacobson, Metaphysics 
of the Profane: The Political Theology of Walter Benjamin and Gershom Scholem, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2003; and Susan A. Handelman, Fragments of Redemption: Jewish Thought and Literary 
Theory in Benjamin, Scholem, and Levinas, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1991.] As Agamben 
shows in The Church and the Kingdom, since messianic time does not mean chronology but a qualitative 
change in how time is experienced, in the original positioning of the Church it makes no sense to speak in 
terms of chronology—there is no time for delay. Thus Paul, when addressing the Thessalonians, speaks about 
the “Day of the Lord” in present tense; or in the Gospels, when referring to the Messiah, he is called ho 
erchomenos, “he who comes,” he who never ceases to come. Messianic time (the term Agamben was using 
in The Time that Remains to replace the term “kairology” in Infancy and History) is set in opposition to the 
historical dialectic of progress and its logic of deferral, for example, the future coming of the Messiah who 
will redeem mankind and bring history to an end. Instead, both Agamben and Benjamin conceive of the 
messianic event as a potentiality of the present situation, or, as Benjamin once described his surrealist alarm 
clock, a clock that rings “sixty seconds every minute.” 
 The Greek term Paroikousa means the manner in which foreigners (and those in exile) dwell, as opposed 
to the Greek verb, katoikein, which designates how a citizen of the city dwells. Paroikein designates how a 
Christian ought to live in this world as well as his experience of time or messianic time. The experience of 
time proper to the Church is defined by the ecclesiastical tradition as “ho chronos tē paroikias” (Agamben, 
The Church and the Kingdom, 2), that is, parochial time (in the sense of sojourning like a foreigner). 
Sojourning here does not mean a fixed period of time nor is it to be understood in the sense of chronological 
time, but in the sense that the Church sojourns on earth for a prolonged period of time without altering its 
messianic experience of time. This position preceded, according to Agamben, the Church’s later position that 
took place on the background of the “delay of the parousia” (Ibid, 4): “Paroika and parousia, the sojourn of 
the foreigner and the presence of the messiah, have the same structure, expressed in Greek through the 
preposition pará: a presence that distends time, an already that is also a not yet, a delay that does not put off 
until later but, instead, a disconnection within the present moment that allows us to grasp time.” (Ibid, 26.) 
The initial Christian community expected the imminent arrival of the messiah (and thus the end of time) but 
was confronted with an inexplicable delay and thus had to reorganize its institutional and juridical 
organization, a repositioning resulting in the Christian community ceasing to paroikein (to sojourn as 
foreigners) so as to begin to katoikein (to live like a citizen), and as a result, lost its messianic experience of 
time. 
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seminar: 
 
Each now is the now of a particular knowability (Jedes Jetzt das Jetzt einer 
bestimmten Erkennbarkeit). In it, truth is charged to the bursting point with 
time. (This point of explosion, and nothing else, is the death of the intentio, 
which thus coincides with the birth of authentic historical time, the time of 
truth.) It is not that what is past casts its light on what is present, or what is 
present its light on what is past; rather, an image is that wherein what has 
been comes together in a flash with the now to form a constellation. In other 
words: an image is dialectics at a standstill. For while the relation of the 
present to the past is purely temporal, the relation of what has been to the 
now is dialectical: not temporal in nature but imagistic [bildlich]. Only 
dialectical images are genuinely historical—that is, not archaic—images. 
The image that is read—which is to say, the image in the now of its 
recognisability—bears to the highest degree the imprint of the perilous 
critical moment on which all reading is founded.302 
 
1.2.3 
We will now attempt to show the connection and interrelatedness between Benjamin’s 
conception of the messianic (and the philosophy of history, at large) and a few ideas [such 
as montage, image, (semantic) void, melancholy, and angels] that characterize his writings 
on aesthetics and art. Illuminating the connection between these domains will assist us 
(among others) in progressing to section II. 
 A note (N1, 10) in The Arcades Project states the following: “This work has to 
develop to the highest degree the art of citing without quotation marks. Its theory is 
intimately related to that of montage.”303 What is a montage-based method of “citation 
without quotation marks”? How does it relate to history? 
 Benjamin, as it is well known, wrote increasingly on aesthetics and particularly on 
(imagery-core) photography. Thus, it comes as little or no surprise that the idea of “citation 
without quotation marks” is also referred to in these terms, that is, as the idea (or method) 
of “dialectical image.”304 Benjamin uses “image” in a broader sense than we are often 
accustomed to, using it as more than a visual image, and thus escapes what seems to be a 
paradoxical term (i.e., “dialectical image,” an image at once frozen and dialectical). His 
 
302 Quoted in Agamben, The Time that Remains, 145; Benjamin, The Arcades Project, 463. 
303 Benjamin, The Arcades Project, 458. 
304 De La Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction, 243–246. 
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method (further formulated as “dialectics at a standstill”) brings together two parties in 
dialogue and into dynamic contact—that is, dialectical images represent the conjuncture of 
past and present and are considered by Benjamin as the only genuine images. A dialectical 
image is charged with an energy that is capable of “blowing elements out of the historical 
continuum” once they achieve a special legibility that Benjamin calls the “now of 
knowability.” Agamben notes that “Walter Benjamin writes that the historical index 
contained in the images of the past indicates that these images may achieve legibility only 
in a determined moment of their history,”305 as well as characterizing Benjamin’s idea of 
the dialectical image as “the fulcrum of [Benjamin’s] theory of historical 
consciousness.”306 
 
Agamben refers to the artistic method of montage and its relation to history also in his 
essay on the poetic characteristic of Guy Debord’s cinema. The specific function of the 
image that Agamben identifies in Debord’s work (though not exclusively) is what ties 
cinema and history together—its operation no longer as an immobile entity. The image is 
not an archetype, nor is outside history, rather (similarly to Benjamin’s “dialectical image” 
as Agamben writes) “it is a cut which itself is mobile, an image-movement, charged as such 
with a dynamic tension.”307 The mobility of the image pertains also to painting, according 
to Agamben, who conceive of it as a still charged with movement, a still from a film that 
is missing. The kind of history that Agamben thinks about, in this regard, is not our 
accustomed chronology, but messianic history, which he defines by two major 
characteristics: a history of salvation (“something must be saved”) and an eschatological 
history (“something must be completed, judged”)—messianic history where something 
happens right here, but in another time, and outside chronology, but without entering some 
other world. This characterization renders the messianic incalculable, but simultaneously 
makes every moment (and image) “the door through which the Messiah enters,” 308 
(paraphrasing Benjamin) right here, right now. This messianic historical situation equates, 
 
305 Agamben, What Is an Apparatus? and Other Essays, 53–54. 
306 De La Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction, 244; Agamben, “Nymphae,” 58. 
307 Agamben, “Difference and Repetition,” 328. 
308 Ibid, 329. 
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for Agamben, to Debord’s cinematic situation. Debord’s compositional technique in the 
field of cinema is, in fact, montage. The conditions of possibility (“transcendentals” in the 
philosophical jargon) for Debord’s montage, Agamben explains, are double: repetition and 
stoppage. There is no need to shoot the film anymore, he writes, “just to repeat and stop,” 
thus montage is shown as such. Debord’s montage is understood by Agamben as an epoch-
making innovation in cinema; it ushers in the time in which “cinema will now be made on 
the basis of images from cinema.”309 Repetition for Agamben, building upon the works of 
previous thinkers, is not the return of the identical as one would imagine, but “the return of 
the possibility of what was”—it restores past possibility, and renders it possible anew. 
Repetition here relates to memory as the latter does not repeat the past as such, but “restores 
possibility to the past.”310 This is, according to Agamben, the theological dimension that 
Benjamin’s ascribes to memory when he writes that “memory makes the unfulfilled into 
the fulfilled, and the fulfilled into the unfulfilled.”311 Images thus charged with a historical 
and messianic importance because they are able to deliver potential possibilities to that 
which is impossible by definition, “toward the past.” The centrality of the act of repetition 
in Debord’s montage comes from the opening it produces between the possible and the real 
as a “zone of undecidability” into which what might become possible again happily enters. 
 The second transcendental is stoppage—the power to interrupt, “the ‘revolutionary 
interruption’ of which Benjamin spoke,”312 which brings cinema closer to poetry than to 
prose, since both cinema and poetry, writes Agamben, exclusively share the concept of the 
caesura and the enjambment: “This is also why Hölderlin could say that by stopping the 
rhythmic unfolding of words and representations, the caesura causes the word and the 
representation to appear as such. To bring the word to a stop is to pull it out of the flux of 
meaning, to exhibit it as such.”313 This is exactly how stoppage works in Debord’s practice, 
as constitutive of a transcendental condition of montage. The cinematic power of stoppage 
works on the image itself, causes it to become separated from continuous narration and to 
be shown as such. Both repetition and stoppage form a single system of montage in Debord; 
 
309 Ibid, 330. 
310 Ibid. 
311 Quoted in Agamben, “Difference and Repetition,” 330. 
312 Ibid, 331. 
313 Ibid, 332. 
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as per Agamben, together they “carry out the messianic act of cinema.”314 
 
We return now to Benjamin. “For Benjamin,” writes Agamben in The Signature of All 
Things, “history is the proper sphere of signatures. Here they appear under the names of 
‘indices’ (‘secrets,’ ‘historical,’ ‘temporal’) or of ‘images’ (Bilder), often characterized as 
‘dialectical’.” 315  The precarious, dialectical and fleeting characteristics of the image 
“become clearer when restored to their proper context, namely, the theory of historical 
signatures,”316 thus, since an image is always accompanied by an index or signature, it is 
constituted temporally and becomes legible precisely by that index or signature. For this 
reason, the success of a historiographic research (which necessarily has to do with 
signatures) is determined, for Agamben, by the researcher’s ability to read ephemeral 
signatures and follow their “subtle and obscure thread.”317 
 
However, the success of a historiographic research is determined not only by an effective 
reading of signatures, but also by recognizing them as a means of understanding. How do 
signatures generate understanding? What form of epistemology do they contain, which 
enables understanding? What do signatures (or Benjamin’s “dialectical images”) offer to 
Agamben, in terms of generating knowledge, that language cannot? 
 Earlier we mentioned that the signature, as the exposition of intelligibility, is akin 
to the paradigm and contains a few elements that refer back to the logic of the paradigm. 
Identifying signatures (that are crystallized historically) with a means of understanding, as 
well as the signatures’ structure and tensive functionality (that relate to a new event of 
meaning), indeed echoes the epistemological dimension of paradigms. This identification, 
in the context of Agamben’s epistemology, will help us to answer the above mentioned 
 
314 Ibid. 
315 Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method, 72. 
316 Ibid, 73. 
317 Ibid. 
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questions.318 
 
A similarity exists between Benjamin’s dialectical images and Agamben’s signatures. Both 
terms represent a constellation of moments beyond mere elements in a historical archive, 
and functions as “a potentially dynamic means of understanding—and changing—the 
present situation, one that acquires its potentiality only at specific, and fortuitous, 
points.” 319  These points are crystallizations of historical experience in a moment of 
unprecedented relevance. This functionality of the dialectical image, as well as that of the 
signature, determines its possibility to appear at a certain moment, which is also related to 
language and meaning. 
 In Nymphs, Agamben addresses the linguistic perspective of the functionality of the 
“dialectical image”: “Where meaning is suspended,” he writes, “dialectical images appear. 
The dialectical image is, in other words, an unresolved oscillation between estrangement 
and a new event of meaning. ... [T]he dialectical image holds its object suspended in a 
semiotic void.”320  The life of the image can thus be characterized by a pause highly 
charged with tension between the two poles. Not only dialectic is inseparable from the 
objects it negates, “but also that the objects lose their identity and transform into the two 
poles of a single dialectical tension that reaches its highest manifestations in a state of 
immobility.”321 
 
We see that the functionality of the dialectical image (and signature) results in a state of 
 
318  However, Agamben’s epistemological discussion should be taken with a grain of salt. In his lecture 
“What Is a Paradigm?” Agamben says: “The title of my presentation is ‘What Is a Paradigm?’ This title seems 
to suggest that my presentation will focus on epistemological and methodological questions. I do not feel at 
all at ease with these kind of questions, I do not like these kinds of problems, I always have the impression, 
like once Heidegger put it, that ‘here we have people busy in sharpening knives when there is nothing left to 
cut’.” (“What is a Paradigm?,” YouTube video, 9:36, “European Graduate School,” March 26, 2008, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G9Wxn1L9Er0.) 
 Agamben mentions this metaphor in relation to criticism and its epistemological character, already in his 
early work Stanzas: Word and Phantasm in Western Culture: “What is now more and more frequently 
concealed by the endless sharpening of knives on behalf of a methodology with nothing left to cut—namely, 
the realization that the object to have been grasped has finally evaded knowledge—is instead reasserted by 
criticism as its own specific character.” (Agamben, Stanzas: Word and Phantasm in Western Culture, xvi.) 
319 De La Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction, 245. 
320 Agamben, Nymphs, 29–30. 
321 Ibid, 31. 
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immobility and the suspension of meaning, which also causes the image to gain its fullness 
and legibility, to be unprecedentedly known. But how exactly does this epistemological 
process come about? 
 In chapter 1 of The Signature of All Things, Agamben examines dichotomy-based 
(particular-general) epistemological processes and the dialectics between them; that is, the 
processes of acquiring knowledge that is based on binary logic. By contrast, the 
epistemological model of the paradigm is based on analogy and advances from singularity 
to singularity. The epistemological mechanism of the paradigm (as well as that of the 
dialectical image) is not logical (as in Hegel) but analogical and paradigmatic (as in 
Plato)—its formula, for whose explication Agamben credits Enzo Melandri, is “neither A 
nor B,” and the opposition it implies is not dichotomous and substantial but bipolar and 
tensive. The two terms are neither removed nor recomposed in a unity, but kept in an 
immobile coexistence charged with tension.322 Each paradigmatic example becomes an 
exemplary case of a general law that could not have been stated a priori. Thus, the 
hermeneutic circle (which was previously discussed) is in fact a paradigmatic circle; there 
is no circularity between pre-understanding and interpretation, meaning does not precede 
the phenomenon but stands, so to speak, beside it—the phenomenon shows the general, 
which is the paradigm. 
 This non-dichotomous model or multi-polar field of forces entails a methodological 
principle that prevails when dealing with dichotomies. That is, how exactly does one need 
to understand a dichotomy? How does a dichotomy form? What kind of relation keeps a 
dichotomy intact? And perhaps more importantly, is it possible to understand both elements 
not as relating, but connecting, touching one another? For when we think about two 
factions, elements or concepts, we create a relation between them, we create a 
representation of one in the other. We then tend to think that richer representation amounts 
to a stronger connection between them as a result of a greater degree of affinity, and the 
stronger the affinity, the closer they get. But contrary to common opinion, they will 
ultimately be articulated or joined together, they will be in real contact, only as a result of 
 
322 Melandri, La Linea e Il Circolo: Studio Logico-Filosofico Sull’Analogia, 798. 
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a complete absence of representation.323 This is an opposite definition of infinite proximity 
to the one we usually give. As long as there is a degree of representation between both 
elements, as long as we do find a relation of one in the other, they are related but not yet 
unified. By absolutely unravelling all their connections, both factions disappear in and of 
themselves, making space for a third thing to emerge for the first time as a figure of their 
unification. This is the meaning of the verb “to coincide,” from medieval Latin coincidere, 
meaning literally “to fall-upon-together.” 
 Moreover, recall Agamben’s critique of deconstruction—although he 
acknowledges its questioning of the primary precedence of origin and presence, he at the 
same time maintains that deconstruction fails to question signification itself. Thus it never 
really escapes from the realm of representation, and “does not yet find a way beyond the 
implicit hold of representation.”324 In the context of the present discussion, [that is, the 
understanding of how knowledge is generated through movement on the basis of the 
analogical model as opposed to the dichotomous particular/universal model (“littered with 
exceptions”) that characterizes the realm of (deconstructionist) representation], Agamben 
puts forth the example “as a contrast figure, found stated in the model of the paradigm.”325 
An epistemological difference in thought models exists between the rule-based norm of 
representation or, in other words, the rule-based movement from the universal (norm) to 
the particular (application), and the paradigmatic example (through which others construct 
their own unique, always singular, identities), since the paradigm presents (not re-presents) 
neither the “original” nor the “copy,” but its own point of origin. As Agamben writes: “A 
paradigm implies the total abandonment of the particular-general couple as the model of 
logical inference.”326 
 
As mentioned earlier, Agamben reminds us, on various occasions throughout his oeuvre, 
of the primacy of the cognitive paradigm in present Western culture, as well as of the fact 
that philosophy has become, after Kant, a doctrine of knowledge rather than one of 
 
323 For a further explication of this idea, see Colli, Filosofia dell’espressione. 
324 Dickinson, “Canon as an Act of Creation,” 142. 
325 Ibid, 150. 
326 Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method, 21. 
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anthropogenesis (that is, the becoming human of man). This claim challenges the 
epistemological threshold of the human sciences, and in this sense, by adopting the 
Benjaminian art of citing without quotation marks and the epistemology of the dialectical 
image/signature, Agamben is able to call into question “the automatic support of a tradition 
turned into a ‘fortress of knowledge’ and vindicates an anti-authoritarian experience of 
language which measures its truth value only against its own merits.”327 
 
We can strengthen these claims by momentarily turning back to an earlier period in history 
(the Renaissance), where the connection between art and theory enables epistemology 
beyond discursive language. We will find, here as well, the relevance of the analogy‒based 
model and its special epistemic functionality. 
 In The Unspeakable Girl, Agamben refers to Odo Casel’s Liturgy as Mystery 
Celebration (1921), a manifesto for what will become the Liturgical Movement, which had 
an immense influence within the Catholic Church. Casel claimed that liturgy is not a 
doctrine but a mystery (thus having a generic relationship to the pagan mystery cults). 
Originally, mystery simply meant “gestures, acts and words through which divine action 
was effectively realized in time and in the world for the salvation of mankind.” 328 
Similarly, in Christian liturgy, the redemptive work of Christ is rendered present in and 
through the Church—what is rendered present in this mystery is not Christ as a historical 
individual but his “saving act,” communicated through the sacrament. According to Casel, 
the force of liturgy lies in its “fullness of actuality of the saving action of Christ.”329 
 The “fullness of actuality” is what the theological tradition attached to the doctrine 
of the efficacy ex opere operato of the liturgical act, that is, to the idea that the saving 
power of the sacrament was unaffected in the case it was administered in an “impure” 
manner (because the effective power of the sacrament is not depend upon the celebrant but 
on Christ, the “mystical presence” who guarantees its efficacy through God). This 
“irreducible liturgical operatively”330 is, however, quite remote from what we find in the 
 
327 Kotsko and Salzani, “Introduction: Agamben as a Reader,” 8. 
328 Agamben, “The Unspeakable Girl: The Myth and Mystery of Kore,” 31. See also Agamben, 
Creation and Anarchy, 9–12. 
329 Quoted in Agamben, “The Unspeakable Girl: The Myth and Mystery of Kore,” 31. 
330 Agamben, “The Unspeakable Girl: The Myth and Mystery of Kore,” 32. 
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pagan mysteries, where salvation is described as “precarious” rather than as something of 
certainty. 
 The mystical experience is expressed through the verb “to see” (opopen), and 
“vision” (epopteia) is the term given to the supreme stage of initiation. Epoptes means both 
“initiate” and “spectator,” and the mysteries they were contemplating “were ‘living 
paintings’ composed of gestures, words and the presentation of objects.” 331  This 
constitutes, according to Agamben, the connection between the mystery cults and painting 
that was so active in Renaissance art. The philosophical tradition links supreme knowledge 
to mystery visions, knowledge that is experienced through seeing, touching, and naming, 
thus painting offered to this knowledge the most apt expression. Agamben builds upon the 
work of Edgar Wind (in particular Pagan Mysteries in the Renaissance), according to 
which even though Renaissance culture (including the act of painting) regarded obscurity 
and mystery as necessary, the scholar (iconographer) must strive for clarity against the 
intention of the artist since any unresolved residue of meaning is an obstacle to the 
enjoyment of art. But, contrary to this, Renaissance allegories (like Eleusinian mysteries) 
are not “mysterious” because of some concealed content but because in them form and 
content have become indistinguishable. The third element, neutralizing both form and 
content, is mysterious because “in it there is no longer anything to conceal.”332 Thus 
because there is nothing left to say on the discursive level, “thought and vision coincide.” 
Form and content coincide not because the content is now exposed, but because they “fall 
together” (as previously stated), reduced and reconciled, and what we are then given to 
contemplate is pure appearance. For this reason, one cannot discursively present the 
knowledge depicted in such paintings but merely title them. 
 If the Renaissance allegories offer a richer expression of thought than contemporary 
philosophical treaties, then not only painting is returned to its true theoretical foundations 
but “the very nature of thought is illuminated.” According to Wind, writes Agamben, the 
pagan mystical tradition exercised a decisive influence on German Idealism, particularly 
on how Hegel and Schelling conceived of the dialectical movement of thought (after the 
 
331 Ibid, 35. 
332 Ibid, 37. 
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model of coincidentia oppositorum). The “profoundest mysteries of art,” claimed 
Schelling, consist in conceiving at once the extreme discrepancy of opposed elements and 
their point of coincidence: “The third element, in which opposites meet, cannot be of the 
same nature as them and requires a different form of exposition, one in which the opposing 
elements are at once maintained and neutralized. It is the content but nothing contains it; it 
is form but it no longer forms anything—exposing, thereby, itself.”333 
 Thus, Benjamin’s idea of “image philosophy,” that is, the “image of thought” or 
Denkbild (which will be discussed at a later stage), should not be taken as a metaphor but 
understood literally—like Renaissance allegory, writes Agamben, it is “a mystery wherein 
that which cannot be discursively presented shines for a moment out of the ruins of 
language.”334  ֹא [Messianic Language] 
 
Agamben’s essay “The Melancholy Angel”335 further elaborates Benjamin’s concept of 
citation without quotation marks. Quotations, according to Agamben, draw their power not 
from their ability to retrieve the past and enable the reader to relive it, but from their 
capacity to expel from context while destroying the past in the course of happening. 
 Agamben points to Hannah Arendt’s notes on this idea. According to Arendt, the 
transmission of the past relates to tradition and authority; “[T]he break in tradition and the 
loss of authority” 336  that Benjamin identified in his own time, writes Arendt, were 
irreparable and thus required new ways of dealing with the past. Benjamin’s solution, so to 
speak, was to replace the notion of the past’s transmissibility with its citability (or that there 
is a modern function of quotation), a solution that was born out of “despair of the present 
and the desire to destroy it,”337 albeit with the hope “that something from this period 
[would] survive.”338 
 Decontextualizing a fragment from the past makes it lose its character of authentic 
testimony while granting it an aggressive force, much like, according to Agamben, the 
 
333 Ibid, 38. 
334 Ibid, 39. 
335 Agamben, The Man Without Content, 104–115. 
336 Arendt, Men in Dark Times, 193. 
337 Ibid. 
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artistic action of the readymade in which an object loses its meaning (guaranteed by the 
authority of its daily use) and is charged “with an uncanny power to traumatize.”339 The 
radical break of this fragment from its past is linked to its hazardous state of alienation but 
also to the possibility of self-healing: “The past can only be fixed in the image that appears 
once and for all in the instant of its alienation, just as a memory appears suddenly, as in a 
flash, in a moment of danger.”340 The particular way of entering into a relation with the 
past resembles for Benjamin, according to Agamben, the figure of the collector who 
“quotes” objects outside of their context and destroys the order given to them by the 
internal order of their original disposition, or of the figure of the revolutionary for whom 
the new can appear only through the destruction of the old. 
 As tirelessly repeated, the image of a man who has lost the link with his past and 
can no longer find himself in history is identified and described (in Benjamin’s “Theses on 
 
339 Agamben, The Man Without Content, 128 (note #3). 
340 Ibid, 104–105. 
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the Philosophy of History”) as the angel of history (Angelus Novus).341 342 343 If Paul 
Klee’s angel that Benjamin refers to is the angel of history, writes Agamben, then Albrecht 
Dürer’s famous engraving depicting a melancholic angel is its analogy, the angel of art. 
Dürer’s angel, however, “appears immersed in an atemporal dimension, as though 
something, interrupting the continuum of history, had frozen the surrounding reality in a 
 
341 Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” 257–58. 
342  In “Walter Benjamin and the Demonic: Happiness and Historical Redemption” (Agamben, 
Potentialities, 138–59), Agamben attempts to show that Benjamin’s reflection on the philosophy of history 
is shaded with a melancholic light as a result of Gershom Scholem’s interpretation (Scholem, “Walter 
Benjamin and His Angel,” 198–237) to Benjamin’s angel as it is portrayed in Benjamin’s prose titled 
“Agesilaus Santander.” (Scholem, “Walter Benjamin and His Angel,” 208.) The angel (which has a 
redemptive role in Benjamin’s conception of history), claims Scholem, hides the dark, demonic traits of 
“Angelus Satanas.” 
 Agamben’s essay aims to open Benjamin’s text to another possible interpretation and to trace Benjamin’s 
lines of ethics. “Ethics” is referred to here in the sense of the use the Greeks had made of the word as “doctrine 
of happiness” as they linked the demonic to happiness. Benjamin’s text also ties the figure of the angel to the 
idea of happiness. 
 Since in the second thesis from the “Theses on the Philosophy of History” we find that happiness and 
redemption are inseparable, the presentation of Benjamin’s theory of happiness, according to Agamben, must 
proceed only by clarification of his ideas on the philosophy of history, which have at their centre the concept 
of redemption. 
 Scholem’s reading of Benjamin’s text is based on a hypothesis that the name “Agesilaus Santander” is 
in fact an anagram, a “secret name,” for der Angelus Satanas. However, Scholem’s formulation is preceded 
by a “disquieting shadow on the image of the angel” (Agamben, Potentialities, 139), which makes it hard to 
verify whether the hypothesis is necessary, whether it economically explains the text without leaving 
unresolved the most problematic aspects. 
 Scholem thus anticipates the Luciferian reading of “Agesilaus Santander” without having demonstrated 
its validity, immersing Benjamin’s text in a demonic light. 
 Scholem’s interpretation is also based on iconographical elements of the Satan, claiming that only Satan 
possesses claws and talons; however, this is not accurate, since in the European iconographic tradition, “there 
is only one figure that brings together purely angelic characteristics and the demonic traits of claws” (Ibid, 
141)—this is not Satan but Eros, Love. A descriptive model, found for the first time in Plutarch, represents 
Eros as a winged (and often feminine) angelic figure with claws. 
 Thus, Benjamin’s figure of the angel with claws and wings leads to the domain of Eros, that is, not to a 
demon in the Judeo-Christian sense but a daimōn in the Greek sense (“in Plato, Eros appears as the demon 
par excellence”). Additionally, Benjamin was aware of this specific iconographic type as he mentions it in 
his essay “The Origin of the German Tragic Drama” (which makes Agamben’s claim more probable) as well 
as in his essay “Karl Kraus,” where the angel is in no sense to be considered a Satanic figure. Benjamin’s 
portrayal of the claws of Angelus Novus does not have a Satanic meaning, but instead characterizes the 
“destructive—and simultaneously liberating—power of the angel.” 
 Thus, there is a correspondence between the clawed angel of “Agesilaus Santander” and the liberating 
angel who (at the end of the essay on Kraus) celebrates his victory over the demon “at the point where origin 
and destruction meet.” This (Agamben’s) reading nullifies Scholem’s reading as the textual element that 
supports Scholem’s reading (of the Luciferian nature of the angel) disappears. This does not mean that 
Scholem’s reading is erroneous but, as Agamben writes, “that there is all the more reason to measure its 
validity only on the basis of its capacity to explain economically the most problematic aspects of Benjamin’s 
text.” (Ibid, 142.) 
 
 
115 
kind of messianic arrest.”344 The past that becomes incomprehensible for the angel of 
history “reconstitutes its form in front of the angel of art; but this form is the alienated 
image in which the past finds its truth again only on condition of negating it, and knowledge 
of the new is possible only in the nontruth of the old.”345 Agamben thus grants aesthetics 
the role of the redeemer as it performs the same task that tradition performed before its 
interruption, resolving the conflict between old and new, and “opening for man a space 
 
343 The Angelus also appears, however only in passing, in Benjamin’s essay “Karl Kraus.” Here the 
Angelus is mentioned in the context of the messenger in old engravings who announces anticipated disaster. 
Kraus, as per Benjamin, is described as someone who “stands on the threshold of the Last Judgment” 
(Benjamin, “Karl Kraus,” 443) and thus resembles those saints in Baroque paintings who face, so to speak, 
an angelic flood. “Just as, in the most opulent examples of Baroque altar painting, saints hard-pressed against 
the frame extend defensive hands toward the breathtakingly foreshortened extremities of the angels, the 
blessed, and the damned floating before them, so the whole of world history presses in on Kraus in the 
extremities of a single item of local news, a single phrase, a single advertisement.” (Ibid.) Benjamin refers 
here to the concept of citation, Kraus’s basic polemical methodology, that further on becomes Benjamin’s 
most adequate methodology reflecting (as we have just analyzed) the structure of his philosophy of history—
the presentation of the whole through a cited part, or in other words, the attempt to capture most accurately 
the historical image through the revelation of its most trivial elements, its remainders or leftovers. The 
excavated fragment contains within itself the figure of the whole (Benjamin, as previously noted, was 
influenced in this regard by Goethe’s Urphänomen). 
344 Agamben, The Man Without Content, 109–110. 
345 Ibid. 
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between past and future in which he can find his action and his knowledge.”346 347 
 
The Man Without Content reserves a particular temporal status for the communicative, 
 
346 Agamben, The Man Without Content, 110. Man’s inability to recover his space in the tension 
between past and future history is exemplified most accurately, according to Agamben, in an image depicted 
by Kafka where train travellers entering into a tunnel are met with an accident causing the train to halt and 
the travellers to lose a sense of spatiality, not knowing whether they are at the end or the beginning of the 
tunnel. Kafka, writes Agamben, “thus replaces the idea of a history infinitely unfolding along an empty, linear 
time with the paradoxical image of a state of history in which the fundamental event of the human condition 
is perpetually taking place; the continuum of linear time is interrupted, but does not create an opening beyond 
itself.” (Ibid, 113.) Thus, Kafka’s image of a state of history is positioned side by side with Benjamin’s idea 
of “now-time” understood as a halt in happening. The creation of an opening beyond itself is likewise the 
theological horizon that the messianic opens up, working from within “given representations to de-stabilize 
them, as an eschatological horizon against which all particular identifications are rendered null and void.” 
(Dickinson, “Canon as an Act of Creation,” 158.) 
347  It may be the case that epistemological questions or discourses of knowledge have merely moderate 
significance for a research process intertwining theoretical and practical artistic tendencies, since the act of 
research alone (physical rummaging, working with materials, archive searching, etc.) creates a 
comprehensive diapason of acquaintances, comprised of diverse degrees of relation of, by, and with its object; 
and this familiarity at least equally pertains to ontology and certainly no less to ethics. For the inquirer, one 
of the fundamental difficulties, whether in the conceptual or studio-based research phase, is that of 
communicating the insights thus accumulated to an interlocutor, most adequately and to the best of one’s 
abilities. Also, the interpreter’s act (as well as that of the reader or the listener), in and of itself, always 
remains partial and limited in its means to appropriate the knowledge generated, and presented as if 
objectively, by and with the (art)work. A historical and epistemological dishomogeneity is constitutive of 
any attempt in art. Furthermore, even under the assumption that the process of sending and receiving 
knowledge is completed as fully as possible (after all, this is just an assumption, as well as a tentative process 
that might not necessarily include other possibilities of acquiring knowledge), knowledge formation is 
subjected to social conditions and restrains; in other words, as tirelessly repeated, knowledge is conditioned 
by the episteme and the operational power struggle that derives from it. Knowledge that is accepted as a 
norm, as a crystallized discourse, is forever liable to individuals’ exchange of words, forever understood as 
“to the best of our knowledge,” thus endangered in becoming outdated and nonstandard. 
 Somewhat ironically, in this sense, it was none other than Michel Foucault who marked that knowledge, 
as a field of historicity, as free of any constitutive activity, liberated from referring backwards to an origin or 
forwards to a historical or transcendental teleology. Knowledge, according to this definition, is a “series of 
denials,” it is not constitutive of anything, and thus is “epistemologically natural—not value-free, but 
saturated with all values ... knowledge is ... the possibility of everything we know.” (Said, Beginnings: 
Intention and Method, 313.) 
 By means of contemplative concepts, philosophy—so it seems—does not constitute “substantive” 
knowledge but, as the word’s etymology indicates, simply (not so simply) the love or passion for knowledge 
and wisdom (Socrates, we recall, never really defines the subject matter he interrogates but joyfully hovers 
over it; Aristotelian rhetoric uses enthymemes; etc.). 
 Art is likewise a manner of reflection, but also simultaneously a (graduated) material attempt to actually 
intensify epistemological precariousness while standing in contrast to two reductive and opposite attempts 
for acquiring knowledge of a thing: what it is made of and/or what it does. What is then the consequence of 
art epistemology? 
 Artistic research is a meadow for creating ideas. The research is not made in order to find facts and/or to 
present certain ideas, but in order to generate them. Knowledge that was supposedly generated by artistic 
research cannot, in principle, be ultimately defined since any (artistic) knowledge always already carries with 
it the whole of Being, with its multiple and diverse knowledges thus accumulated prior to research. 
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aesthetic gesture of the artist. If, in fact, the problem of art is to redeem the ever-possible 
conflict between past-present-future, it is obvious that the work of the artist, the poiesis 
(being a lead to the presence, an unveiling independently of the will), must have access to 
“a more original temporal dimension.”348 All this is configured as a sort of messianic arrest 
of time, as a caesura that projects art into an “atemporal dimension” that is given, however, 
only in the transience (or lapse) of the work.349 350 
Agamben continues: 
 
The work of art ... allows man to attain his original status in history and time 
in his encounter with it. This is why Aristotle can say in the fifth book of 
the Metaphysics351: ‘arts are also called “beginning,” and of these especially 
the architectonic arts.’ That art is architectonic means, etymologically: art, 
poiesis, is pro-duction of origin, art is the gift of the original space of man, 
architectonics par excellence. ... [I]n the work of art the continumm of linear 
time is broken, and man recovers, between past and future, his present 
space.352 
 
The relationship between aesthetics and epistemology (and the relevancy of this relation to 
the fractured structure of Western culture at large) is analyzed by Agamben in his relatively 
short but dense book Taste. 
 According to Agamben, the Western cultural tradition understands taste, in contrast 
to sight and hearing (the “theoretical” senses Hegel calls them in Aesthetics), as unrelated 
to the faculty of knowledge, and thus to ethics (mostly exemplified by Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics). On the other hand, one finds a complete vocabulary in Greek and 
Latin languages that etymologically and semantically connects taste with the act of 
knowledge (Isidore of Seville’s Etymologies, Nietzsche’s Pre-Platonic Philosophers are 
the main references for Agamben). 
 
348 Agamben, The Man Without Content, 101. 
349 Agamben, “Un Libro senza Patria,” 43–46. 
350 One recalls that in The Time that Remains, Agamben retakes the problem of time, and more 
accurately, the problem of the caesura of messianic time. Messianic time seems to be an underground alley, 
dug under the internal history of the West, in order to access salvation through the suspension or deactivation 
of chronological time and the works that are contained in it. I return to Agamben’s idea of the caesura, as 
art’s atemporal dimension, at the end of part I (of section II). 
351 Aristotle, Metaphysics V, 1013a. 
352 Agamben, The Man Without Content, 101–102. 
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 Seventeenth‒ and eighteenth‒ century aesthetics, which centres around the 
judgment and enjoyment of the beautiful, indicates taste as “this special form of knowledge 
that enjoys the beautiful object and the special form of pleasure that judges beauty.”353 
Kant describes taste as the “enigma” that intertwines knowledge and pleasure (The Critique 
of the Power of Judgment, 1790). 
 The problem of taste presents itself as that of “another knowledge” (knowledge that 
cannot account for its judgments but rather enjoys them) and “another pleasure” (a pleasure 
that knows and judges). 
 Modern aesthetics, beginning with Baumgarten, attempts to investigate this other 
knowledge and to establish its autonomy alongside intellectual cognition (“intuition” 
alongside “concept or logica”). Aesthetics describes this relation as “one between two 
autonomous forms within the same gnoseological process,”354 though failed to investigate 
the fundamental problem: why is knowledge originally divided, and likewise originally, 
why does it maintain a relation to the doctrine of pleasure, that is, to ethics? Can one 
reconcile the fracture between knowledge and the beautiful (between knowing the truth 
and enjoyment)?—“that science knows the truth but cannot enjoy it, and that taste enjoys 
the beauty, without being able to explain it?”355 
 These fractures (the division of the epistemic object into truth and beauty, and the 
division of human ethical telos356 into knowledge and pleasure), that characterize Western 
metaphysics, can be illuminated by the discussion of taste. 
 
In Plato’s account (in Phaedrus) of the relationship between beauty and wisdom, Agamben 
writes, one finds “the original metaphysical problem of the fracture between visible and 
the invisible, or appearance and being.”357 The lack of an image of wisdom, and the 
particular visibility of beauty as per Plato’s definition, means a paradox of the visibility of 
the invisible or the sensible appearance of the Idea. In the Symposium, Plato defines Eros’ 
 
353 Agamben, Taste, 5. 
354 Ibid, 7. 
355 Ibid, 8. 
356 “(which in the Aristotelian ethics still appeared undivided in the notion of a theoria that is also teleia 
eudaimonia, ‘perfect happiness’)”―(Ibid.) 
357 Ibid, 10. 
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(love) status in the epistemic realm as a medium between wisdom and ignorance, 
“knowledge that judges correctly and grasps the truth without, however, being able to 
justify itself,”358 or in other words, “right opinion” (orthe doxa). Plato assigns to the theory 
of love a paradoxical task of guaranteeing the relation between beauty and truth. One of 
Plato’s most profound intensions is to exclude the visible from the domain of science (see 
book 7 of the Republic—the truth [of astronomy] cannot be grasped from the standpoint of 
appearance and visible beauty). “The episteme, by itself, cannot ‘save appearances’ in 
mathematical relationships without presuming to have exhausted the visible phenomena in 
its beauty”359—this intertwining of double impossibility (that beauty cannot be known and 
truth cannot be seen) is at the core of Plato’s theory of Idea and Eros’s “other knowledge.” 
The significance of the term “Idea” is contained in the play between truth and beauty. “Only 
because the supreme act of knowledge is split in this manner into truth and beauty, ... 
wisdom must be constituted as ‘love of knowledge’ ... [Wisdom] must present itself as 
philosophy.... as a medium between science and ignorance―between a having and a not-
having.”360 
 
“The formation of the concept of taste, ... betrays its metaphysical origin through the secret 
solidarity it presupposes between science and pleasure. Taste appears from the beginning 
as a ‘knowledge that does not know, but enjoys’ and as a ‘pleasure that knows’.”361 
 “In its most radical formulation, eighteenth-century reflection on the beautiful and 
taste culminates in the return to knowledge that one cannot explain since it is grounded on 
a pure signifier; ... and to a pleasure that allows one to judge since it is sustained not on a 
substantial reality but, rather, on that which in the object is pure signification.”362 
 
The concept of taste, which Western culture established as an ideal of knowledge (“one 
that could suture the metaphysical scission between the sensible and the intelligible”),363 
 
358 Ibid, 12. 
359 Ibid, 17. 
360 Ibid, 18–19. 
361 Ibid, 22. 
362 Ibid, 39–40. 
363 Ibid, 51. 
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appears as an impossibility for the subject since it cannot be explained. Taste is an empty 
or excessive sense, situated at the very limit of knowledge and pleasure. The object of this 
knowledge is designated as beauty: according to Plato’s conception, it is given to sight, but 
a sight of which there can be no science, only love. Thus, this impossibility of grasping the 
object of vision as such drove Plato to account for it not as “wisdom,” but as the desire for 
wisdom. Beauty means that “there is a subject of desire (a philosophos) but not a subject 
of wisdom (a sophos),”364 therefore Plato’s theory of Eros aims at bridging these two 
divided subjects. 
 In the last part of the book, Agamben discusses the expression “excessive signifier” 
that derives from the work of Levi-Strauss, in particular his theory of signification that he 
developed through the concept of mana in his Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss 
(1950). Levi-Strauss presumes “a fundamental inadequate relation between signification 
and knowledge that translates to an irreducible excess of the signifier over the signified.”365 
According to Levi-Strauss, the process of meaning-granting was a gradual transformation 
(and which had no counterpart in the field of knowledge), thus an opposition exists (in the 
history of the human mind) 
 
between symbolism which is characteristically discontinuous, and 
knowledge, characterized by continuity.... The categories of the signifier 
and the signified constituted simultaneously and interdependently, as 
complementary units; whereas knowledge ... got started very slowly.... The 
universe signified long before people began to know what it signified; ... 
but... from the beginning, the universe signified the totality of what 
humankind can expect to know about it.366 
 
The surplus of signification, which maintains the relationship of complementarity, “is the 
very condition of the exercise of symbolic thinking.”367 For Levi-Strauss, the notion of 
mana means “that floating signifier which is the disability of all finite thought.”368 
 Extending Levi-Strauss’s conception, we can conclude that, since Plato was unable 
 
364 Ibid, 52. 
365 Ibid, 55. 
366 Ibid, 56–57. 
367 Ibid, 60. 
368 Ibid. 
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to exhaust the visible phenomena as such (through its explanation) and thus had to seek the 
invisible, “ancient science left free in the phenomena what was pure appearance in them 
(that is, pure signifier), opening beside itself a space that divinatory science could occupy 
without contradiction.”369 Thus astrology, which picks up the pure signifier that astronomy 
could not fully explain, treats that signifier as “a supplement of signification to distribute 
at its whim.”370 
 This structure can be extended to incorporate the entire epistemological status of 
Western culture, claims Agamben. Thus, in the ancient world there are two types of 
knowledge: one that is known (that is founded in the adequation of signifier and signified), 
and one that is not known (divinatory science, founded on the excessive signifier). Emile 
Benveniste’s distinction between the semiotic and the semantic as the “double 
signification” inherent in human language means, in this sense, that the first is semantic 
knowledge (which has a subject and can be explained) and the second is semiotic 
knowledge (which does not have a subject and can only be recognized). Philosophy is 
placed by Plato between these two forms of knowledge, but since it perceives the 
phenomena as beauty it is not limited merely to the distribution of the excessive signifier, 
but “thanks to the mediation of Eros, is able instead to save the phenomena in the Idea.”371 
 Since the eighteenth century, divinatory science was excluded from knowledge, and 
science negated the possibility of any knowledge without subject. But this form of 
knowledge did not disappear completely since “hard” science was unable to fill or reduce 
the excessive signifier. Modern aesthetics (and other forms of knowledge such as 
philology) substitutes divinatory science as the knowledge of the excessive signifier (of the 
beautiful). In political economy, too, we see a connection to aesthetics in this sense—Georg 
Simmel, according to Agamben, defines money as a “pure relation without content,” thus 
the “value-form, like Levi-Strauss’ mana, is a zero symbolic value or pure signifier that 
simply indicates the necessity of a supplementary symbolic content.”372 At the end of the 
nineteenth century, another science replaced the vacancy left by divinatory science based 
 
369 Ibid, 61–62. 
370 Ibid, 62. 
371 Ibid, 63. 
372 Ibid, 67. 
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on the assumption that there is a knowledge that is not known but that is revealed in 
symbols and signifiers: psychoanalysis. In a way, the more modern culture and science 
attempt to “save appearance,” 
 
the greater becomes the residue of the excessive signifier (the quantity of 
knowledge that is not known) that must be explained by the divinatory 
sciences. Semiotic science and semantic science, divination and science 
strictly appear together linked through a relation of complementarity, in 
which the one guarantees the possibility and the function of the other.... The 
fracture between signification and knowledge―the semiotic and the 
semantic―is not in fact something produced once and for all outside of the 
human, but instead is a fracture of this very same subject of knowledge: man 
as Homo sapiens. Since, as a speaking and thinking being, the human is held 
between signification and knowledge, its cognition is necessarily split and 
the problem of who knows knowledge (the problem of the subject of 
knowledge) remains the fundamental question of every epistemology.373 
 
Philosophy and modern science, since Descartes, tried to guarantee the unity of cognition 
through the fiction of an ego cogito, the I as a pure self-consciousness and the only subject 
of knowledge. Yet this subject of knowledge is called into question in recent developments 
of human science—psychoanalysis’ id as the subject of a knowledge that is not known; 
structuralism’s structure as an unconscious categorical knowledge without a reference to a 
thinking subject; or linguistics’ identification in the phoneme of a knowledge independent 
of the speaking subject. All of these are examples of an Other as the subject of knowledge. 
 Thus, a problem arises—that is, the passage between knowledge that is known and 
knowledge that is not known (knowledge of the Other and knowledge of the subject). Yet, 
this gap cannot be bridged, similarly to the way Benveniste showed the impossibility of 
bridging the gap between the semiotic and the semantic. Thus, semiology cannot constitute 
itself as a general science of the sign (as a knowledge founded upon the unity of the signifier 
and the signified), since, in order to do so, it would have to reduce the signifier’s excess 
and suture the scission between semiotic knowledge (knowledge that is known) and 
semantic knowledge (knowledge that is not known), a scission that is inscribed into the 
very notion of the sign—a conclusion that brings Agamben’s discussion of taste to an end, 
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and section I of this thesis nearly to its end. 
 
Before we end, it is necessary to conclude this section with a minor reservation, put forward 
by Agamben in Creation and Anarchy: The Work of Art and the Religion of Capitalism 
(his book most recently translated to English), regarding art’s (and artists’) capacity to act 
in and upon the world. If it appears, somewhat justifiably, as if Agamben ascribes art (or 
the aesthetic gesture of the artist) with unrealistic, grandiose power and potentiality, let us 
consider his suggestion that we “abandon the artistic machine to its fate.”374 What is the 
artistic machine? 
 In “Archeology of the Work of Art” (the book’s opening essay), Agamben raises 
the following question: what is the place of art in the present? 375  The essay tries to 
archeologically analyze the problematic (as per Agamben) position of the syntagma “the 
work of art,” to determine “whether the decisive element is the work or the art, or a mixture 
of them that is no better defined, and whether the two elements proceed in harmonious 
agreement or are instead in a conflictual relationship.”376 The decisive crisis in the notion 
of “work,” as we experience it today according to Agamben, causes the work’s 
disappearance from the sphere of artistic production—today art is more and more realized 
as an activity without a “work,” because “the being-work of the work of art had remained 
unthought.”377 Agamben thus calls for a genealogy (in this short essay, though, he merely 
focuses on three key moments) of this fundamental ontological concept, by means of 
language analysis (since “philosophical problems are in the last analysis questions about 
the meaning of words”), in order to resolve our contemporary problematic relationship with 
the “work of art.” 
 In classical Greek, writes Agamben, artists are conceived as “technicians” who do 
not possess their own telos, their own end, because they produce a product that is exterior 
to them. Artists are constitutively incomplete beings (unlike the ones who contemplate or 
the visionaries, for example, who are philosophically superior to artists and hold within 
 
374 Agamben, Creation and Anarchy, 13. 
375 Ibid, 2. Agamben mentions Giovani Urbani, the late Italian art critic, as the first one perhaps to pose 
this question in a coherent way, and to whom Agamben’s book The Man Without Content is dedicated. 
376 Ibid. 
377 Ibid, 3. 
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them their energeia, the being-in-act or being-at-work) since “in unproductive activities, 
as thought (theöria) precisely is, the subject perfectly possesses his end.”378 Praxis, the 
action that has its end in itself, is superior to poiësis, the activity whose end is in the work. 
Beginning from the Renaissance, Agamben writes, art becomes an action that no longer 
has its energeia in the exterior object, but is slowly transformed into one of those activities 
(like knowing or praxis) that have their being-at-work in themselves. Art no longer resides 
in the work, but in the mind of the artists, in their ideas, while they produce the work. This 
concept has its model (as we previously saw in the gloss “The Before of the Book”) in the 
theological idea of divine creation, according to which God created the world with a pre-
existing model in His “mind”; likewise, the artist already acquires the idea of the work of 
art before its realization. This is the theological vocabulary of creation in today’s art writing 
as per Agamben. This process results in the modern status of the art object itself, as an 
unnecessary remainder with respect to the artist and its creative act. Thus, “ergon and 
energeia, work and creative operation, are complementary yet incommunicable notions, 
which form, with the artist as their middle term, what I propose to call the ‘artistic machine’ 
of modernity. And it is not possible, … either to separate them or to make them coincide 
or, even less, to play one of against the other.”379 
 Further into the essay, Agamben attempts to juxtapose, in regard to the present, the 
practice of the avant-garde and liturgy, based on the (also previously mentioned) writing 
of Odo Casel (the manifesto of the Liturgical Movement of the 1920s). Based on the idea 
that liturgy is not a “representation” or “commemoration” of the salvific event, but is itself 
the event, and thus is carried out ex opere operato (“in that moment and in that place”), 
Agamben hypothesises that a strong analogy exists between sacred action of the liturgy 
and the praxis of the artistic avant-garde and of the art called contemporary. These arts 
abandon, writes Agamben: 
 
[T]he mimetic-representative paradigm in the name of a genuinely 
pragmatic claim. The artist’s action is emancipated from its traditional 
productive or reproductive end and becomes an absolute ‘performance,’ a 
pure ‘liturgy’ that coincides with its own celebration and is effective ex 
 
378 Ibid, 6. 
379 Ibid, 8–9. 
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opere operato and not through the intellectual or moral qualities of the artist. 
… [L]iturgy and ‘performance’ insinuate a hybrid third, in which the action 
itself claims to present itself as a work.380 
 
With the “invention” of the ready-made, Duchamp, according to Agamben’s third and last 
genealogical moment, attempted to free art from what was blocking it, namely the “artistic 
machine.” Duchamp attempted to deactivate this machine by forming a new place for the 
ready-made—"neither in the work nor in the artist, neither in the ergon not in the energeia, 
but only in the museum, which at this point acquires a decisive rank and value.”381 Thus, 
in contemporary art there appears a historical conflict between art and work, energeia and 
ergon. 
 In conclusion, not only does Agamben suggest that we abandon the “artistic 
machine,” but with it the idea that there is something like a supreme human activity that, 
“by means of a subject, realizes itself in a work or in an energeia that draws from it its 
incomparable value.”382 
[Continue Reading]
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 [Messianic Language] אֹ 
Benjamin’s philosophy of history is analyzed by Agamben not exclusively from the 
messianic perspective offered thus far (Benjamin’s concept of history and the idea of 
messianic time as a paradigm of historical time that are at the core of the essay “Theses on 
the Philosophy of History”), but also (and perhaps always, as these perspectives are 
complementary and interwoven) from a perspective based in language. 
 A comprehensive discussion of Benjamin’s philosophy of language, its connection 
with the problem of history and its messianic intention, is found in Agamben’s early essay 
“Lingua e storia. Categorie linguistiche e categorie storiche nel pensiero di Benjamin.”383 
The essay commences with a fragmented quote from Benjamin’s preparatory notes to 
“Theses on the Philosophy of History”: 
 
The Messianic world is the world of a total and integral actuality. The first 
instance of universal history occurs there. Today this term can only denote 
a type of esperanto which cannot be realized until the confusion of Babel is 
cleared up. It presupposes a language into which every text can be wholly 
translated. ... Or rather, it is itself this language; not in written form, but as 
it is joyously acted out.384 
 
Benjamin’s argument, writes Agamben, messianically conflates language and history, 
 
383  The essay originally appeared in Italian, in the edited volume Walter Benjamin: Tempo storia 
linguagio (1983). English translations appeared as “Language and History in Benjamin” in the journal 
Differentia (1988); and a later version, albeit lacking a few final paragraphs, also appeared as “Language and 
History: Linguistic and Historical Categories in Benjamin’s Thought” in the collection Potentialities (1999). 
A further treatment of this theme appears, in Potentialities, also in “Walter Benjamin and the Demonic: 
Happiness and Historical Redemption,” 138–159. 
 Additionally, Agamben also develops this theme in Infancy and History, in an attempt to develop a new 
experience of time and history that will be grounded, accordingly, in a new experience of language. There he 
picks up on Benjamin’s essay “On the Program of the Coming Philosophy” (Benjamin, Selected Writings, 
Vol. 1, 100–110) of 1918 where Benjamin calls for a reinvention of experience beyond the constrains of the 
Kantian model, a reinvention that by relating to the Kantian system would likewise be turned into knowledge. 
This would be a transformation of the concept of knowledge that begins to manifest itself in the acquisition 
of a new concept of experience, and at the centre of this reinvention we find the question of language. 
Benjamin writes: “The great transformation and correction which must be performed upon the concept of 
experience, originated to one-sidedly along mathematical-mechanical lines, can be attained only be relating 
knowledge to language;” (Ibid, 107–108) and, moreover, “a concept of knowledge gained from reflection on 
the linguistic nature of knowledge will create a corresponding concept of experience which will also 
encompass realms that Kant failed to truly systemized.” (Ibid, 108.) 
384 Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, 1239. Quoted in Agamben, “Language and History in Benjamin,” 
169. 
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maintaining that the history of redeemed humanity is the only universal history that 
amounts to its language (that is, universal post-Babylonian language), and that this 
language comes in the form of joyous celebration rather than writing. 
 The conflation of historical and linguistic categories, according to Agamben, 
should not come as a surprise—in fact, it can be grasped already in the Middle Ages (in 
the seventh century) when, for example, Isidore of Seville claims (in the Etymologies) that 
“[h]istory pertains to grammar,”385 or in an even remoter reference, Augustine’s De ordine, 
where one finds the claim: “Whenever something memorable was to be written down, it 
necessarily pertained to grammar. Grammar was thus linked to history, ... a discipline ... 
not so much for historians but for grammarians.”386 Every historical process of handing 
down refers to the domain of the “letter,” since the Augustinian conflation is based on a 
broader definition of grammar, one that also includes (beyond the obvious lingual structural 
analysis) “the infinite dimension of historical transmittal.”387 The letter, for Augustine, is 
essentially “an historical element.” This conception is a sequel to the long tradition of the 
ancient world that reflects on language in terms of being a two-fold system that 
incorporates names (as pure denomination) and discourse (in Marcus Terentius Varro’s 
words, “a river from a spring” 388 ). Man’s use of words is a result of his historical 
participation in this river. That is, history mediates and conditions the foundation of 
language for man, who receives names (that proceed him) only through a process of them 
being handed down to him, them hierarchically descending to him within a historical 
process. Whether descending from a divine or profane source, the crucial thing here is that 
“the origin of names escapes the speaker. ... As long as man has no access to the foundation 
of language, there will be a handing down of names; and as long as there is a handing down, 
there will be history and destiny.”389 
 Benjamin’s conflation of language and history thus means, writes Agamben, that 
 
385 Isidore of Seville, Etymologies, I, XLI. Quoted in Agamben, “Language and History in Benjamin,” 
170. 
386 Augustine, De Ordine, 2, 12, 37. Quoted in Agamben, “Language and History in Benjamin,” 170. 
387 Agamben, “Language and History in Benjamin,” 170. 
388 Varro, De Lingua Latina, VIII, 5, 6. Quoted in Agamben, “Language and History in Benjamin,” 
171. 
389 Agamben, “Language and History in Benjamin,” 171–172. On the concept of “handing down” 
and/or “handing over” in the context of Christian Theology, see Agamben, Pilate and Jesus, 26–29. 
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“[m]an’s historical condition is inseparable from his condition as a speaker, and is inscribed 
in the very modality of his access to language, originally signaled by a split.”390 The 
original field of language, as articulated by Benjamin in his essay “On Language in General 
and the Language of Men” (1916), is that of names exemplified (according to the story of 
Genesis) in the Adamic language. This “pure language” is not our customary (and 
bourgeois, as per Benjamin) idea of language according to which a signifying word 
transmits meaning from one subject to another, but a language where the name 
communicates itself absolutely—in the name, “the spiritual essence which communicates 
itself is language.”391 Nothing is communicated in the Adamic language beyond the name 
itself; in other words, spiritual essence and linguistic essence coincide, and in such a “pure 
language” the problem of the unsayable, which characterizes human language, does not 
exist, thus it corresponds with the religious concept of revelation, “which does not know 
any unsayable.”392 
 The original sin of man means, in this sense, language’s fall from its perfect status 
of non-signifying names to the signifying word as a means of exterior communication and, 
moreover, man’s making of language a means and a sign, a process that ended up in a 
Babylonian mayhem. This fallen condition of language is later on thought from the 
perspective of messianic redemption via Benjamin’s essay “The Work of the Translator” 
(1921). In this essay, Benjamin attempts to explicate the relation between the original, 
paradisiacal language and the multiple of languages that comprise it in terms of part and 
whole, claiming that a thing can only be understood not by an individual language but by 
the “totality of their meanings which become fused together as pure language.”393 In other 
words, a meaning conveyed and explained by supposedly only one language is impossible 
as it exists merely as a potential waiting to be harmonized with all other languages, in what 
Benjamin terms the “messianic end of their history.”394 Both history and linguistics move 
forward towards their messianic fulfillment; once this point arrives, language will be a 
“‘word without expression,’ which is liberated from the weight and the alienation of 
 
390 Agamben, “Language and History in Benjamin,” 172. 
391 Ibid, 173. 
392 Ibid. 
393 Quoted in Agamben, “Language and History in Benjamin,” 173. 
394 Ibid, 174. 
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sense.”395 At the same time, however, once this state is reached, all communication and 
sense will extinguish themselves. 
 What is a word, asks Agamben, that no longer means, that is no longer destined for 
the historical handing down of a signified? How can person speak purely, how can they 
understand the word, without the mediation of the signified? For Agamben, that which 
remains unsayable and unsaid in every language is precisely that thing it wants to say but 
cannot, “the pure language, the inexpressive word”; the field of names is that meaning 
which it tries to convey but cannot bring “as such into speech.”396 Languages signify and 
have sense because they mean, but what they mean—that is, pure language—remains 
unsaid. The unsaid of meaning sustains, in each language, the tension between a language 
and its historical evolution; and it is what destined the language for its historical 
development. The biblical myth of the fall of Edenic language, according to Agamben, 
should be understood exactly in this way.397 
 The relationship between the various historical languages and their one common 
feature remains dialectical—on the one hand, they need to cease their meaning to say it, 
but on the other hand, this is exactly what they cannot do without (at the same time) abolish 
 
395 Ibid. 
396 Ibid,175. 
397  Agamben will develop this theme in his later book Infancy and History: On the Destruction of 
Experience, where he deals with human linguistic infancy or how humans are expelled from language as such 
into a linguistic and metaphysical scission. Infancy refers to the interim state between our pure state of grace 
in language, echoing that of the animal, and our acquisition of voice. Having language and the privation of 
voice are fundamental conditions of human being. “Animals are not in fact denied language ... they are 
already inside it. Man, instead, by having an infancy ... splits this single language and, in order to speak, has 
to constitute himself as the subject of language—he has to say I. ... man’s nature is split at its source, for 
infancy brings its discontinuity and the difference between language and discourse. The historicity of the 
human being has its basis in this difference and discontinuity.” (Agamben, Infancy and History, 52.) One can 
thus conclude that: (1) humans have no voice of their own; (2) as humans acquire their voice, a division is 
developed between speech and language; (3) this division and our awareness of it define human beings, as 
well as the way in which we come to have language (not the mere fact that we have one); and (4) we have 
language first as bifurcation (language-speech), then as subordination (speech over language), and then as 
negation (speech denies the experience of the nature of language as such). Yet because we have infancy we 
also have history, and because we have history we are human. 
 Moreover, infancy first names our coming away from being animal, then it indicates our ability to 
conceive of pure thinking not in terms of what cannot be said, but what can, and finally, it names the problem 
of human experience. The human experience of language, for Agamben, is always taken within language, 
but not entirely within language as if the division between language and speech never occurred. To undergo 
an experience within language is to undergo a new form of experience as testing (“experience” is related 
etymologically to “experiment” in Latin) or thinking, one that accepts the presence of language as such. 
Infancy is to be found in the human at all stages as both remnant of the animal and potential for the post-
human. (Watkin, The Literary Agamben: Adventures in Logopoiesis, 6–9.) 
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themselves, since this capacity is only accessible to the totality of their messianic end: 
“Inasmuch as the pure language is the only one which does not mean, but says, it is also 
the only one in which that ‘crystalline elimination of the unsayable in language,’ can be 
realized.”398 
 Benjamin suggested, according to Agamben, that universal language (or history) 
should not be understood in terms of being an “Ideal” or an infinite duty that crosses all 
historical evolution; nor that the inexpressive word should be understood in terms of an 
infinite task (that could never be fulfilled) towards which the historical experience of 
speaking man is moving. Agamben justifies this claim by interpreting Benjamin as a 
thinker who “grouped together the social democratic transformation of a Marxist ideal of 
a classless society into a never-ending task, with an analogous transformation ... of the 
Kantian idea into an ideal;”399 and just as classless society is never actually realized, so the 
ideal language never reaches the level of the word. A classless society (which was, for 
Benjamin, genuinely messianic) is not the end of historical progress, but its interruption, 
“‘so often missed and finally fulfilled.’”400  According to Agamben’s interpretation of 
Benjamin, contemporary hermeneutics (which looks for the unsaid and the infinity of 
meaning) tries, in fact, to fulfill the unsaid and the infinity of meaning rather than to 
conserve them, which is the exact opposite of true textual hermeneutics. Accordingly, for 
Benjamin, “if the letters ... commit human language to an historical handing down and an 
infinite interpretation, we can suppose ... that the universal language represents rather the 
definite cancelation and resolution of human language.”401 
 
398 Agamben, “Language and History in Benjamin,” 175. 
399 Ibid, 177. 
400 Ibid. It was Benjamin’s break with a Marxist teleological reading of history that propelled his 
conception of a “weak messianic force” working through history in order to redeem those who were forgotten 
by history. Benjamin uses the notion of the messianic as a disruptive force working within the canonical 
representation of history; and just as the messianic is envisioned by Benjamin to be the redemptive figure of 
political liberation for the Jewish people, so he found a way to generate alternative meaning to history, 
through a messianic cessation, and against violently narrated ideological ends. (Dickinson, “Canon as an Act 
of Creation,” 137.) 
401 Agamben, “Language and History in Benjamin,” 178–179. 
 
 
131 
 “Like the origin,”402 writes Agamben, for Benjamin “the language of names is not, 
then, an initial chronological point, just as the messianic end of languages, the universal 
language of redeemed humanity, is not a simple chronological cessation. Together they 
constitute the two faces of a single ‘idea of language’.”403 The universal language can only 
be, for Benjamin, the idea of language, “not an ideal (in the neo-Kantian sense) but the 
very Platonic idea of language which saves and contains in itself all languages.”404 This 
“idea of language” no longer presupposes any other language, it has nothing more to say, 
but, simply, speaks. At this radical point of transparency, there is no distinction in the 
language between “field of names” and signifying words or between the intended and the 
said, and the language reaches its messianic end. Accordingly universal history “knows no 
past to transmit, but it is the world of an ‘integral actuality’. Language here disappears as 
an autonomous category. ... [M]en no longer write their language, but they act it out like a 
celebration.”405 Language (that is, universal language) had become so close to man (and 
his history) that they seem, like never before, to perfectly coincide, in the same way as 
lovers who have no more room for any image, letter, or grammar to reside between them. 
[Continue Reading]
 
402 The origin, with respect to language and names in particular, is elsewhere illustrated by Agamben 
via the metaphor of the vortex: “Names—and each name is a proper or a divine name—are the vortexes of 
the historical becoming of language, whirlpools in which the semantic and communicative tension of 
language clogs up into itself and becomes equal to zero. In a name, we no longer say—or do not yet say—
anything; we only call. It is perhaps for this reason that, in the naive representation of the origin of language, 
we imagine that names come first, discrete and isolated as in a dictionary, and that we then combine them to 
form a discourse. Once again, this puerile imagination becomes perspicuous if we understand that the name 
is actually a vortex that perforates and interrupts the semantic flow of language, not simply in order to abolish 
it. In the vortex of nomination, the linguistic sign, by turning and sinking into itself, is intensified and 
exacerbated in the extreme; it then makes itself be sucked in at the point of infinite pressure, in which it 
disappears as a sign and re-emerges on the other side as a pure name.” (Agamben, The Fire and the Tale, 61–
62.) 
403 Agamben, “Language and History in Benjamin,” 180. 
404 Ibid. 
405 Ibid, 182. Benjamin’s conception of language seems to exceed a realization in a mere theoretical 
form. As if bodily experienced, it is grounded on actuality, closely tied to the experience of language, to the 
realization that there is language, and in the same manner as any other ontological substance, it is given in 
time and (from itself) involves a reflection on history. 
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Section II—Philosophical Archeology Space 2009–2019 
 
Introduction 
This section is an integral component of my thesis exhibition titled Philosophical 
Archeology Space 2009–2019. The first part of section II is meant to contextualize the 
archeological orientation in contemporary art, as well as to generally draw how some artists 
have recently worked with archives or collections in their practice. A connection is thus 
made between art’s conception of the historical and the archeological, between document 
and monument, in order to delineate a material conception of temporality. Consequently, 
the messianic conception of time (and its possible temporal realizations) is described in its 
relation to artistic, archeological production. 
 The discussion does not intend to punctiliously demonstrate how philosophical 
archeology works regarding our engagement with art, but to picture, in general terms, how 
key elements of the methodology (that were presented thus far) are conceived within the 
discourse of contemporary art. 
 
The second part of section II (titled “The Archive and the Index”) is meant to offer a further 
entry to my artistic practice and thesis installation/exhibition. It does so by explicating the 
installation’s two-part structure and the material a priori (as a historiographic 
methodology) of my artistic practice; and additionally, by offering terrains of thought 
regarding the various art works (or, in the jargon of philosophical archeology, “paradigms”) 
that are contained within the archive part of the installation. 
 I aim to write about these works rather indirectly, without over‒explicating them, 
in order to leave enough room for the readers (and viewers) to generate their own self‒
directed archeological interpretation. Moreover, these terrains of thought somewhat shy 
away from a discussion mostly based on contemporary art theories or heavily infused with 
examples of artworks from the history of contemporary art. 406  I use philosophical 
archeology, in writing, to comment upon ideas that lay at the core of (my) artworks and 
 
406 However, I offer (in footnotes) references where one can turn in order to find further relevant 
information. 
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artistic practice (as an arche or “historical a priori”), and that has the power to do exactly 
that. The important thing for me, given the logic of philosophical archeology, is to unfold 
a non-authoritative reading of the concepts (or, in the jargon of philosophical archeology, 
“signatures”) that condition and govern my ongoing artistic projects/practice.
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Part I—The Archeological Orientation in Contemporary Art 
 
2.1.1 
A key essay in the vigilant articulation of the archeological orientation in contemporary art 
was published by curator Dieter Roelstraete in 2009, under the title “The Way of the 
Shovel: On the Archeological Imaginary in Art.”407 The essay’s central argument concerns 
the identification of a “historiographic turn” in the art of the early twenty-first century, that 
is, a preoccupation with “looking back” among the generation of artists active at that time 
in the international art scene. Moreover, the essay questions whether this historiographic 
mode of artistic production and thinking might overemphasize the romantic notion that 
truth lies buried in history, and thus distracts from more pressing issues of the present and 
the future. 
 Roelstraete’s series of subsequent essays and curated exhibitions that he continued 
to develop on the subject matter culminated with the publication of The Way of the 
Shovel—a catalogue that accompanied an exhibition he curated at the MCA in Chicago 
under the same title (November 2013–March 2014). The catalogue contains, among others, 
Roelstraete’s essay “Field Notes,” which commences with a quote from an “archeological” 
thinker who is perhaps the most appropriate to sound out a culture marked by fragments, 
shards and traces—that is, Walter Benjamin: “He who seeks to approach his own buried 
past must conduct himself like a man digging.” 408  The metaphor of digging, writes 
Roelstraete, seems to be an identifying (though ironic) feature of contemporary art: “that 
the one sector of culture most commonly associated with looking forward should appear 
 
407 For the reverse orientation, in other words, for the recent influence of the visual arts on the discipline 
of archeology, see Renfrew, Gosden, and DeMarrais, eds. Substance, Memory, Display: Archeology and Art. 
For their mutual influence, in general, see Renfrew, Figuring It Out. One of the important claims in these 
texts is that both art and archeology involve making subtle modifications in the landscape, explore natural 
materials and processes of change, as well as ask profound questions about the nature of the human condition. 
The difference between them relates to the fact that archeologists explore their field in the form of objective 
knowledge, attempt to formulate statements about their findings that “go beyond one’s own personal 
experiences and subjective beliefs.” (Renfrew, Gosden, and DeMarrais, eds. Substance, Memory, Display: 
Archeology and Art, 166.) Artists, on the other hand, have no such constraints and are expected to indulge in 
self-expression. The need to figure out what one is looking at when facing a monument in the field or an 
artwork in the gallery is common to both disciplines, but the difference between them is that this need is an 
obligation for the archeologist whereas for the artist is rather a meadow for further explorations. 
408 Benjamin, “Excavation and Memory,” 576; Roelstraete, “Field Notes,” 14. 
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so consumed by a passion for looking not just the proverbial other way but in the opposite 
direction―backwards.”409 Nonetheless, historical consciousness in the art world “appears 
to have reached a critical level, to have become something qualitatively new.”410 
 
A few of the exhibited works in The Way of the Shovel clearly illustrate the archeological 
orientation in contemporary art that Roelstraete points to. One of them is Plot (2007) by 
Canadian artist Derek Brunen. It is a performance/video work that, in the course of 6 hours 
and 12 minutes, shows the artist literally digging his own grave, “recording the laborious 
action in real time, solitarily performed in a cemetery in the artist’s former hometown, 
Vancouver.”411 This is a philosophically charged work that does not shy away from the 
big questions—life, death, fate, infinity—as it seeks answers to them, answers that 
inevitably remain somewhat unanswered. This is the way of the shovel at its most literal 
sense, as earthly soil is dug out with a shovel in order to prepare for the artist’s ultimate 
exiting. “[I]n its appropriation of the endgame motif,” Roelstraete writes, the artist proves 
“how the frustrated spectacle of the search for meaning can still engender an experience of 
the new.”412 413 
 Another exhibited work which lucidly speaks to the manner in which contemporary 
artists construct their relation to history is Message from Andrée (2005) by Danish artist 
Joachim Koester. Drawing on both documentary and fiction, Joachim Koester’s work 
reexamines and reactivates certain forms and traces from the past, with the intention of 
finding and translating “the buried stories such marks might contain.” 414  While two 
prominent recurring concerns in his work are “how ideas and narratives take on a physical 
form” and “how stories and history materialize,” 415  equally important is the 
“dematerialized” question of the “tension between the apparent narrative, which the viewer 
 
409 Roelstraete, “Field Notes,” 15–16. 
410 Ibid, 19. 
411 The Way of the Shovel: On the Archaeological Imaginary in Art, 65. 
412 Ibid. 
413 For another film that shows an artist digging his own grave, see The Hole (1972–74). The film was 
a part of a two-year project, culminating in the film itself. Shot under the influence of LSD and bathed in 
eerie, hazy light, this short film shows the artist, Jacques Katmor, staging his own burial while drawing 
Cabalistic and Jewish symbols on the ground and with the movements of the camera. 
414 The Way of the Shovel: On the Archaeological Imaginary in Art, 140. 
415 Koester, Message from the Unseen, 40. 
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immediately sees, and what remains invisible or illegible.”416 
 Message from Andrée (usually presented as an installation of a 3:39 minute, 16mm 
film and two ink-jet prints) was inspired by a hot-air balloon expedition led by Swedish 
researcher Salomon August Andrée, who left Norway to journey across the North Pole in 
1897. Thirty-three years later, the explorers’ remains were found with a box of negatives 
that told the story of a crash and an ill-fated three-month trek across the ice. Koester 
photographed the negatives, which were covered in black stains, scratches, and streaks of 
light, and produced a film that just shows black dots of different sizes flicker over a field 
of white—those effects of film often ignored by historians. Koester writes: “Most 
historians studying the expedition ignored this layer of ‘visual noise’. I, on the other hand, 
have made it my focus. If language defines our world, the black dots and light streaks on 
the photographs can be seen as bordering on the visible, or marking the edge of the 
unknown, pointing to the twilight zone of what can be told and what cannot be told, 
narratives and non-narratives, document and mistake.”417  While the viewer sees only 
inscrutable traces of something fluttering across the screen, the film evokes memories of 
the tragically optimistic explorers, the forces of time and severe weather conditions 
physically acting on the film, and the power of photography to reveal otherwise lost 
moments. 
 Message from Andrée, corresponding to a turning point for Koester, is his first work 
to include a film with a flicker effect and whose documentary dimension is a pretext for a 
perceptual experiment. From there, the artist concentrated more and more on a quest for 
“spirits.” Koester’s “ghost-hunting,” which attempts to bring back forgotten people or 
places, often involves occultism or rituals that experiment with different types of 
perception. Spirits, for Koester, are all those things never fully realized in history. As Foster 
writes on Koester’s work: 
 
Even as modernization obliterates history, it can also produce ‘points of 
suspensions’ that expose its uneven development—or, perhaps better, its 
uneven devolution into so many ruins. Such are the ‘blind spots’ that 
intrigue Koester. An oxymoron of sorts, the term suggests sites that, 
 
416 Ibid. 
417 Caron, Joachim Koester: Of Spirits and Empty Spaces, 178. 
 
 
137 
normally overlooked, might still provide insights; and, as Koester captures 
them, they are unsettled, an unusual mix of the banal and the uncanny, 
evocative of an everyday kind of historical unconscious.418 
 
Foster’s “points of suspension” is borrowed from Koester’s (and Buckingham’s) treatment 
and analysis of empty or indeterminate spaces and their relation to meaning embedded in 
material forms. They draw on the example of the Free City of Christiania, a 1,200 person 
anarchistic squat located in Copenhagen, which since 1971 “exists as a police-free social 
experiment, self-governed under a direct-democratic process where all major decisions are 
made by unanimous vote. A sign posted at Christiania’s main entrance declares: You are 
now leaving the European Union.”419 The representative flag is comprised of three yellow 
dots on a red background, a design that seemingly acts in opposition to “usual” symbols 
(that attempt to fix meaning against the flow of time) in the sense that it marks transience 
and fragmentation. “The three dots resemble an ellipsis, or ‘points of suspension’, the 
typographical mark that indicates an omission, faltering speech, or an incomplete thought 
in a printed text.”420 The ellipsis marks the indeterminate but can also act as a connector 
of any two (or more) sentences, “forming an endless chain of possible thoughts.”421 The 
three dots also form a broken horizon line, a limit that at the same time allows the mind 
spaces beyond the limit: “Empty spaces urging us onwards, reminding us that the vanishing 
point of history is always the present moment.”422 
 A last example from The Way of the Shovel belongs to the artist that, as Roelstraete 
writes, “[N]o survey of the archeological impulse in contemporary art would be complete 
without”423—Mark Dion. Dion’s practice has become almost synonymous with the art of 
the archeological dig, both as a metaphor and as a literal, physical act. In the exhibition, 
Dion presents a series of illustrations of mixed‒media installations that he produced 
throughout his vast artistic activity, as well as two, crude and well‒used shovels that have 
accompanied Dion on numerous digs. The emphasis of Dion’s work, and in relation to the 
 
418 Foster, “Blind Spots: Hal Foster on the Art of Joachim Koester,” 216. 
419 Koester and Buckingham, Points of Suspension, 56. 
420 Ibid, 60. 
421 Ibid, 62. 
422 Ibid. 
423 The Way of the Shovel: On the Archaeological Imaginary in Art, 100. 
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archeological orientation in contemporary art, resides in its epistemological inquiry: 
“Dion’s sprawling installations,” writes Roelstraete, “regularly borrow from the aesthetic 
Lingua franca of nineteenth‒century Victorian museum culture, consistently reversing the 
means and ends of scientific research and its ‘objective’ results or findings, to turn both the 
investigation and the locale—a desk, a lab coat, a tool kit—into a work of art.”424 
 
The new height of historical consciousness among contemporary artists, according to 
Roelstraete, is partly the result of the current knowledge economy that artists (as well as 
art critics, curators, and almost all art-world agents) are subject to; in other words, artists 
are part of a larger process of epistemological reorientation underway in society, a clearly 
identifiable process that (in the art world) is practiced through research done in the archive 
and library rather than in the studio, where such work (traditionally) used to take place.425 
In this quest for knowledge, artists aspire to recover long-forgotten artifacts, but also 
(sometimes due to the impossibility of the mission of recovery) attempt to enhance our 
memory, to reconstruct, reenact, repeat; to engage not only in practices of storytelling but 
of history-telling: “Indeed, if the past truly is a foreign country ... it is certainly one many 
artists feel called upon to rediscover from afar―the only terra incognita left to map, 
perhaps, in a world of total transparency in which everything is always immediately 
‘known’.”426 
 Moreover, in his attempt to answer the question “Why now?” of the historiographic 
turn, Roelstraete addresses the current crisis of history both as an intellectual discipline and 
as a fundament of contemporary culture more generally. Today’s general state of post-
ideological fatigue as well as the political evacuation of academia are signaled as the 
crisis’s symptoms: “If ‘progress,’” he writes, “in contemporary culture is predicated in part 
on accelerated oblivion, it is typically art’s role to go against the grain of such dominant, 
homogenizing trends and slow down the spiral of forgetfulness, and even to occasionally 
 
424 Ibid. 
425 In order to support this claim, Roelstraete mentions two previous important texts written on the 
phenomenon: Godfrey’s “The Artist as Historian” (2007) and Foster’s “An Archival Impulse” (2004). 
426 Roelstraete, “Field Notes,” 25. This artistic inclination towards researching and presenting 
alternative histories, according to Roelstraete, is also a result of current technological and political burdens. 
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turn back the clock.”427 
 Another part of Roelstraete’s answer to the question, “Why now?”, relates more 
directly to “the straightforward matter of chronology.” The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 
and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 [being parts of a series of various political 
upheavals in (mostly) eastern Europe at the end of the twentieth-century] mark the first 
clear milestones in this process as per Roelstraete; and the current generation of artists who 
grew up around that time are the ones who today attempt to, in some ways, preserve in 
memory the way of life on the “other” side (of the wall, the border, etc.) or to preserve 
what is no longer there. The other key event in this proposed chronology is the September 
11, 2001, terror attack in New York, an event that signaled the end of “the age of neoliberal 
complacency ushered in by the publication, in 1989, of Francis Fukuyama’s landmark 
essay ‘The End of History?’,”428 an event that announced the dramatic return to History 
(with a capital H) and renewed calls upon art to take part in this process (as the present 
political worldwide climate is overly miserable to handle): “The historiographic turn in 
contemporary art, then, was also a turning away from a present that art, as a whole, felt 
utterly powerless to change―or ... uninterested in being a part of.”429 430 
 Furthermore, the reason for art’s recent attraction to the archeological paradigm, 
according to Roelstraete, is related also to the discipline’s truth claims—that is, “the 
 
427 Ibid, 33. 
428 Ibid, 37. 
429 Ibid, 39. 
430 The one tragic flaw of the “historiographic turn” in art, writes Roelstraete, is “its inability to grasp 
or even look at the present, much less to excavate the future.” (Roelstraete, “The Way of the Shovel: On the 
Archeological Imaginary in Art,” 6.) In a follow‒up essay, Roelstraete offers a fix to this flaw, maintaining 
the need to view the art world as a historical whole, “to finally be able again to capture art in a handful of 
isms.” (Roelstraete, “After the Historiographic Turn: Current Findings,” 7.) Specifically, after the financial 
crisis (in the art market) of 2008, a true historical thinking on the grand scale of “isms” is required (as we 
often expect or witness after a “natural” breed of realisms crises). We hardly have any realism in art and 
culture now, according to Roelstraete, because there “have not been real crises,” and “there simply has not 
been terribly much engagement with something akin to a ‘real’ world in recent times.” (Ibid, 9.) 
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rhetorical assumption that depth delivers truth, that the ground cannot lie.”431 432 The 
archeological, material-based quest or (re)search is an elaborated allegory of the artist’s 
quest for the unknown and unknowable. In this quest, earthly soil plays a crucial role.433 
 
2.1.2 
If we accept the assumption that the ground cannot lie, and at the same time, recognize that 
archeology is practiced (as a form of art) through engaging with its philosophical 
dimension, we can perhaps argue that philosophical archeology in artistic practice confines 
this term to its proper meaning, that is, as potential truth. 
 In what he terms as “anteroom thought,” Siegfried Kracauer advocates against the 
radical character of philosophical truths, due to their “generality and concomitant 
abstractness” as well as their favouring of “either-or decisions” and tendency for “freezing 
into dogma.”434 Resisting attempts at mediation, philosophical doctrines tend to leave no 
 
431 Roelstraete, “Field Notes,” 43. 
432 However, even if one believes the assumptions that “depth deliver[s] truth, that the ground cannot 
lie,” this belief does not necessarily entail its grasping. Isaiah Berlin writes, with regard to the division 
between “surface” and “depths,” the following: “There is a vision, or at least a glimpse, a moment of 
revelation which in some sense explains and reconciles, a theodicy, a justification of what exists and happens, 
as well as its elucidation. What does it consist in? ... [W]e are here plainly intended to see that these 'heroes' 
of the novel―the 'good' people―have now, after the storms and agonies of ten years and more, achieved a 
kind of peace, based on some degree of understanding: understanding of what? Of the need to submit: to 
what? ... To the permanent relationship of things, and the universal texture of human life, wherein alone truth 
and justice are to be found by a kind of 'natural'―somewhat Aristotelian―knowledge. ... How can this be 
known? ... By an awareness, not necessarily explicit or conscious, of certain general characteristics of human 
life and experience. And the most important and the most pervasive of these is the crucial line that divides 
the 'surface' from the 'depth'―on the one hand the world of perceptible, describable, analyzable data ... [a]nd, 
on the other hand, the order which, as it were, 'contains' and determines the structure of experience ... [W]e 
are in art living in a world the constituents of which we can discover ... [B]ut in part, we are immersed and 
submerged in a medium that, precisely to the degree to which we inevitably take it for granted as part of 
ourselves, we do not and cannot observe as if from the outside ... cannot even be wholly aware of, inasmuch 
as it enters too intimately into all our experience, is itself too closely interwoven with all that we are and do 
to be lifted out of the flow (it is the flow) and observed with scientific detachment, as an object. It―the 
medium in which we are―determines our most permanent categories ... [It is] the ultimate framework, the 
basic presuppositions wherewith we function. ... Yet some human beings are better aware―although they 
cannot describe it―of the texture ... [I]t is ... a special sensitiveness to the contours of the circumstances in 
which we happen to be placed ... [T]his inexpressible sense of cosmic orientation is the 'sense of reality', the 
'knowledge' of how to live.” (Berlin, “The Hedgehog and the Fox,” 487–89.) 
433 In this sense, Roelstraete mentions Georges Bataille’s idea of “Base Materialism” according to 
which both art and archeology are forms of work that involve our bodily engagement “in the world,” 
diminishing the distance from the material and the work itself, forcing us to touch and scratch it, “intensifying 
out bodily bondage.” 
434 Kracauer, History: The Last Things Before the Last, 214. 
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room for something to exist in the interstices between these truths. This threatens to 
overshadow potential truths that are not conceived as belonging to the “ultimate range of 
the general.” 435  Anteroom thought, on the contrary, requires the acknowledgment of 
philosophical truths and their claim to objective validity alongside the awareness of their 
limitations in terms of absoluteness and controlling power—“[a]mbiguity is of the essence 
in this intermediary area.”436 437 
 
2.1.3 
Art’s current coupling of historical perspective and archeological digging brings to mind a 
previous, similar coupling—between the document and the monument—described perhaps 
most elliptically by Foucault in this celebrated passage from The Archeology of Knowledge: 
 
435 Ibid. 
436 Ibid. 
437  Siegfried Kracauer’s “anteroom thought” can perhaps be realized in the context of poststructuralism, 
and especially its relation to language. In Experiencing the Past, Michael Shanks clearly explains this 
multilayered connection. Metaphysical judgments, he writes, are judgments about what really exists, that is, 
ontology. The object of study is the origin. The past, present in its traces, is the beginning and end of 
archeology. The word itself—archeology—contains all that exists in its project: (arche) meaning origin and 
beginning, power and sovereignty; (logos) meaning account, reason, explanation, expression, discourse. 
Whether these elements have presence and meaning in themselves is to be questioned in a poststructuralist 
account, especially ideas of identity, origin, and meaning. 
 It is argued that the past has no determinate meaning, but it constantly slips from our conceptual hold. 
The reason for this is because it depends on foregrounding language and its structure. Language is argued as 
central to human experience, and language is primarily signification—communication in and through signs. 
Saussure’s structural linguistics established a fundamental split within the sign: between the (differential, 
sensible) signifier, that is, a sound or image that acts as a vehicle; and the (formal, intelligible) signified, that 
is, a concept referred to. Signifiers have no necessary meaning in themselves, but hold potential. This 
potential comes from signifiers being located in a structure of signifiers that differ from each other. A word 
on its own means nothing; rather, its meaning comes from its difference from other words—this structure of 
difference enables the signifier to be tied to the signified (both components of the sign, differs from the actual 
object in reality, which is called the referent). 
 We relate the word and its associations with others. The result is a texture; each word is formed on the 
basis of traces within it of other words. Nothing is ever simply present or absent, and there is no end to this 
differing. We are always delayed in reaching meaning. Meaning is constantly deferred, divided from itself. 
There are only webs of signifiers. This entails meaning always being absent, in a way—it is not present in 
the sign. Thus, if our “hold” on reality is primarily through language, then identity and meaning are elusive. 
 When one holds an object in one’s hands, various attributes (decorations, markings, colours, styles, etc.) 
are associated with the object that seem to give it its identity. These attributes are not present within the object 
but are constantly shifting; the object is becoming and not being. It does not have identity and being so much 
as difference and becoming. The meaning of the object is here and elsewhere. The signifier is subverted; the 
(object’s) past is not the origin of meaning. 
 In conclusion, Shanks claims that poststructuralist argument does not question truth to replace it with a 
free play of signifiers, but the truth of the past is material and institutional, social and personal; and 
archeologists write in the space between past and present. 
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“In our time, history is that which transforms document into monument.”438 Foucault’s 
critique, being a continuation of a historical tradition that started in France by the 
intellectuals of the Annales journal of the 1930s, emphasized a redefinition of the 
methodology involved in historical research. This critique of the document and history’s 
fundamental relation to it, as well as the manner in which visual and textual materials were 
being used in historical research, highlight a more reflective use of the document that was 
exercised in academic circles, but also (and perhaps more lucidly than in others fields) in 
artistic practices of the 1960s onwards—using the document no longer as a site for 
interpretation, but as a site for construction. “The document,” as Foucault writes, “is no 
longer for history an inert material,”439 it actively manifests its potentiality in different 
ways if one just learns how to question it properly.440 As opposed to the classic work of 
the historian, who investigates the document in order to uncover its supposed concealed 
truths, the artist is able to produce a document that is no longer part of a group of hidden 
evidence, but is part of constructed scenes of knowledge manufacture.441 
 
The idea that, in the hands of artists, the document is no longer an inert material (and that 
it has become a site for knowledge production) is reflected by multiple examples in recent 
contemporary art. Artists have continuously used archives and collections as a form of 
storytelling or history telling, in order to construct a desired narrative or to rewrite the 
 
438 Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge, 7. 
439 Ibid. 
440  Foucault builds upon the work of the French historian Marc Bloch, who writes: “For even those 
texts or archeological documents which seem the clearest and the most accommodating will speak only when 
they are properly questioned. ... [E]very historical research supposes that the inquiry has a direction at the 
very first step. In the beginning, there must be the guiding spirit.“ (Bloch, The Historian’s Craft, 64–65.) If 
we adhere to the idea that any document is fraught with ideological overtones, we should also approach any 
monument in the same way. The historian Jacques LeGoff, a follower of Marc Bloch, adds that a document 
is made a monument through historical societies’ efforts to impose—voluntarily or involuntarily—a certain 
image of themselves into the future. He writes: “There is no truthful document. Every document is a lie. It is 
the task of the historian to deconstruct, to demolish this montage, to re‒structure this construction, and to 
analyze the conditions of production of these documents‒monuments.” (Le Goff, “Documento/Monumento,” 
455.) 
 The other assumption, according to Bloch, that permits the historian its research is the conception of 
time as “a multiple operator ... as the source of the heterogeneous multiplicity and polysemy of reality.” In 
characterizing time as both continuous and changing, Bloch conceives of time as causing “history to be 
experienced in a multiplicity of ways and within a multiplicity of meanings. ... Time becomes a locus of 
distribution of multiple meanings.” (Calcagno, “Abolishing Time and History,” 21.) 
441 For a discussion of art epistemology, see Govrin, “Art Epistemology (Project for a Review).” 
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historiography of a certain subject matter. To demonstrate that, and to further support the 
claim for the historiographic tendency in contemporary art, we can review a few prominent 
examples to the way artists have worked with and constituted archives or collections in the 
past, while shedding light on important socio‒political consequences of it. 
 Mining the Museum (1992) was an exhibition curated and installed by artist Fred 
Wilson. Wilson was invited by The Contemporary (Baltimore) to create the exhibition 
using the archives and resources of the Maryland Historical Society. The society’s 
collection is known for holding many objects from the “antebellum period.” These items, 
along with their indexation, made the collection itself known for promoting agenda of white 
supremacy. When Wilson culled objects from the permanent collection, he juxtaposed the 
products of slavery with fine‒art statuary, furniture, and silverware. It constituted an act of 
criticism directed at the institution itself, showing the gap between the society’s own blind 
spots toward its past and the repressed history of the black population in the U.S. today. 
For example, in one room titled “Cabinetmaking,” he placed a set of antique armchairs in 
front of a whipping post (that was in use until 1938), as if to allow the audience to watch 
the white elite entertained by the abuse and humiliation of the black population. In this 
room, as well as others, Wilson mimicked the usual methods of curatorial museum display 
(i.e., specially painted rooms, silkscreened wall texts, labels, audiovisual material, etc.) and 
through that mimicry radicalized a subgenre of conceptualism—the institutional critique. 
 Institutional critique became more entrenched in contemporary art from the time 
that artists were invited by the institutions themselves to act as critics within their own 
walls. An example from two years earlier was Joseph Kosuth’s The Play of the 
Unmentionable (1990), which was exhibited in the Brooklyn Museum. Kosuth’s project 
was part of a site‒specific series of installations in the grand lobby of the museum, where 
artists were asked to “shed further light on the debate with an eye to history,”442 as stated 
by Robert T. Buck, the director of the Brooklyn Museum. For this installation, Kosuth 
created a dialogue about what art is in its social and political context, and for that he chose 
approximately one hundred works from the museum’s permanent collection “that were 
 
442 Brooklyn Museum, “The Brooklyn Museum Collection: The Play of the Unmentionable (Joseph 
Kosuth).” 
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once considered acceptable in the cultures in which they were created, but now might be 
viewed by some as otherwise,”443 as noted further in the museum press release. 
 Howard Halle notes in his essay “Mining the Museum” (1993), that most of the 
artists criticizing the institution of art represent minority groups, such as women (like 
Louise Lawler, Judith Barry, Silvia Kolbowski and Andrea Fraser) or artists of colour, like 
Wilson, as part of a struggle to redefine art history by erasing the demarcations of gender, 
race, and class. Claire Bishop (in her essay “Rescuing Collective Desires: Benjamin, 
History and Contemporary Art”)444 agrees with Halle’s comments on Wilson’s project, but 
notes that most exhibitions curated by artists are not trying to confront any element of art 
history, but rather use the art collection as the extension of their own practice, in what 
should be considered “archival installation,” as defined by Hal Foster. In “Archival 
Impulse” (2004), Foster argues that through the archival‒like installation, artists collect 
and rearrange objects as part of an associative dialogue, jumping from one idea to the other, 
so that the installation acts only as a module of their taste. Raid the Icebox 1 with Andy 
Warhol (1969) is a good example of this. In early 1969 Andy Warhol was invited to select 
works for a travelling exhibition that intended to provide a fresh and less academic 
interpretation of the collections in the storerooms of the RISD Museum. This landmark 
exhibition was not only noteworthy for Warhol’s idiosyncratic choice of objects—
including shoes, parasols, chairs, hat boxes, Native American pottery and blankets, 
wallpaper, bundles of auction catalogues, even a ginkgo tree growing in the museum’s 
courtyard—but for the radical way he chose to display the works: along with their storage 
cabinets, racks, and shelves, as they were stacked and grouped in storage when he first saw 
them. 
 The origins for both approaches to working with a collection, as Bishop notes, 
resides in two unfinished projects from the beginning of the twentieth century: Warburg’s 
Mnemosyne Atlas (1924–29) and Benjamin’s Arcades Project (1927–40). In the Atlas, 
Warburg used pictorial reproductions pinned on wooden panels to show the continuity of 
visual elements from the early pagan era to the renaissance of Christianity. By contrast, 
 
443 Brooklyn Museum, “The Brooklyn Museum Collection: The Play of the Unmentionable (Joseph 
Kosuth).” 
444 Walter Benjamin: Exilic Archive, 77–86. 
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Benjamin’s Arcades Project illuminates a process that locates the decisive shift to the 
modern age. Through a montage of quotations from, and reflections on, hundreds of 
published sources, arranged in thirty‒six categories, Benjamin tells the history of 
nineteenth‒century capitalism and what he calls the “commodification of things.” From 
this research, he coined (as previously mentioned) the term “Dialectical Image,” where past 
and present interact with one another as a method and subject of critical analysis. In other 
words, the juxtaposition of collected archival materials, as organized by Benjamin, can 
show how experience from the past can tell us something about present times, and perhaps 
even of the future. Artists working with collections in this way could create new readings 
of materials, retelling their stories and narratives, leading to new knowledge of the 
institution, its collection, and more generally of art history and beyond. But the detailed, 
repetitious, laborious act of uncovering buried “treasures,” revealing the process of time’s 
passage, etc.—approximate a “scientific” type of art—is needed before any new knowledge 
can be founded. In other words, this “new” knowledge has come to be dependent more and 
more on the archeology of the past, and therefore, the archeological optic is one of the 
founding principles of modern museum culture (which in itself became a site to be 
explored) as well as the way contemporary artists work with and through archives or 
collections. 
 Artists are not historians and they should not attempt to be. They may create works 
that masquerade as documents and in doing so emphasize the extent to which documents 
are the products of conventions of knowledge production rather than vehicles for evidence. 
Their interest, in this case, lies less in uncovering than in unsettling historical truths and 
narratives. A great example is Walid Raad’s Atlas Group (established in 1999), which 
researches and documents the contemporary history of Lebanon, in particular the years of 
the Lebanese Civil War (1975–90/91). Through the collection of the continuing effects of 
all the individual and collective experiences that constitutes history in the first place, the 
archive grows through not only found, but also intentionally invented photographic, 
audiovisual, and written “documents” of everyday life in Lebanon. Raad aligns experience 
and memories of the past with “actual” photographs and documents from the time of the 
civil war; and by doing so, he asks an important question about the authenticity of 
documents: why is a memory of the past less valid than a documentation of it? This 
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important question is very much related to the world we live in today, where every 
experience seems to be photographed and uploaded immediately to humanity’s largest 
archive—the Internet.445 
 In her account of Walid Raad’s work, Eva Respini emphasizes that “the Atlas 
Group presented itself as an organization founded to research and document the 
contemporary history of Lebanon, specifically the Lebanese Civil War, and as such as 
maintaining an archive of documents, films, notebooks, photographs, and objects.”446 
Investigating how photographs, moving images, documents, and first-person narratives 
confer authenticity on official histories, be they histories of war or art, Raad’s work weaves 
elements of the past, the present, and the future to build narratives that question how 
history, memory, and geopolitical relationships are constructed. Each Atlas Group 
document was attributed to a source, including the colourful historian Dr. Fadl Fakhouri 
who, however, was fictional as was the Atlas Group organization itself. For Raad, it seems, 
the opposition between fiction and non-fiction does not apply. A fact in his work 
incorporates fantasy and imagination while a fiction is grounded in real events, dates, and 
statistics: “Perhaps it is more productive to think of Raad’s work in terms of its imaginary 
dimensions rather than its fictive ones.”447 In fact, it seems as if Raad’s work’s success 
hinges on our need to believe in official narratives. None of the “documents” produced by 
the Atlas Group is essentially faked: but when Raad re-photographs or scans them and 
mediates their presentation through story lines, literary titles, narrative wall texts, and 
engaging performances, they move into the imaginary realm. Raad’s work turns to fiction 
in order to represent historical experience more adequately. He isn’t concerned very much 
with “the fallaciousness of the material it presents,”448 but in suggesting that only through 
fiction can an adequate image of reality be created. 
 
2.1.4 
This methodological research and understanding of history nonetheless transgress the 
 
445 For another recent project that addresses the intersections between photography and archeology, see 
The Ar(t)chaeology Project: Intersections of Photography and Archaeology. 
446 Respini, Flood, and Raad, Walid Raad, 29. 
447 Ibid. 
448 Godfrey, “The Artist as Historian,” 145. 
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proper discourse of art production. Media critic Knut Ebeling hypothesizes that in the 
twentieth century a new, archeological thinking of the past appears next to its historical 
twin. This form of thinking is constituted via a few major, modern intellectual endeavours 
he terms “Wild Archeologies,” that is, the dealing with archeological projects outside 
archeology proper. Such projects include, as he mentions, Freud’s “Archeology of the 
Soul”; Benjamin’s “Archeology of Modernity”; and Foucault’s “Archeology of 
Knowledge.” What all these projects share in common is that they are framed by Kant’s 
“Archeology of Philosophy” of 1793, as well as the fact that they “experimented with a 
material reflection on temporality.”449 
 Thus, a shift occurs from nineteenth century’s historical thinking to twentieth 
century’s archeological thinking; intellectual history becomes archeological, not historical. 
He writes that, nowadays, “]T[hinking temporality in the digital age requires a different 
line of thinking than historical discourse: not narrating, but counting; seeing rather than 
reading, not historia but archaiologia.” 450  Ebeling’s idea corresponds and supports 
Roelstraete’s claim regarding artists’ current enthusiasm for narration and (story‒ and 
history) telling strategies, as well as their archeological, material conception of the past. 
 “Wild Archeologies” present a certain suspicion towards history, in terms of 
historical facts, documentations and records, and the “monopoly of scripture” that history 
once exclusively obtained. As opposed to history’s constructs, to the printed word and the 
textbook version of the world, one finds the archeological effort of uncovering that is 
systematically different—from simply “telling a story” to sounding out real debris, detritus 
and the world of things, that is, from textual to material reflection of the past. He writes: 
“Archeology does not represent the past; it materializes it. Archeologists work with the 
materiality of the past, whereas historians work with its written documents.”451 Thus, the 
difference is the one we have already mentioned, that of document versus monument, 
textuality versus visibility. Both archeology and art secure remnants for visibility as 
opposed to history’s telling of them. 
 Additionally, the encountered objects might tell something different than the 
 
449 Ebeling, “The Art of Searching,” 8. 
450 Ibid, 7. 
451 Ibid, 9. 
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wishful thinking of self-narration. This is the epistemic difference between document and 
monument. The archeologists do not have a causal knowledge of the event or phenomenon, 
their knowledge of the contemporary is strictly material, it needs to construct everything 
from a post-contemporary position, simultaneously, without sequencing semantics. This is 
the archeological image, or as Benjamin called it, the dialectical image. 
 The second major difference between history and the archeology is that of the 
language of inquiry—the historical account, whether written or oral, transforms everything 
into language, symbols and digits, whereas the archeological account first brings history 
and its object to light in order to consult the remnants themselves, not knowing in which 
language or logic to read and decipher them. 
 The third difference pivots around their conception of time as they sequence past 
contemporaneity452 in different ways. Historical narration constructs time chronologically, 
linearly and continuously, jumping back and forth on an immaterial axis of time—one 
always starts to narrate in the beginning. In contrast, material archeology starts from the 
most recent, present moment (from the “contemporary ground,” as Benjamin called it) and 
regresses backwards in time, calculating back “from the end, which is the present.”453 454 
 Thus, history and archeology qualitatively differ in their temporalities, or as 
Agamben puts it (according to Ebeling), history explores the documented past that has 
already originated, whereas archeology searches for the originating, instead of the always 
already originated. The emergence of original temporalities is what interests the 
archeologist. He calls it an “event”: “the idea of an ‘operation’ whose effects are yet to 
come. ... [F]or the originating, effective past, or, more generally, for all effective 
operations—that lie in the past, but effect the present.”455 
 Agamben, claims Ebeling, is somewhat less wild than the other “Wild 
Archeologists” previously mentioned, since his methodology “holds no materiality, it 
 
452 For a tangential discussion of this term, and in the context of art production, see Osborne, The 
Postconceptual Condition, 3–58. 
453 Ebeling, “The Art of Searching,” 9. 
454 This also entails a spatial difference between history and archeology. Archeology shows spatially 
what once was, while history narrates something chronologically in time. History chooses from chronological 
time while archeology preserves it all for display in the archaic regime of visibility (from transcendental 
model of historical time to strata of time, in other words, material time, the deep time of the layer). 
Archeology renders time sensible. 
455 Ebeling, “The Art of Searching,” 11. 
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swallows and ignores the conflict between paper and stone, reading and seeing, text and 
technique,” up to the point where it is “completely absorbed and assimilated by 
philosophy.”456 Is archeology without materiality, asks Ebeling, still archeology? To that, 
I want to suggest, Agamben might reply with his proposition for a “minimal definition of 
thought” (in accordance with Aristotle’s identification of the blank page as the pure 
potentiality of thought): “To think means to recall the blank page while we write or read. 
To think―but also to read―means to recall matter.”457 My suggestion emphasizes that 
even when the idea of “archeology without materiality” is pushed to its extreme (that is, 
becomes completely and merely “thinking”), the materiality of the blank page always lurks 
in the background—thoughts, in this sense, resemble readymades. Thus, my suggestion 
responds to Ebeling’s question with a “yes.”458 
 In his book on Agamben’s work, Kishik has an insight that can offer another 
pertinent angle in this regard. He writes: 
 
This attitude [i.e. the idea that philosophical prose must be ‘poeticized’ or 
else it runs the risk of falling into banality] partly explains the mosaic-like 
nature of his work. The tesserae that make up his texts are fragments 
chiseled from larger stones, or texts, written by others. It is a kind of 
historical materialism, not in the sense of a historical analysis directed at 
material processes but in the sense of a philosophical process that uses 
history as its material, indeed, as its capital, and thus wins over history itself 
by going against its grain.... A preliminary name for this method might be 
détournement: the cutting, pasting, and altering of found materials in the 
process of creating a new work.459 460 
 
Materiality, according to Ebeling (as previously mentioned), is the common denominator 
of all “Wild Archeologies,” which try, in varying ways, to construct archeology outside 
archeology proper. Materiality operates as other, as the other of history and historical 
 
456 Ibid, 14. 
457 Agamben, The Fire and the Tale, 108. 
458 This suggestion is based on a broader definition of “archeology,” conceiving it also as a metaphor 
or allegory. 
459 Kishik, The Power of Life, 61. 
460 The method of détournement might propel a reference to artists working with language in a similarly 
materialistic ways; one example, out of many, is Robert Smithson’s essay “Language to be looked at and/or 
things to be read” (1967) in relation to his drawing/work “A Heap of Language” (1966). See Smithson, The 
Collected Writings, 61. 
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knowledge.461 “Wild Archeologies” of the modern period thus “transformed” the very idea 
of materiality—from immaterial idea to material understandings of it—which is, 
essentially, the base matter of archeology. 
 The formulation of a new archeological object (Metaphysics in Kant; Media in 
Kittler; Souls in Freud; Knowledge in Foucault, etc.), as per Ebeling, enables a culture to 
define and describe itself. The archeological action can be interpreted as the art of 
constructing the missing link to the self. 
 
2.1.5 
In recent history, the art world (operating as a site of cultural discourse) has attempted to 
encounter, document, and interpret the past in various ways: the antiquarian endeavors of 
the eighteenth century (with its display technologies); the alignment of the advent of 
modern photography with archeological pursuits of the nineteenth century; and the artistic 
responses to the formal aesthetics of archeological artifacts of the early twentieth century 
are perhaps the most prominent constructions. In the second part of the twentieth century, 
according to curator and writer Ian Alden Russell, one witnesses a shift “from purely 
formal responses to archeological aesthetics toward more reflective and critical treatments 
of the manifestations of traces of human agency in the world”462—a shift that was carried 
out by the works of a large and diverse group of artists (such as Henry Moore, Barbara 
Hepworth, Richard Long, Keith Arnatt, Cornelia Parker, Mark Dion, and perhaps most 
notably Robert Smithson), all contributing to the development of archeological awareness 
as a mode of ecological sensitivity. 
 Moreover, Russell claims that in the latter half of the twentieth century, archeology 
extends its metaphor to become an allegory, a historical development that refocuses critical 
engagement “from rhetoric of layers, depth, and progress (as in the twentieth century) to 
affect, performance, and meaning-making,” so that the return to the past is not carried out 
primarily for the sake of inspiration, but “is a deployment of the past as a technique in 
itself—a search for liberation through the subaltern past as a means of resistance to and 
 
461 On the relation between “Otherness” and material debris, see Bell, “Rag‒Picking.” 
462 Russell, “The Art of the Past: Before and After Archeology,” 308. 
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critique of the teleology of technological progress.”463 Thus, the first decade of the twenty-
first century witnesses a strengthened relationship between archeological and artistic 
practices and an ongoing effort towards a renewed conception of the past, so much so that 
“we may be witnessing a revival of an avant-gardist past that is not confined by disciplinary 
structures or epistemic conventions, where the past is not the destination but the way.”464 
 
2.1.6 
An avant-gardist, renewed conception of the past might be a different rehabilitation that 
Roelstraete seeks for the “tragic flaw of the historiographic turn in art,” although not 
necessarily in the form of another “ism.” Rethinking the past, or more generally, rethinking 
time as the medium in which the objects of historical research in art are taking part, is 
perhaps not an “ism” as such, but is at least a radical shift that has equal value in our 
thinking and making, and which has the potential to open up renewed possibilities outside 
linear chronologies and against the blockage of the cultural imagination that art seemed to 
have reached. 
 In a feature for Frieze in late 2012 (“This Is So Contemporary!”), writer Amelia 
Groom surveys how a number of recent exhibitions have been integrating the past with the 
present, seeking to do away with correct chronological sequence and the confines of 
cultural context, in order to suggest that the time and place in which a thing was made 
should not shut it off from other times and places. 
 Groom offers heterogeneous examples: The Russian Linesman (2009) at London’s 
Hayward Gallery, curated by Mark Wallinger, suggested surprising correspondences 
between vastly different objects spanning two millennia; History of History (toured 
between 2003–9), organized by Japanese contemporary artist and collector Hiroshi 
Sugimoto, established intricate dialogues between new works and material culture from 
distant pasts; Intolerance (2010) by the Dutch artist Willem de Rooij, organized at the Neue 
Nationalgalerie in Berlin, presented a series of animal portraits from the Golden Age of 
Dutch painting alongside feathered ceremonial headdresses from eighteenth-century 
 
463 Ibid, 311–12. Russell further brings various recently curated international exhibitions (organized 
around 2010) and scholarly publications as examples to the growing allegorical appropriation of archeology. 
464 Ibid, 313. 
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Hawaii, referred to the display as part of his ongoing work with “spatial collage”; Never 
the Same River (Possible Futures, Probable Pasts), curated by Simon Starling at London’s 
Camden Arts Centre in 2010–11, slipped between different histories in the present as the 
artist restaged works from Camden shows of the last half-century; Shaped by Time (2012) 
at the National Museum of Denmark, organized by artist Julie Sass and curator Milena 
Hoegsberg, positioned (in relation to the museum’s prehistoric collection) fragmented pasts 
in dialogue with the present in order to consider the construct of history and reveal its 
fluidity; or when the 54th Venice Biennale (2011), curated by Bice Curiger, included 
paintings by Tintoretto amongst its line-up of new art. 
 These lines of thought, writes Groom, can be dated back to the art of the early 1960s 
(framed today as Minimalism, Conceptualism, and Land Art), which involve practices that 
were theoretically influenced by the Mesoamerican art historian George Kubler, and his 
book The Shape of Time: Remarks on the History of Things (1962). Dismissing the rhetoric 
of progress in favour of more chaotic models of time, Kubler outlined how artistic 
innovation, replication, and mutation never unfold in a single unbroken direction. History’s 
movements are turbulent, and art will always refuse to tell a fixed, unified story. The Shape 
of Time emphasized that the segmentation of the past is purely arbitrary and conventional, 
and that an imposition of linear order on something that is infinitely more fluid and 
complex is problematic. Kubler further claimed that historic time is always at once 
progressive and regressive, in the same way that art modifies our conception of what went 
before it and what comes after it (for instance, one’s knowledge of Auguste Rodin forever 
changes one’s understanding of Michelangelo, according to Kubler). 
Groom concludes: 
 
When we are presented with old art and new art together on equal terms, 
divisions become slippery and the past is made available for communicative 
interaction with the present. We form new associations, and possibly face 
up to contradictions we’d rather not acknowledge. The inclusion of things 
in displays of contemporary art that are neither strictly ‘contemporary’ nor 
‘art’ is not, as some have suggested, a mere fleeting curatorial trend. It’s 
part of a broader growing awareness of the anachronism inherent in all time. 
After the failed productive-progressivism of modernity, we’re dealing with 
the fact that then and now and later aren’t proceeding along a flat line; 
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they’re synchronized and woven through each other.465 
 
2.1.7 
What entails a cultural condition that denies linear chronology and advancement along a 
flat line but nonetheless is considered and executed at the present time? What kind of 
(temporal) present does it present and represent? 
 In his meditation on the (cultural) contemporary, theorist Boris Groys addresses the 
present and its position within and in relation to chronology. He writes: “The present has 
ceased to be a point of transition from the past to the future, becoming instead a site of the 
permanent rewriting of both past and future.”466 The artistic medium that best reflects this 
contemporary condition is, for Groys (and not without a touch of irony), time-based media: 
 
[B]ecause it thematizes the non-productive, wasted, excessive time—a 
suspended time ... it captures and demonstrates activities that take place in 
time, but do not lead to the creation of any definite product. ... But it is 
precisely because such a wasted, suspended, non-historical time cannot be 
accumulated and absorbed by its product that it can be repeated—
impersonally and potentially infinitely. ... Hence, practicing literal 
repetition can be seen as initiating a rupture in the continuity of life by 
creating a non-historical excess of time through art. And this is the point at 
which art can indeed become truly contemporary.467 
 
Time-based art (as opposed to traditional artworks) is thus not based on a solid foundation 
of time, but rather documents time “that is in danger of being lost as a result of its 
unproductive character.”468 This change in the relationship between art and time also 
changes the temporality of art itself—it ceases to be present, ceases to be “in the present” 
or “in time,” and begins to document a repetitive present that can be prolonged into the 
indefinite future. The temporality of contemporary art, according to Groys, is thus “with 
time”—being contemporary, as the essay’s title suggests, means being a “comrade of 
time.” 
 
465 Groom, “This Is So Contemporary!” 
466 Groys, “Comrades of Time,” 4. 
467 Ibid, 6. 
468 Ibid, 7. For the suggestion that, from the perspective of production, time-based media promotes an 
understanding of the plasticity of time, see Birnbaum, Chronology. 
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 For the most part nowadays, the actual conditions of spectatorship in time-based art 
(as it is often exhibited in art spaces) seem to support Groys’ analysis. In modernity, the 
attitude of passive contemplation was discredited by celebrations of the potent movements 
of material forces. He writes: “While the vita contemplativa was for a very long time 
perceived as an ideal form of human existence, it came to be despised and rejected 
throughout the period of modernity as a manifestation of the weakness of life, a lack of 
energy.”469 Contemporary spectators, on the other hand, can no longer rely on having 
infinite time resources or perspectives (“the expectation that was constitutive for Platonic, 
Christian, or Buddhist traditions of contemplation”); contemporary vita contemplativa 
coincides with permanent active circulation. It is a repetitive gesture that leads to no result, 
to no “well-founded aesthetic judgment.”470 471 
 The growing disbelief that characterizes the contemporary—the disbelief that 
cultural projects can realize their (past and future) promises in a way that reflects the 
disbelief of socio-political structures—causes Groys to speculate on a particular, acute 
need of the contemporary: “The contemporary is actually constituted by doubt, hesitation, 
uncertainty, indecision—by the need for prolonged reflection, for a delay. ... [A] prolonged, 
even potentially infinite period of delay.”472 
 
2.1.8 
Paul, as we recall from section I, used the expression ton kairon exagorazomenoi, “buying 
up time,” to convey the temporal condition of messianic time against the representation of 
chronological time that separates us from ourselves as impotent spectators. 
 Ceal Floyer’s video work “Drop” (2013)473 is a clear example which seems to 
 
469 Ibid, 8. 
470 Ibid, 10. 
471 This claim corresponds with Peter Osborne’s argument according to which “the mode of attention 
appropriate to the conditions of contemporary art is best conceived in terms of a historical dialectic of 
boredom and distraction, rather than the strictly transcendental timelessness of the model of ‘contemplative 
immersion’ historically associated with the exhibition-value of modern art.” (Osborne, Anywhere or Not at 
All, 176.) 
472 Groys, “Comrades of Time,” 3. 
473  HD Video, Silent. 11:18 min, Loop. Video Documentation: 
https://www.303gallery.com/artists/ceal-floyer/video-slideshow/undefined?view=slider#2 (and a Hi-Res 
version at: http://www.contemporaryartdaily.com/2016/04/ceal-floyer-at-aargauer-kunsthaus/). 
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fulfill the contemporary’s need (as per Groys) for potentially infinite deferment that will 
allow for the messianic to “seep in.” The sublime emptiness of the present moment is 
manifested in her portrayal of the passing of time (and the present moment) in a material 
form—water drops accumulating very slowly until a breaking point occurs and gravity 
pulls it down, causing the drop to fall and shutter. The agonizing time of the viewer, who 
waits for the drop to disconnect, stretches out endlessly and becomes pure duration. The 
piece is not only a time-based work, but also takes place in time—that is, it criticizes the 
metaphysics of presence in the sense that it shows the before and after of presence, of the 
present moment by stretching the past and the future to its extreme.474 The actual moment 
of falling happens almost too quickly for the human eye to catch, the present withdraws 
and appears as if never took place. One is never contemporary with the present, as there is 
no now; the now is always deferred. 
 
2.1.9 
What seems to undergo a profound change is not the water drop itself, as an essence or 
material entity in and of itself, but something in our understanding of it, in our appreciation 
of the drop perhaps like never before. The messianic world, in a return to Agamben, 
introduces a small displacement that does not affect the identity of the Absolute and our 
concrete world, does not concern the state of things, but “their sense and their limits,” as it 
takes place “in the space of ease between everything and itself.”475 In his questio about 
halos, Saint Thomas, writes Agamben, addresses this displacement by characterizing it as 
a “halo”—a surplus that makes the essential more brilliant, a supplement added to 
perfection, a “vibration of that which is perfect, the glow at its edges.” 476  “This 
imperceptible trembling of the finite,” writes Agamben, “that makes its limits 
indeterminate and allows it to blend, ... is the tiny displacement that everything must 
accomplish in the messianic world. Its beatitude is that of a potentiality that comes only 
 
 As far as my research was able to reveal, this work was shown for the first time at Museion (Bolzano, 
Italy) in 2014 and later on at Aargauer Kunsthaus (Aarau, Switzerland) in 2016, and at Kindl (Berlin, 
Germany) in 2016/17. 
474 Ebeling, “Debris Field: An Archeology of Contemporaneity.” 
475 Agamben, The Coming Community, 53. 
476 Ibid, 54. 
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after the act, of matter that does not remain beneath the form, but surrounds it with a 
halo.”477 
 In a short essay on Cy Twombly’s sculpture Untitled (dated Gaeta, 1984),478 
Agamben refers to beatitude (or beauty) and its conditioning by the concept of “caesura.” 
The theory of the caesura is developed, writes Agamben, by Hölderlin’s annotations on his 
translation to Sophocles according to which (as per Hölderlin) “in the textured cut in the 
line made by the caesura,” what appears is “representation itself, the ‘pure word’.” 
Likewise, writes Agamben, Twombly’s sculpture, as a material artistic manifestation of 
this caesura, “has succeeded in giving form to a caesura, in displaying its sculptural 
equivalent.” 
 According to Agamben, the image of beauty (in every genuine creative journey) 
that was thus far pursued as a continual ascent, suddenly inverts and starts falling directly 
downwards. Twombly’s sculpture is not a representation of caesura but is “the caesura 
itself, in its movement, ... the caesura that exposes the inactive core of every work, the point 
at which the will of art supporting it seems almost blinded and suspended.” The movement 
of falling beauty, for Agamben, has no weight; it is a sort of inverse flight that Twombly’s 
sculpture makes apparent, “in which every ascent is reversed and suspended, almost a 
threshold or caesura between an action and a non-action: Falling beauty.” 
 This point is a point of de-creation on the part of the artist, understood by Agamben 
in theological terms, or more precisely, as a messianic moment “which has no possible title 
and in which art miraculously stands still, almost thunderstruck, fallen and risen at every 
moment.”479
 
477 Ibid, 55. 
478 Agamben, “Falling Beauty,” 13–15. 
479 Ibid. 
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Part II—The Archive and the Index 
 
As inquired of in section I, one of the fundamental questions in regard to philosophical 
archeology is the following: What is an origin? Origin (or arche), as we recall, means both 
beginning and commandment; that which gives birth to something and that which governs 
its development in time. Within the framework of this part, I am interested in my personal 
origin: What gave birth to, and still commands, my personal identity and meaning of self? 
And more specifically: What conditions my various artistic engagements in the world, and 
how? In other words: What is the material a priori of my practice? How does it manifest 
itself in Philosophical Archeology Space 2009–2019? 
 
*** 
 
2.2.1 
The archive and the index constitute the installation’s two-part structure. The first part, the 
archive, delimited in roughly one-third of the exhibition space, is not fully accessible. A 
perforated metal door blocks the physical entry to the archive, so that one can merely view 
and listen to (remotely behind the door) what’s inside. The archive contains previous works 
of mine from the past decade: some of them are boxed, some are fully exhibited, and some 
in between. The second part, the index, situated in the main part of the gallery space, is a 
series of photo-litho prints (Japanese Washi paper sheets, 30 x 55 in. each) infused with 
collage work, sounds, and ephemera, forming a constellation rendered and conceived by 
archeological art-making. 
 
Based on what he defines as “the culmination of twentieth-century linguistics,” 480 
Benveniste’s well‒known scholarly study Dictionary of Indo-European Concepts and 
Society (1969), Agamben points out the philological finding that the word “index” derives 
from the Latin verb dico which originally means “to show”—to show by words, therefore, 
 
480 Agamben, Foreword, ix. 
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to say. The lexical family of dico, as observed by linguists and philologists, is joined by an 
essential bond to the sphere of law, thus index “is ‘the one who shows or indicates by means 
of the word,’ just as iudex481 is ‘the one who says the law.’”482 The term “vindex” (“which 
denotes the one who in a trial takes the place of the accused and declares himself ready to 
suffer the consequences of the proceedings”),483 Agamben indicates, belongs to the same 
group and is derived etymologically from vim dicere (“to say or to show force”).484 The 
force in the action of vindex is thus the force “of the efficacious formula, as the originary 
force of the law. That is to say, the sphere of the law is that of an efficacious word ... [and] 
if this is true, the law is the sphere of signatures par excellence, where the efficacy of the 
word is in excess of its meaning (or realizes it).”485 
 It follows, then, that the index is not simply a neutrally configured locus designed 
to indicatively and expressively function as a means for communication and orientation, 
but is inherently a locus that incorporates dimensions of authority, constraint, and even 
coercion as it literally forms itself in the figure of a biding locus of signatures. In this sense, 
one could find in the presented index an illuminating relation, if not an equivalent (albeit 
in an artistic form), to the arche that has been conceived thus far. The exhibited archive 
and index function (under the framework of my artistic modus operandi) in parallel to 
Agamben’s paradigms and signatures (under his method of philosophical archeology)—
the various works in the archive participate in, and are conceived under, signatures 
gathered together by the index.486 
 
The index is comprised of three complementary and interwoven signatures (that I titled as 
 
481 In English, judge. 
482 Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method, 74. 
483 Ibid, 74–75. 
484 Ibid, 75. 
485 Ibid. 
486  This indexical, material “historical a priori” is encapsulated within its paradoxical title: in spite of 
the historical dimension in which it dwells, at the same time, it harbours the ahistorical. Its metaphor is that 
of the crystal, the poet’s refractory tool, which reflects the very structure of living. “Reading” the crystal 
enables the poet to escape history altogether, since living and history are in opposition. The crystal “appears 
as the index of a certain aesthetic occurrence” (Whyte, “Studio as History,” 1) that represents reality in an 
ahistorical manner, as something primordial that happens before judgment or language. 
 However, the index is materially produced, it sprouts from the depths of the ground, and in this sense 
the studio is for the artist what historiography is for the historian: “it is what says what can be said, how, and 
for whom.” (Ibid, 2.) 
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follows): 
(1) Impassability—Impassibility—Impossibility; 
(2) Anchorite—Anchorage—Bridging; and 
(3) Remnants—Relics—Fragments. 
 
The first signature (Impassability—Impassibility—Impossibility) refers to the discussion 
of dishomogeneity, to the gap that can be identified within the evolution of historical 
phenomena or the gap within the creative process that prevails between preliminary thought 
and executed action. Here, a fracturing of unity marks both the need for artificial 
construction of meaning and the point where artistic historiography begins. In terms of a 
cultural critic’s vocabulary, this signature alludes to the discussion of the crisis in 
representation and its reference to the ontological problem. This signature thus also touches 
upon ideas of reconnection and relations formation. The first signature is a reminder and a 
call for unification. 
 
The second signature (Anchorite—Anchorage—Bridging) aims somewhat to offer a 
response to this call, and in this sense can be seen as a complementary part to the previous 
signature, but at the same time, it stands independently. This signature incorporates various 
elements of bridging—fulcrums to be based upon. Several theoretical and material 
elements are presented as tools to process and generate meaning, interpretation and 
understanding—such as techniques of ekphrasis, acts of translation, mental maps, 
hermeneutic strategies, etc.—tools that the works use, although differently in each 
occurrence. 
 But beyond these tools that are primarily based on spoken, written, or visual 
language, the works themselves are also forms of bridging—they attempt to convey to a 
certain viewer, through their materiality, the subjective experience of the artist. Discussing 
his own practice, the British sculptor Antony Gormley articulates this very point while 
emphasizing the potential of materiality in addressing this issue. When asked about the 
problem of bridging intense, subjective experiences, he replied:  
 
That for me is the real challenge of sculpture. How do you make something 
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out there, material, separate from you, an object amongst other objects, 
somehow carry the feeling of being―for the viewer to somehow make a 
connection with it.... That idea that in some way there are things that cannot 
be articulated, that are unavailable for discourse, which can be conveyed in 
a material way, but can never be given a precise word equivalent for.487 
 
The various fulcrums of this signature are attributed to a subject that, historically 
developed, has a special function that pertains to the signature’s theme. As Alain de 
Libera’s archeological analysis (on the basis of Foucauldian concepts) portrays, the 
concept of a subject was conceived mutely and non-linearly prior to Descartes, throughout 
the history of (Western) philosophy. He writes: “Descartes did not bring about a 
comprehensive concept unifying subjecthood, personality, identity, egoity, agency, and 
causality under the single word subject. Before being decentered ‘the’ subject had to be 
centered. It had to become a ‘centre’ of perception, a ‘centre’ of acting and suffering. Such 
a concept had been delineated in the Middle Ages.”488 Thus, the modern subject emerged 
through the combination, in late scholasticism, of two conflicting “models of subjecticity” 
inherited from late antiquity—the Aristotelian philosophical conception and the 
Augustinian theological conception—“enabling us to grasp the ‘modern subject’ as a 
‘bridging’, transdisciplinary entity.”489 
 In this sense, artistic practice (and this installation-based thesis exhibition that takes 
into account the historical discussion in terms of the medium of presentation, and the 
certain historical charge of presenting art “archeologically”) involves a subject as a focal 
point of perception that also has an active, participatory role in the construction of the body 
of work. Allying itself with poststructuralist theory at large, and in contrary to a perspective 
rooted in the Renaissance, art-historian Claire Bishop advocates for installation art’s 
potential, however tentative, to propel in the viewer/subject (after recognizing its 
fragmented and decentered subjectivity) a form of emancipation, because the activation of 
the subject is analogous to the subject’s engagement in the world. A tension prevails 
 
487 Hutchinson et al., Antony Gormley, 12. 
488 De Libera, “Subject (Re–/decentred),” 22. See also de Libera, “When Did the Modern Subject 
Emerge?” 185; 194–95; 202–203. 
489 De Libera, “Subject (Re–/decentred),” 22. See also de Libera, “When Did the Modern Subject 
Emerge?” 216. 
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between the fragmented model subject of poststructuralist theory and a self-reflexive 
viewing subject capable of recognizing its own fragmentation, since installation art “insists 
upon the viewer’s physical presence precisely in order to subject it to an experience of 
decentering.”490  What installation art offers, then, “is an experience of centering and 
decentering: work that insists on our centered presence in order then to subject us to an 
experience of decentering.”491 
 
The third signature (Remnants—Relics—Fragments) emphasizes the material aspect that 
is at work in the index, speaks to the archeological momentum the index manifests, and the 
various acts of digging and unearthing that were employed at hand. 
 Additionally, this signature echoes the recurring, interpretive theme of the 
hermeneutic circle (as it is comprised by pairs such as general–particular, object–subject, 
text–interpreter, and classic–romantic), albeit in a material fashion, by the use of scattered 
pieces of various kinds in relation to a (supposedly or imaginary) complete material entity. 
It underlies a material practice that continuously negotiates parts and whole within the 
artwork. 
 This material negotiation entails an epistemic dimension, in accordance perhaps 
with Foucault’s crossing of dispersed remnants and the existence of knowledge: “[T]he 
epistemic is not a grand unifying theory, it is a space of dispersion, it is an open field of 
relationships and no doubt indefinitely describable.... [T]he epistemic is not a slice of 
history common to all the sciences: it is a simultaneous play of specific remanences.... The 
Epistemic is not a general stage of reason; it is a complex relationship of successive 
displacement in time.”492 
 The fragmentary, material-based characteristic of this signature establishes a 
relation to the dishomogeneity characteristic of the first signature. In the same manner that 
(as previously mentioned) Jabès’ writing is a succession of textual fragments that (due to 
printed spaces that separate them from one another, as well as its mixing together of 
different times, places, and levels of language) constitutes a structure of dishomogeneity 
 
490 Bishop, Installation Art, 133. 
491 Ibid, 130. 
492 Foucault and Lotringer, Foucault Live, 35. 
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and openness to further elaboration; so the fragmentary signature allows the artwork to stay 
open to unforeseen possibilities, whether on the interpretive dimension or the creative one. 
New uses become possible only through a perforated structure, between its cracks. 
 
The other material aspect of the index reveals itself in the form of sound (although sound, 
beyond its materiality, appears in other ways within the installation at large). In his essay 
on listening, Roland Barthes speaks about a first type of listening he terms “alert,” in which 
living beings orient their listening to certain indices, similarly to animals. Thus, he writes, 
“[T]he raw material of listening is the index, because it either reveals danger or promises 
the satisfaction of need.”493 By the human “invention” of intentional reproduction of a 
rhythm or rhythmic representations, “listening ceases to be a purely supervisory activity 
and becomes creation,” and due to rhythm language becomes possible since “the sign is 
based on an oscillation, that of the marked and the non-marked, which we call 
paradigm.”494 Barthes raises the example of a child who listens to noises indicating his 
mother’s desired return—the child performs alert listening, that of indices. But once the 
child stops supervising the appearance of the index, and begins miming its regular return, 
the child turns the awaited index into a sign—thus entering the second type of listening, 
which is that of meaning. This type of listening is a mode of deciphering in which what the 
ear tries to intercept are certain signs. The child no longer listens to the possible, but to the 
secret (recall Benjamin’s idea of “secret indices”): “that which, concealed in reality, can 
reach human consciousness only through a code, which serves simultaneously to encipher 
and to decipher that reality.”495 496 
 
2.2.2 
The (visual, textual, and sonic) juxtaposed elements in each signature are not intended to 
 
493 Barthes, “Listening,” 247. 
494 Ibid, 249. 
495 Ibid. 
496 The contemporary discussion around sound art is vast. See, for example, the following anthologies: 
Kelly, ed., Sound; Sterne, ed., The Sound Studies Reader; Cox and Warner, eds., Audio Culture: Reading in 
Modern Music; Altman, ed., Sound Theory Sound Practice; LaBelle and Roden, eds., Site of Sound: Of 
Architecture and the Ear; and Cobussen, Meelberg, and Truax, eds., The Routledge Companion to Sounding 
Art. 
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be read in direct opposition, nor do they suggest simple forced equivalencies. Rather, they 
are deeply entangled notions of coexistence. They refute (as was previously discussed in 
relation to the mode of knowledge of the paradigm) dichotomous logic in favour of a 
bipolar analogical model, a model that archeologically proceeds by means of reading signs 
and their analogies. This reading does not necessarily intend the conception of the signature 
as a unity-in-plurality, in accordance with the traditional, aesthetic demand from art, which 
was raised by Plato.497 The knowledge the signature generates propagates in time, as it 
appears in one place only to manifest differently somewhere else, at another time. The 
signature, as said, is a mode of distribution that operates through time and discourses. 
 Are the written sentences, concepts, images, and sounds imprinted on the paper 
actually a call to decipher hieroglyphics as in ancient Egypt, or are they abandoned signs, 
which serve only the image? And what does it mean, in this context, to have an aesthetic 
experience, that is, to experience beauty? 
 
The three signatures of the index crystallize and unify, transport and disseminate the 
different artworks (referred to here as “paradigms”) that are contained within the signed 
archive, forming a practice-based historiographic methodology, an archeological modus 
operandi. Thus, the index, in its presented materiality and conceptual structure, 
corresponds and refers to similar artistic-hermeneutic techniques of historiography. One of 
them (previously discussed), for example, in the context deployed thus far, is Benjamin’s 
Denkbild in which its further explication will assist in highlighting the index as an artistic, 
archeological and historiographic (cross-disciplinary) apparatus. 
 
As of 1923, Benjamin began to publish short narrative prose pieces, so-called Denkbilder, 
which bears a relation to the Baroque emblematic technique.498 The Baroque emblem 
contains visual and verbal material in a tripartite form: pictura (icon or pictorial aspect), 
inscriptio (motto, written above and describes, somewhat enigmatically, the image), and 
 
497 Plato’s demand finds its connection here with the idea of kairos: “The idea of kairos as right timing 
is reimagined by Plato as aesthetic and ethical propriety, or the power of proportion to harmonize elements 
into a proper balance.” (Chan, “A Time Apart,” 53.) 
498 The following discussion of Benjamin’s Denkbilder is based on Kirst, “Walter Benjamin’s 
‘Denkbild’: Emblematic Historiography of the Recent Past.” 
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subscriptio (epigram, written below the pictura as an explanatory poem or prose). The 
emblem aims to reveal a hidden meaning and significance (res significans) and 
additionally, follows the two-fold intention of Darstellen (representation) and Deuten 
(interpretation). 
 Benjamin’s Denkbilder work similarly. They generally have a three-part form 
consisting of a title, a narrated image, and a related thought, and present an image as an 
integral albeit not immediately recognizable part of the thought. Neither is clear without 
the other, and their relation is subject to critical reflection of their interdependence. This 
interdependence of parts is characteristic of the Baroque emblem, and likewise in 
Benjamin’s Denkbilder these parts are supposed to provide information about the hidden 
signatures of reality. The objects of the Denkbilder become signs for hidden, fabricated 
human meaning about the world (as opposed to divine meaning in the Baroque emblem). 
Because the emblematic structure is intimately bound to the concept of res significans, the 
author must believe in the possibility and necessity of uncovering a secret meaning in the 
world, whether religious (as for the Baroque writer) or materialist as for the modern artist. 
The reader is not presented with a clear meaning, but is compelled to find the description 
of their own reflective process, to be led into a careful contemplation of the world. Thus, 
the Denkbilder relate to the hieroglyph—in the tension between image and thought, it 
conveys polysemy. It is this polysemy that, once reflected upon prudently, may reveal the 
world’s hidden meaning. This significance, however, may never be grasped fully, 
according to Benjamin. But nevertheless, his Denkbilder are intended to illustrate that 
reality may be constructed in multiple ways. 
 The Denkbilder urge the reader to turn backwards upon history, to recognize in 
itself “the past” as philosophical material which has yet to be re-presented “visually,” 
wishing for the reader to discover it as a paradigm of (Benjamin’s) experience of reality. 
Consider, for example, the following Benjaminian Denkbild titled “Heidelberg Castle”: 
“Ruins jutting into the sky can appear doubly beautiful on clear days when, in their 
windows or above their contours, the gaze meets passing clouds. Through the transient 
spectacle it opens in the sky, destruction reaffirms the eternity of these fallen stones.”499 
 
499 Benjamin, One-Way Street and Other Writings, 81. 
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The view through the castle ruin reveals the dependence of eternity on its contrast to 
transience—the ruins serve as an allegory for the lost past when it is identified by the 
observer as a permanent loss, also a loss that could be one’s own. Simultaneously, the 
Denkbild of the castle ruin illustrates the multidirectional temporality of history, when the 
past is revealed (for a fleeting present moment) in its future, revolutionary potentiality. The 
observer’s perception of the ruins is revealed as the rubble of historical hegemony. The 
aesthetic appreciation that was produced by the tension between eternity and transience 
turns into the understanding that the once-ruling historical protagonists have been 
overthrown and are permanently destroyed. Benjamin’s Denkbild provides an insight into 
the tragically self-inflicted catastrophe of human history, a catastrophe stemming from a 
lack of understanding of the discontinuous relation of the present and the past. Benjamin, 
writing within the discourse of historical materialism, refers to this revelation as “profane 
illumination,” which can occur only if the historian will recognize the reappearance of the 
past in the present; only then will past events gain their true significance. In this sense, as 
per Benjamin, history can be pictured as a kaleidoscope—infinite, ever-changing 
constellations of past and present moments (accordingly, for example, the calendar reveals 
itself as a document of historical time). From this perspective, the past does not progress 
linearly toward the present, but (as the Denkbild demonstrates) rather endures in the 
present. As such, time is charged with a redemptive quality. Thus, the Denkbild gains 
importance as a historiographic narrative form. In 1928, Benjamin seems to further develop 
his thinking of the functionality of the Denkbilder—he writes: “[T]he function of artistic 
form is ... to make historical content ... into a philosophical truth.”500 
 
2.2.3 
This part thus introduces comments on my own work—comments (or terrains of thought) 
that refer to issues of materiality in my works, to questions I asked myself as an artist while 
making the works, to questions (however pressing) I was unable to formulate. For example: 
What is a historical a priori inquiry in art? What is an artistic a priori inquiry into history 
or historical phenomena? How does one perform philosophical archeology in art? What is 
 
500 Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 182. 
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a material-based philosophical archeology that addresses the past via objects containing 
their own epistemologies? 
 
These questions are addressed primarily by and through the exhibition, but also in my 
writing that supports the exhibited installation. How should one address, in writing, 
material art objects? According to Pedro Erber,501 the critique of art objects tries out 
different approaches for sounding out an object, not in order to impose a specific, “correct” 
theory on it, but rather as a process of negotiation through which its infinite potentiality of 
possible meanings is gradually revealed. The unsayable in an art object cannot be 
straightforwardly explained nor translated into a conceptual discourse or a form of 
narration. Nonetheless, the repeated attempt to do so is a fundamental task in art writing, 
which should be guided by the object and its potentiality to speak aesthetically. This 
working‒through resembles an idea by cultural theorist Mieke Bal, according to which an 
image is a dialogical partner rather than a case study subjected to the scholar’s scalpel. 
Such a “speaking image” speaks back at its spectator, transforms the way the latter looks 
at art, and is termed by Bal (following French art historian Hubert Damisch) as a 
“theoretical object.”502 Theoretical objects, writes Bal, are “not conceptual as opposed to 
material, but conceptual in their very materiality.”503 This claim conceives of materiality 
as no longer dependent on visuality but, at the same time, as not in opposition to it either—
thus, a theoretical object proposes a transformation of visuality into a participatory act, 
seducing the spectator into a relationship beyond contemplation. Art writing itself is a mode 
of “spectator participation,” performed as a response to the object’s seduction (yet 
resistance to translation). Conversely, the making of an art object can be seen as a material 
translation of something that resists conceptual expressivity. Translation, in this sense, is 
no longer understood on the basis of correspondence between clearly defined and separate 
realms of significance; what’s missing is correspondence itself as well as its conditions of 
possibility, that is, a clear division between the artistic and the theoretical, the material and 
 
501 See Erber, “Theory Materialized.” 
502 Erber, “Theory Materialized,” 4; Bal, Louise Bourgeois’ Spider: The Architecture of Art‒Writing, 
5. 
503 Erber, “Theory Materialized,” 9; Bal, Louise Bourgeois’ Spider: The Architecture of Art‒Writing, 
84. 
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the conceptual. Instead of corresponding, the kind of translation at stake here is more 
accurately conceived as responding to what demands (yet resists) translation. This 
translation, which adapts itself to its object, refers back to an “origin,” in itself never 
completely exhausted in translation. 
 
*** 
 
I knew, but didn’t believe it and because I didn’t believe, I didn’t know (2017) 
 
[Plate 1] 
 
In this mixed‒media installation, an analogue TV screen is positioned on the floor in a 
defined space. The physical entry to the space is blocked, but the viewer can see through, 
and hear through, a perforated metal door. The TV shows a close‒up video segment of a 
man (Jan Karski) speaking indirectly to the camera. The video has no sound—sound, 
however, is played back from within the space through concealed audio speakers. The 
sound includes abstract sounds and field recordings of a forested surrounding. Outside the 
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space, next to the door, a text504 is hung—a transcription of the talking head, depicting his 
desperate attempts to convey his firsthand report on the unprecedented events of the Shoah. 
 
In 2010, Claude Lanzmann's film The Karski Report was released. It is comprised entirely 
of an interview with Jan Karski, an official in the Polish resistance during World War II 
whose testimony in Shoah (Lanzmann's seminal film from 1985) remains unforgettable. 
The Karski Report outlines Karski's desperate attempts to convey the unimaginable events 
to the West from occupied Poland. Did he succeed? What will entail an unheard-of, horrific 
story to someone who is unprepared to receive it because it concerns a crime that is without 
precedent in the history of humanity? To Lanzmann’s question regarding the early (yet 
unfounded) rumours of the fatal events, Karski replied: “I knew, but didn’t believe it and 
because I didn’t believe it, I didn’t know.” 
 
 
504  The text reads: “A few days later the ambassador tells me: “Johnny, now you're going to see Justice 
Frankfurter. He will come here.” Again, he gave me his briefing. “Now, Johnny, again be careful.” He always 
would brief me. “Now, all knowledgeable people consider this man the most brilliant man in the 
administration.” As a justice of the supreme court, the institution is very important. But next, “For years he 
is a confidant of the president. All America knows about it.” Now he says: “Johnny,” now “he is a Jew, so 
be sure he will be interested in your report.” All right, so I wait again carefully. On the appointed hour – as a 
matter of fact I even remember it was between breakfast and lunch, before lunch in the morning hours, on 
time – I was sitting in the living room, salon... ambassador comes from the first floor with Justice Frankfurter. 
Justice Frankfurter, a little man. He did emanate some brilliance, very alive, his eyes... unimpressive 
physically, a little man, Jewish looking. Very friendly, friendly, smiles, towards me all the time friendly, 
several times he called me “young man” during our conversation. Well, I introduced myself, we sat down. 
He in front of me, Chehanowski on my left. Justice Frankfurter starts: “Mr. Karski, I had been invited by my 
very good friend, your ambassador, to come here to see you. I was also advised that I should see you. 
Apparently, you have some information that I should know. What do you have to say?” My answer: “Sir, I 
don't know what you're interested in. Could you ask me some questions? It will be easier on me.” Frankfurter: 
“Young man, do you know that I am a Jew?” “Yes, sir, Mr. Ambassador told me about this.” “Well, tell me 
about the Jews. We have here many reports, what happens to the Jews in your country?” Now I become a 
machine again, I give my stack. The man sits. I remember he looked like... smaller and smaller, somehow... 
like... looking at the floor, but listens, he doesn't interrupt me. I report, as you know from this film, usually it 
lasted 15 to 20 minutes. I tell him, Jewish leaders, Ghetto, Belzec. 15 to 20 minutes passed and I stopped. 
Now, Justice Frankfurter, he sits, looks at me still at this moment, and tells me the following: “Young man, 
as I mentioned, I had been informed about your activities. I was told that you came out of hell, and I was told 
that you're going back to hell. My admiration for people like you.” And then now: “Young man, I'm no longer 
young, I'm judge of man. Man like me, with a man like you, must be totally honest. And I'm telling you I 
don't believe you!” Chehanowski breaks in: “Felix! What are you talking about? Well, you know about him, 
he saw the president, he was checked and rechecked ten times, in England, here, Felix! What... he is not 
lying!” Frankfurter: “Mr. Ambassador,” formally, “I didn't say that he is lying, I said that I don't believe 
him... these are different things. My mind, my heart, they are made in such a way that I cannot except it... 
No! No! No!” I mumbled something; that is a shock for me.” 
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Thus, in this installation I attempt to address the problem of representation, to point to the 
presence/absence split relation and to a possible attempt to close its gap. I try to conceive 
of the index as a mediator.505 
 
According to Lanzmann, the catastrophe of the Shoah is non-representable. He thus 
employs, in both films, a “non-representability” cinematic principle according to which 
any kind of archival images or documents associated with the Nazi killing machine are 
avoided, and the common historical archive as well as fact-based fictions are likewise 
rejected. Instead, Lanzmann relies exclusively on spoken testimony506 in order to examine, 
beyond the memory of the slaughter of Jews during World War II, the discourses of 
historical representation and truth.507 
 
I. Historical Representation 
 
505  The relation between an index and the object it represents is a natural relation (as opposed to 
agreement-based characteristics of relation or other signification functions such as the symbol or the icon). 
The index forms a direct relation between the signifier and the signified; it points to its object. Accordingly, 
the pointing finger seems to “penetrate” the object and thus indicates its existence. The indexical signification 
diminishes the gap between the signifier and the signified and creates contiguity. The penetration point marks 
the conceptual point of incredulity, which therefore subsides but simultaneously generates pain. 
 Various passages throughout the holy scriptures depict God as experiencing emotions (See, for example, 
Jeremiah 14:17 and Isaiah 63:9 in Oei, “The Impassible God Who ‘Cried’,” 238), textual depictions that 
afterward had certainly propelled controversies with regard to the Christian doctrine of divine impassibility 
(somewhat influenced by Hellenistic philosophy) according to which God is not subject to emotion—on the 
one hand, an impassible God is too distant and thus inferior and incapable of redemption; on the other hand, 
an emotional God entails His dependency upon creation and the contingency of the world, clearly an 
impossible theological situation that diminishes God and enables His vulnerability. The doctrine of God’s 
impassibility (by nature), the idea that God is indifferent to human life, poses a serious theological problem—
if God cannot weep, it is claimed, He cannot love either. To modern Christian theologians, who witness (like 
all others) the terrible suffering of modern times, this problem becomes perhaps more acute than ever: if man 
can enter into a relationship with a caring God, they say, God must be capable of entering into man’s pain; 
sheltered under God’s compassion and empathy, man can overcome its pain. Hence, their search for what is 
called “a God after Auschwitz.” 
506 German anthropologist Johannes Fabian terms the temporality of the ethnographical fieldwork as 
“coevalness”: the sharing of time between subject and object, “the temporality of dialogical interaction.” 
(Erber, “Contemporaneity and Its Discontents,” 30.) It indicates an attempt to correct the betrayal of the 
anthropologists who distinguish themselves from the time of their subject of knowledge, often constructing 
the Other in terms of distance, spatial and temporal. This distance means a denial of contemporaneity, and is 
established in the transition from oral, dialogical knowledge to the written medium. Fabian terms this 
fallacious situation as “allochronism,” which is grounded in a primacy of seeing and observing, transforming 
the other into an object of contemplation—it amounts to “a sort of aestheticization of the other” (Ibid) instead 
of an inquiry into the other based on linguistic communication. Thus, one finds a different mode of 
temporality that originates by the “oral-to-written” displacement. 
507 On reenactments of the Shoah in art and imaginative literature, see Van Alphen, Caught by History. 
 
 
170 
Lanzmann’s categorical choice in favour of spoken testimony emphasizes a fundamental 
absence—a missing and impossible image—that is indicative of the irreducible totality of 
the catastrophe. But can verbal testimony be considered as a withdrawal from 
representation? Can we even indicate clearly when the threshold of representation has been 
crossed and a phenomenon has reached the area of non-representability? Certainly, we 
cannot be satisfied with the lack of visual material only, as spoken testimony is a crucial 
part of the film’s archival material. Perhaps the threshold is crossed if we are left with 
abstract tones only, sounds supposedly devoid of meaning, as a testimony only to the land 
that involuntarily hosted the monstrous events. 
 Thus, I decided to extract the full soundtrack of Shoah, which runs for roughly 
eleven hours. I then deleted all the sound scenes and sonic materials that could be 
associated with even the minor conveying of meaning (dialogues, field recordings of folk 
songs, train sounds, etc.). Eventually, I ended up with about fifteen minutes of sound. This 
ratio came to me somewhat as a surprise, since I’d expected it to be much higher. My 
surprise was a result of a direct encounter with the film and the overall impression of it as 
a slowly progressing, meditative, lamenting, and silent cinematic work—an impression that 
was in clear contradiction with the minor degree of semantic, verbal, and sonic material. 
How could one reconcile this supposed paradox? Perhaps it means that an audible space, 
its sense of volume and density, is not necessarily and solely a result of sonic information. 
As my editing action over Shoah’s soundtrack showed, a large degree of meaning-
conveying sounds of various forms and textures can still constitute a sense of 
contemplative, silent space (mental space as well as cinematic space). 
 Exemplified by the lack of visual imagery, the impossibility to represent the Shoah 
as a historical event is further emphasized, in addition, by the abstention from using 
meaning-conveying sounds. This makes evident the radical lack of context and the 
meaninglessness itself, unrelated to a certain historical event—a crossed threshold. The 
threshold (from meaning to meaninglessness) is crossed backwards. In an attempt to 
inversely cross back over it, meaning does not constitute positively but as a subtraction of 
information, knowledge, history and time from a place (or space) beyond us, beyond our 
bodies. The soundtrack is an archive that lacks the use of language as a means of 
representation—what meaning does it thus generate? I was wondering whether, because it 
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lacks the language of representation, a certain context is required to form the entry to the 
work without, at the same time, diminishing its interpretive dimension that is subject-
dependent. 
 We can even imagine an archive, apparently devoid of context, presented without 
the perspective of whomever constructed it. In such a scenario, it seems, the archive is 
understood and constituted differently each time according to the viewer’s ideologies that 
have been embedded through many years of education and social involvement. Is this an 
archive that, instead of supplying more knowledge, intensifies disinformation and 
speculations just as a drama is spun in a child’s mind? What role does the imagination play 
in this sense? Experiencing such an archive does not guarantee the reception of meaning, 
but its mystery generates an imaginary dimension aroused by the physicality of the archival 
material and the wish to make sense of it. It seems as if the act of searching and sorting the 
archive, randomly digging its depths with one’s hands (or ears), has an importance of its 
own because it slows the viewer’s experience and thus discharges the excess of 
imagination. 
 
II. Truth 
One of my intentions in this work, following Lanzmann, was to think about the truth-fiction 
relation. I was wondering whether information becomes knowledge when completed with 
faith. Faith, for its part, is dependent in the sense of the truthfulness and verity one grants 
this information with—this appears to be the relation between information and knowledge, 
as well as between truth and fiction. One believes in the story one tells oneself, as the story 
is based on the long-lasting actions of narrative plotting and sketching. I suppose that a 
work of art does not necessarily tell a captivating story in and of itself, but constitutes a 
rich, symbolic meadow for the viewer and the entry into the work in terms of an adequacy 
with one’s branched psycho-ideological array at the core of consciousness. This array is 
perhaps the condition for giving faith in the feasibility of a certain event. One can know 
something informatively but deny its possibility or existence due to a mental block. Thus, 
the story we tell ourselves conditions what we believe to be real. 
 In “On Fiction” (1966), Vilém Flusser maintains that reality is not given or 
discoverable, it is invented. Reality is fictitious. There is no comparative reference (or 
 
 
172 
external world), fiction is the only reality. Each type of fiction is a reality in its respective 
discourse. No specific perspective is more “real” than another. All points of view are 
relative and equivalent. Eliminating perspectives leaves nothing. A thing is the sum of its 
perspectives, Flusser claims, and the reality of a thing is the sum of the fictions that form 
it. If all perspectives are fictions, then the human beings who project these perspectives 
form reality—but aren’t we exactly what we project? We, ourselves, without things to 
project on, are nothing. Without things, we are mere fictions, mere virtuality. Reality is 
thus not in objects and also not in subjects (since they are both fictions). Perhaps reality is 
the relationship between subject and object—but what if there are many relations as points 
of view? Does it mean they are all reality, ontologically equivalent? Then, according to 
Flusser, reality is fiction and fiction is reality, and only faith can provide reality. 
 
*** 
 
Silent Maps (2016) 
 
[Plates 2–7] 
 
This body of work is presented as a mixed‒media installation in variable dimensions. It 
includes maps made out of various materials (paper, wood, stone, resin, wax, and rusted 
metal) and formations (photolithography prints, collage, text‒based works, sound works, 
and a display cabinet). My work on it began with a reflection on what I perceived as a 
peculiar intersection of two things: a material I often use in my works—damar resin—and 
a story I was once told. 
 From preliminary research towards the exhibition, I observed that inclusions 
trapped in amber are often found in the Baltic Sea region of Northern Europe. Fossilized 
from tree resin and formed through a long period of petrification, these inclusions don’t 
easily share their mysteries. Early amber hunters of the region used to measure the amber’s 
value according to the inclusions found within it. Their assessment was based not only on 
the object caught within the resin, but also on the narrative they could generate from the 
particular inclusion. Vernacular Baltic legends about how a certain insect or plant ended 
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up trapped within this once viscous material highly affected their overall evaluation. By 
contrast, an inclusion found and presented as an orphan fragment caused great confusion. 
Mysteries entangled and exchange rates followed promptly. Extensive landscape 
descriptions, maps, and drawings were made by the hunters for future reference. Their 
outlines had to be reliable; however, if mistakes occurred, one could always revisit the 
landscape to decipher the problem. 
 Can we apply this methodology to a textual landscape? Can we follow the same 
path, back and forth, between a text (as a system of representation or as an abstract map) 
and the world supposedly outside the text? Can we revisit the world in order to decipher an 
error or a problem in comprehension that occurs within a textual landscape? Will it still be 
the same world? 
 My grandfather once told me about a story he was planning to write. It was about a 
journey he had taken from his hometown of Vilnius to the Curonian Spit, which separates 
the Curonian lagoon from the Baltic Sea’s southeastern coast. He departed on that journey, 
as a somewhat modern Baltic hunter, in search for the earliest catechism written in Old 
Prussian, around AD 1400, and said to be buried within the dunes of the spit. The catechism 
also included, so he was told, a mysterious “footnote” written in Hebrew and serving as an 
important key to the text, without which the text could not be fully deciphered. Being fluent 
in both languages, he was hired by a local archbishop eager to find the original text and its 
footnote (though he already held a printed copy in his hands from the 16th century). He 
equipped my grandfather with a crumbled map that indicated the catechism’s exact 
location. Because it seemed completely hopeless, my grandfather was astounded to find 
the catechism, including its footnote, in the exact place indicated by the map. But he could 
not immediately recognize nor read the footnote, because it was written densely, by an 
encumbered hand. Back in Vilnius, feeding the archbishop’s discontent, all he managed to 
ascertain was its subject matter. 
 I then asked myself: what if I’ll retrace my grandfather’s journey? 
 
In Eastern philosophy one finds the idea of subtle realms—experiential inter-worlds and 
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realms of unconscious associations that form intuitive perceptions of physical reality.508 
The territory of subtle realms is a territory that runs parallel to physical reality but interacts 
with it, so that a person is effectively living in two worlds at once, subtle and physical. 
When one searches for the subtle realms, one develops an intuitive awareness through the 
use of the imagination. As a faculty yoking the sensible and the intelligible, the imagination 
operates in the experience of the beyond and in the construction of imaginable worlds. 
 
With this work, I ask myself (as an artist) the following questions: How can one draw the 
territory of the subtle realms? What does it mean to enter its landscape? How does one 
form its map as a mode of external symbolic storage?509 What is the relationship between 
the concept of “landscape” and environment or world. In the history of art, landscape 
painting is a genre; in Geography, it is part of nature, etc. What does it mean to see a 
landscape? Is it something exterior? Is it something psychological or internal? The concept, 
I assume, can be understood in various ways. 
 When anthropologists and historians treat the concept of landscape, they often 
claim it is a modern invention and refer to a letter by Petrarch who describes his climbs up 
Mont Ventoux in Provence to gaze at the landscape.510 This is considered, in the West, as 
the first description of man looking at landscape (similarly, art historians claim that 
“landscape painting” begins with fifteenth‒century Flemish painters), a false consideration 
since even Petrarch himself mentions the ancients climbing the mountain to contemplate 
and look down at the landscape, or even Roman frescoes with beautiful landscapes, and so 
on. 
 
For a philosophical perspective on landscape, one can possibly turn to a seminar Heidegger 
gave in Freiburg in 1929/30 titled “Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, 
 
508 “Such is the case with the Kehai of Kami as well, where Kami come and go into the interstices of 
being but leave their faint signs, and where sensitive humans, by emptying themselves into the midst of now 
(naka ima) may directly experience the time/space gods embodied—however fleetingly—in the signs, 
sounds, and sights of the world. It is an ‘experiential, mysterious place’ created as a third place between all 
other places and as an accumulation of experienced ch’i beyond all distinctions, boundaries, orders, and 
descriptive constructs.” (Pilgrim, “Intervals (‘Ma’) in Space and Time: Foundations for a Religio-Aesthetic 
Paradigm in Japan,” 271.) 
509 For a thorough discussion of mental maps, see Gould and White, Mental Maps. 
510 Cassirer et al., The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, 36–46. 
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Finitude, Solitude.” In this, perhaps his most important seminar, Heidegger tries to define 
the fundamental structure of Dasein (of human beings) as a passage from the poverty of 
the animal world to the building of a world that defines humanity. In order to do this, he 
must define the essence of the environment of the animal, thus to understand the difference 
between animal environment (a poor world, in his terms) and human one. The animal’s 
environment is defined, as per Heidegger, by the idea that each animal selects (in the natural 
world) one crucial element that defines its environment and is absorbed in it without being 
conscious about it. On the contrary, what defines the building of human world is the fact 
that man is never unconsciously absorbed but perceives being as such. Deep boredom, 
according to Heidegger, is a good example: when we are bored we suspend any relation to 
the world (cannot do anything or are not interesting in anything). Thus, in the suspension 
of animality one becomes human. 
 Looking at a landscape we see everything, all elements at once, and perceive it in 
another dimension, suspending all animal relation as well as human relation (being as 
such); we are absorbed in the landscape as if we lose our subjectivity while observing it, 
becoming an integral part of it. In Heideggerian terms, the human world is the making 
inoperative of the animal relation to its environment, while landscape is the making 
inoperative of the human world itself—this is a third stage after animality (environment) 
and human (world).511 
 
*** 
 
Vaalbara (2014) 
 
[Plates 8–13] 
 
This body of artwork is constituted of several overlapping narratives, manifest in varied 
artistic mediums, that unfold by means of a series of artistic revelations in dialogue with a 
fragmented, poetic manuscript of my late grandfather. Since he passed away when I was 
 
511 See Agamben, Creation and Anarchy, 45–50. 
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nearly fourteen years old, I have been left with a strong sense of loss. His diverse 
manuscript and artistic work, although insignificant for me at that time, has become 
increasingly important to me. By telling a story and reimagining its narratives, I interpret 
in and through this personal archive. This work tries to recreate the possibility of a shared 
biography through an artistic dialogue. 
 
The first narrative displays the manuscript, which is placed inside a covered cabinet. A 
sound that resembles that of a Morse code emerges from within and fades in and out. It 
was necessary to divide the voluminous manuscript into several piles due to presentation 
constraints, but also due to issues such as fragmentation, meaning construction, and the 
relation between parts and whole. How should I divide the manuscript? Which pages 
should I explicitly show, at the expense of others? 
 The second narrative is made out of many sheets of paper, stitched together and 
bathed in a mixture of resin and beeswax (as an encaustic medium)—materials I use in 
several of my works. The papers are thus grouped together to form two main strata that 
correspond to the left and right audio channels. Sound comes from beneath the thick layers, 
portraying abstract, unpleasant (even appalling) murmurs, perhaps that of a little child at a 
pre‒verbal stage who tries, but fails, to communicate. 
 The third narrative combines two rusted metal plates and sound. The plates are 
leaned against the wall, connected to one another by a hidden sound device that works both 
as a speaker and a tactile transducer—it simultaneously plays the distant sound of faint, 
slow piano playing and, by rumbling, causes the plates to sound out low metallic noises. 
 The last, fourth narrative is a diptych made out of Japanese washi paper and a few 
texts from the original manuscript. The papers are treated with diluted resin, which causes 
them to rearrange in layered forms as they become transparent in various degrees. The 
original texts combine together to become a partly deciphered unity. 
 
These narratives seem to suggest the signified yet obscure and unreachable nature of a 
literary work sealed shut. I was thinking about them as trying to traverse a gap, to bridge a 
physical presence that will cause them to materially seep into the archive. I felt that the 
textual depth of this archive is suspended to present the gravity of the work as a physical 
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mass; as if the manuscript is rendered as an object. Deleuze writes: “Time becomes a 
subject because it is the folding of the outside and, as such, forces every present into 
forgetting, but preserves the whole of the past within memory: forgetting is the 
impossibility of return, and memory is the necessity of renewal.”512 The outside entity, the 
manuscript, is folded in, and as such, is preserved in memory. My intention was for the 
overlapping narratives to be the renewal—not interventions but parallel responses, like 
light rays aligned in parallel, communicating as collimated spirits in non-linear time. It was 
written that they indicate wormholes where the dialogue becomes possible, taking place, 
and by avoiding semantic translation and representation, the aura of the literary manuscript 
is maintained.513 
 
*** 
 
To Return to a Place, Is, Like Dying (2016) 
 
[Plates 14–15] 
 
This is a multidisciplinary body of work in sound, installation, printmaking, and text. The 
geographical and spiritual remoteness from home constitutes the exhibition’s core, as a 
fundamental contemplation on distancing, exile, retreat, and nomadism. However, more 
personal questions guided me in this work: how much of my cultural, biographical, and 
subjective background comes into the writing and the making of exhibitions at present? 
And even: what is the tension between the (Israeli) foreign and the (Canadian) local 
perspectives in this process? The exhibition space, coloured in shades of yellow and brown, 
brings to mind an ancient appearance, an old photograph or a cave revealed in an 
archaeological dig. 
 
I. Re(moteness); Re(treat); Re(turn) 
 
512 Deleuze, “Folding, or the Inside of Thought (Subjectivation),” 327. 
513 See Abraham, “Collimation,” 10–12. 
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The late Israeli poet Yehuda Amichai wrote: “To return to a place, / is, like dying. / It is, 
to fulfill prophecies / or empty them.”514 
 
In the previously mentioned interview between Jabès and Ettinger Lichtenberg, we find the 
following dialogue: 
Ettinger Lichtenberg: At the moment when it’s impossible to fixate something, it’s 
impossible to separate one thing from another. 
Jabès: Here you touch at the heart of the nomadic writing. You’re at the heart of nomadic 
writing. 
Ettinger Lichtenberg: Which is the inability to fixate, to strike roots? 
Jabès: This is the desert, nothing strikes roots here.515 
 
And finally, Shapira summarizes: 
 
514  Quoted from his poem “Ein–Gedi”; my translation. 
 
“To return to a place, 
is, like dying. 
It is, to fulfill prophecies 
or empty them.” 
  
“                    ,  
  ,                   .  
    ,                                       
               .” 
 
The aforementioned quotation is at the same time formal and semantic; inasmuch as the quoting action itself 
by which the quotation’s content is concerned with—its meaning—is happening (again) “in-itself,” we 
perceive as a drawing. Because it is also semantic, in its simple textual sense, it seems to achieve, without an 
insignificant extent, an almost automatic precedence. The double move is in fact a second order abstraction; 
a reverberation of a reverberation, a quote of a quote—a return to something alienated and familiar. 
 How should this be understood? Perhaps, by a pre-understanding (what is pre-understanding?) that it is 
of great significance to correctly position a question, any question, in order to fulfill, even temporarily, our 
basic curiosity drive. But this temporality points more than anything else, to the significance that a properly 
given answer will leave the question open yet stable. The punctuation marks condition the thought, and being 
conditioned by repetition and sense fixing—it is impossible for the thought to reveal itself in its pureness; 
however clear methodological forms, through their interrelations, can determine between various senses that 
“seep into” the thought from the outside. The mark requires repetition and sense, iteration and sense... until 
the question’s deep foundations will (again) collapse into themselves. 
 The double operator of the punctuation marks—multiple roles become possible—as an organizing 
element, structures, balances, calms, permits a relation a relationship to be established and again soothes, or 
rather, emerges, reveals, breaks, bubbles, floats from above, in trauma? The assumption is that the experience 
of art requires from us a certain disregarding, even if against our natural and humane will. 
515 Routes of Wandering: Nomadism, Journeys and Transition in Contemporary Israeli Art, 248. 
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The archeologist conducts a journey to discover relics of an extinct culture. 
The fragments that he exposes do not exist, in effect, without his gaze, and 
their chronicle is formulated by him by means of the language of his 
discipline. But this discipline (even when it is conscious of its reflective 
activity) represents the historical processes that it contextures as events that 
happened in the past (before the language of archeology which constitutes 
them). Hence, archeology conditions itself upon a prior time that it itself 
signifies—a time signified as an artificial product, and not as an origin or 
an authentic basis.516 
 
The voice of the past is combined with that of the present. 
 
II. (Re)—Time 
The prefix (Re‒) inevitably includes a certain conception of time. What is the time of 
return? Different philosophical approaches view the present as the most important time; it 
is the atemporal time, the time which all other times refer to. The more it becomes possible 
to connect the past to the present experience, the richer and deeper the present 
consciousness gets. The larger the liaison with past events, the more the contemporary, 
present consciousness gains through sprawl and burgeoning horizon. According to the 
philosopher Edmund Husserl, the experience of the present works to bring into focus its 
strength as well as the contents of all times of the past and of the future. For this he coined 
the term “standing–streaming”—a formalistic expression that measures the consciousness’ 
static dimension of the present against its dynamic flow of experiences.517  
 In Jewish sacred and literary sources, a certain time is mentioned that is “not day, 
and not night.” It is a time described as uniting all times, a time that designates a conscious 
space of abstruseness: a conscious space of numerous intellectual contradictions into which 
coherent, logical reasoning tools collapse.518 
 This conception of time brings to mind (as previous mentioned) Agamben’s 
conception of messianic time, and the form of time at the basis of Benjamin’s dialectical 
 
516 Ibid, 209–10. 
517 To return to a place, is, like dying, ii–vi. 
518 Ibid. 
 
 
180 
image.519 
 
*** 
 
Galut (Diaspora) (2011) 
 
[Plate 16] 
 
This is an eight‒channel sound installation (in the form of a radio drama) that is presented 
in a dark space alongside a painting. The installation is inspired by the artistic work of my 
grandfather—this time, by a painting he made of his late parents who were exiled to an 
unknown concentration camp during WWII (the ultimate diaspora). The content of the 
installation is made out of fragments of my grandfather’s literary works, which were 
removed from their original context and rejoined to tell a story. 
 Some of the questions I asked myself in the making of this work were as follows: 
how is it possible to reuse old decontextualized fragments in order to produce a new literary 
meaning? What role does sound take in conveying and representing meaning? Is this role 
unique to sound? Can I return from this metaphorical (even physical) exile? What is the 
relationship between the three figures of the radio drama, which are actually one and the 
same? Where do our histories converge? 
 
It seems as if an unavoidable gap exists between the work and its interpreter, between the 
work and the text written about it; as if, enforced by various techniques of 
defamiliarization, the interpreter becomes an exile who faces itself. If these alienations will 
not be resolved, one is left in suspension as an exile in one’s own land. 
 In the radio drama, a man is transformed into a number. 56698 is his new, alienated 
and estranged name. He dwells in a place without a place, where there are no openings. In 
the eternal night that prevails this place, no face is revealed in the mirror. The sole traces 
 
519 On the application of current theoretical examinations of time to the field of contemporary art, see 
Ross, The Past is the Present; It’s the Future Too: The Temporal Turn in Contemporary Art. 
 
 
181 
of a meaningful world are barred shadows upon a missing floor, merely projections. 
 When listening to the installation, the sonic garden of forking paths seems to resist 
a linear melodic motif; it rather forms a multidimensional, atemporal space. It is an exilic 
space in the deepest sense, detached and forever irrelevant. A fabric of distancing. 
 
*** 
 
Between Things (2010) 
 
[Plate 17] 
 
This installation is based upon a few (poetic, philosophical, scientific) texts that attempt to 
articulate time. The texts are hung in the air, while various leftovers of paper, ink, 
accompanying materials, and sound are piled up on the floor beneath them. In this 
installation, time is contemplated and expressed as a plastic thought, as image and sound. 
This is a work about a concept (time) that prevails perhaps in any work of art, but is here 
conceived within an ongoing series of works that attempt to formulate a specific form of 
time—a form of time that evolves into the conception of time as messianic time, and that 
lies at the basis of this thesis exhibition. What kind of trace does time generate in this 
installation?520 
 
A leftover is a testimony to an act that took place at the interval between things. This act 
occurs in relation to time—it is carried out in light of an expected final result, and therefore 
desperately clings to the speed of change and its purpose, or alternatively, through an 
involuntary and temporary act of conspicuousness (as a deviation from somewhat predicted 
and routine path). This act is temporally carried out, in the world, even as pure abstraction. 
Time is expressed through numerous descriptions (in parallel with the characteristics of the 
act itself) that complement each other in different modes, and their nature is often remains 
 
520 For a survey of contemporary art and theory that proposes alternative to outdated linear models of 
time, see Groom, Time. 
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unclear to us. Each action matches a different relation and it seems as if we cannot 
comprehensively generalize the exact nature of this relation. Moreover, perhaps other, 
infinite relations exist and therefore infinite types of time exist as well; these time essences 
will always refer to various actions in themselves and in relation to other actions. 
 Leftovers are piled on the floor. The space divides and separates them as it divides 
and has been divided by time. Therefore, a series of question arise in the making of this 
work: what exists between successive events that come to be in time? Does time exist 
within time? Can we at all speak about a “between things” mode of existence? Or whether 
this is a different type of time that requires a different comprehension? 
 
Personally, in making this installation, the most interesting aspect of time occurs between 
things. An action occurred, a body appeared, an object was installed, a cat crossed the 
street, stopped and sat down on the sidewalk. What happened at the point of transition, a 
moment before it started and a slight moment after it ended? Could we at all split or bound 
the action and consequently the time it took for it to happen? Does this mean that time 
stands still? Or alternatively, that infinite essences of time correspond to infinite types of 
events whose theoretical summation is “the” time that we talk about or intuitively relate 
to? How, if at all, does time exist between things? 
 Time indicates life, whether intensive or almost static, short or long, fulfilled with 
actions or reduced to the smallest measure needed to keep life going. Time means living 
souls, it cycles, from morning to the next, it always exists within things but also (and 
especially) between things, where it exists perhaps in the strangest way. The breath 
indicates life, life within the body, alive, which continuously helps time to be formed. 
Every breath feels differently. So is time. 
 
*** 
 
The archive includes other, undiscussed previous works or only minute fragments of these 
works. The scale, both physical and symbolic, of the leftover or fragment is occasionally 
the reason for not discussing the work or for not offering any terrain of thought in regard 
to it. However, sometimes the reason is of a different register, as in the case of the following 
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works (that are nonetheless included in the archive) which present a challenge for thinking. 
This challenge, so it seems, sometimes overpowers an attempt for critical analysis; at other 
times, the work is utterly intuitive, and does not easily lend itself to words. 
 
These works are (in chronological order): 
Not Quite the Highest Point (2017) [Plates 18–23]; 
Teca (everything you tell me I keep in my body) (2015) [Plate 24]; 
The Revisit II (2014) [Plate 25]; 
Had We but World Enough and Time (2014) [Plate 26]; 
From the River Archive (2014) [Plate 27]; 
Quiet Whispers in the Hallway (2013) [Plates 28–29]; 
A Revisit (2012) [Plate 30]; 
The Revisit (2011) [Plate 31]; 
Attentiveness Foldings (2010) [Plate 32]; 
If the Walls Could Speak (2010) [Plate 33]; 
Moraine (2010) [Plate 34]; and 
15 Maps for Becoming a Concept (2009) [Plate 35].
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Conclusion 
 
“There will be no conclusion. I think, in fact, that in philosophy as in art, we cannot 
‘conclude’ a work: we can only abandon it, as Giacometti said of his canvases.”521 
 
This research revealed philosophical archeology to be multifaceted—it is a research 
methodology (a historiographic framework) in the humanities at large, which essentially 
embodies one’s relation to history and historiographic research (as extensively exemplified 
in section I, part I); a metaphor (allegory);522 (art) content or subject matter as well as a 
material-based historiography or method of historical inquiry in art;523 a critical force that 
conceives of its (past) objects as (future) prototypes or blueprints; and, lastly, philosophical 
archeology embodies a certain (messianic) conception of time that conditions a conception 
of history.524 The originality of philosophical archeology, as a critical methodology, does 
not necessarily stem from the nature of its tools, but from the integration of threads drawn 
from various disciplines and broad fields of knowledge. 
 
As a historiographic methodology in use throughout research across the humanities at 
large, philosophical archeology aims at researching the “historical a priori” dimension of 
a certain historical phenomenon, a dimension (“point of emergence”; “moment of arising”) 
that cannot be identified as the phenomenon’s diachronic origin, but as an active tendency 
within it that conditions its development in time. The “historical a priori” designates a 
 
521 Agamben, Creation and Anarchy, 76. 
522 See p.55 where Freud speaks about archeology as a metaphor for the mind; p.58 where, for Foucault, 
archeology is a metaphor for “knowledge as a substratum that ‘lies beneath the surface’”; p.45–46 and p.131 
where Agamben uses the idea of vortex as a metaphor for the origin or arche (and vice versa); p.149 where 
I suggest that “archeology”, in its extreme sense, can be understood as a metaphor rather than as a material 
discipline in practice; and p.150 where Russell claims that in the twentieth-century archeology extends from 
being a metaphor to being an allegory (that is, it now employs narrative, not just a single word, in order to 
deploy the past “as a technique in itself”). 
523 See section II in its entirety, and p.134 where Roelstraete refers to archeology as an “identifying 
feature of contemporary art”; p.137 where the archeological dig equates with Mark Dion’s artistic practice; 
and p.140 where the artistic archeological search represents “the artist’s quest for the unknown”. 
524 See mainly the discussion of messianic time-history-aesthetics in section I (part II), and for example 
p.158 where the “historical a priori” is conceived as a crystal that embodies non-linear time, or p.165 where 
ruins symbolize “the lost past” that nonetheless can redirect its advancement. 
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sequential past, yet not simply as an older prehistoric unified phase nor as an a-historical 
structure; as a past that still commands in the present, it is an operative force within the 
historic phenomenon that guarantees its intelligibility and consistency. Philosophical 
archeology is thus “a ‘science of signs’, an inquiry into the signatures left by the origin on 
the living body of history.”525 
 The “historical a priori” dimension is synchronic, contemporaneous with the 
present and the real, and therefore the archeologist withdraws, so to speak, towards the 
present. Once the archeologist reaches this phase or dimension, the past that was never 
really experienced (and thus remained a present) becomes a real or true present, thus it has 
the temporal structure of future anterior, a past that will become a past in the future once 
the archeological work is complete. 
 The “historical a priori” dimension is qualitatively different from the historical 
dimension. Like the child in psychoanalysis (which is a continuous active force within the 
life of the adult) or the “big bang” (which we assume took place and the effects of which 
we can feel, though we cannot locate chronologically), the “historical a priori” is not an 
event or substance that precedes the phenomenon diachronically or which can be dated or 
chronologically situated. Neither is it a metahistorical construct that narrates the 
phenomenon from the outside, as in the common sense of an origin. Lacking a concrete 
time and space, it is a heterogeneous fracture existing between history and prehistory, a 
field of bipolar historical tensions that spreads between the phenomenon’s arche and its 
becoming, between arch-past and present. 
 From an epistemological perspective, the “historical a priori” dimension, through 
various processes of canonization, conditions the potential to constitute knowledge of and 
by the phenomenon while at the same time being conditioned itself as it is embedded within 
historical constellations. Fulfilling the paradox of an a priori condition embedded within 
history, it is thus paradigmatic and transcendent. Once the archeologist, through a critique 
of origins, reaches this dimension that is covered and concealed by the long-lasting effect 
of tradition, the past that was never really experienced becomes accessible for the first time, 
and with it, its buried epistemologies. Hence the “historical a priori” (the arche) elucidates 
 
525 Cerella, “The Sacred and the Political: Exploration on Mimesis, Violence, and Religion,” 225. 
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the phenomenon from within. 
 
*** 
 
In this doctoral research I attempted to show that philosophical archeology is constituted 
as an interdependence between three inseparable pillars: history, archeology, and 
philology—any historical investigation requires not only archeological vigilance, but must 
also give an account of language. The articulation between language and world is disclosed 
as “history” by the continuous process of anthropogenesis—that is, the continuous event 
experienced by Homo sapiens of becoming human and remaining inhuman. This 
articulation is humankind’s (and philosophy’s) historical a priori. Philosophical 
archeology is immanent and constitutive to philosophy; it means going back 
archaeologically to the continuous event of anthropogenesis in an attempt to bring to light 
the various historical a priori that condition the history of humanity. Thus, philosophical 
archeology entails coming to know the means and ways by which a thing articulates itself 
and its historical development, based on the a priori principles that it possesses. 
 Moreover, philosophical archeology’s tripartite structure (as indicated above) 
always involves a messianic moment of thinking. This moment (as elucidated mainly in 
Paul, Benjamin, and Agamben), although originally theological, is prevalent throughout 
the length and breadth of secular time. Secular time incorporates another time, messianic 
time, that (illustrated via Guillaume’s idea of operational time) operates in it from within— 
messianic time enables chronology by the construction of “time images” (or “time 
representations”) that, only at that point, are still charged with potentiality (“the time which 
is left to us”). Messianic time is in opposition to historical dialectics of progress, since the 
messianic is the pure potentiality of the present moment. This messianic conception of 
time, this concept of temporality and history, shows a structure with bipolar tensions: linear 
chronology (which supposedly ends in an origin), and a radial form whose manifestations 
all revolve around an Urphänomen in a non-linear manner. Based on a dialectic of 
“oneness” and repetition, the origin is (at the same time) inside and outside chronology, it 
is (at the same time) independent and inseparable from chronology. Like the arche, the 
origin is a historical a priori that remains immanent within history, within the phenomenon. 
 
 
187 
The origin is not a factual event nor a mythical archetype, but a vortex in the stream of 
becoming; it is that which emerges from the process of becoming and disappearance while 
it swallows the material involved in the process. As materiality, worldly things disrupt (in 
this process) the balance between the infinite and time—the infinite (the apeiron, as per 
Anaximander), although an arche, is crossed by time and cannot overrule it. Material things 
thus defy the infinite due to (their movement in) time, but also defy time due to their 
inevitable return to the infinite. As we saw, for Aristotle, the infinite is not a force of the 
cosmos but the intermediary between its elements; a mediatory field or space that is named 
“the middle (meson).” The infinite (and, it could be argued in regard to the exhibited 
installation, the Washi paper) is a central space from which all elements are equally 
distanced due to the balance they are forced to maintain. Thus, as an arche, the infinite is 
not understood as a fixed point of origin and primary rule. The arche is not a whole, but a 
perforated concept—a characteristic that enables it to be a mediator; similarly, time is 
formed as a porous structure. 
 
In section I, part II, we encountered another mediator—Benjamin’s (and Debord’s) 
montage or the concept of “citation without quotation marks.” Related to Benjamin’s idea 
of the “dialectical image” (or “dialectic at a standstill”—the image at once frozen and 
dialectical), this mediator enables secret meetings of times, images, and texts and, similarly 
to Paul’s “typos,” can disappear (as past occurrence) if the present moment does not 
recognize itself in it. An image or text carries an index within itself which will cause it to 
burst only at a specific moment in the present when the past and present form a 
constellation—Benjamin’s concept of messianic time (as opposed to historical progress) 
thus emphasizes the redemptive potentiality of the non-chronological present. Understood 
as a conjuncture of past and present, and containing a historical index (or signature, which 
is a mode of distribution as it is characterized by a signatory displacement, a pure historical 
element due to its connectivity characteristic and its working outside chronology), an image 
is constituted temporally to achieve legibility in the future—it is thus, more than a visual 
image pure and simple, the fulcrum of Benjamin’s theory of historical consciousness. A 
dialectical image appears when both of the objects it negates freeze and become immobile, 
thus suspending meaning. The image becomes full, legible and produces knowledge by 
 
 
188 
adhering to the analogy-based epistemological model/process that consists of a bipolar, 
tensive opposition between its elements. The elements do not unite, but remain in an 
immobile coexistence charged with tension. This form of knowledge, formulated and 
developed also by Benjamin’s Denkbild, seems to offer Agamben what discursive language 
epistemologically cannot—the Denkbild (which “shines for a moment out of the ruins of 
language”), and perhaps art at large, is the pre-conceptual knowledge of the world. 
 The concept of “citation without quotation marks” expels from context, and thus 
destroys, the past. The problem of transmitting the past is thus replaced by the aspiration 
to cite it. This action resembles the way artists work with ready-mades—an artistic action, 
and a relation to the past, that brings to mind (art) collectors or revolutionaries in terms of 
destroying the common, bourgeois order. This action, however, carries within it a potential 
for renewal and healing. Benjamin’s methodology of citation (like Kraus’s) becomes his 
main tool for reflecting on the kaleidoscopic structure of the philosophy of history—the 
whole is presented through the part or fragment; the cited leftover contains the image of 
the whole within it. Similarly, it could be argued, in his writing style, Agamben works like 
a curator, as per the previously described method of “brachylogy.” 
 In the footsteps of Benjamin, Agamben thus grants aesthetics (or aesthetic 
operations) the role, however modest or limited, of the redeemer—aesthetics opens for us 
a space between past and future as a messianic arrest of time. Messianic time is a gap 
between our conception of the present and our experience of it, a gap that exhibits our 
inadequacy of being fully present “in-time” but also our ability to aesthetically work it out. 
This opening is the theological (and epistemological) horizon reflected in the messianic. 
The artist (or aesthetics), as a redeemer, must have access to an original temporal 
dimension. This is the messianic dimension that deactivates chronological time, as a 
caesura that transports a work of art into an atemporal existence. Messianic time resembles 
an underground alley—dug beneath history and enables its redemption. Thus art, poiesis, 
is a beginning, the pro-duction of origin, as it breaks the continuum of chronological time, 
and can conceive of history as a blueprint for science fiction. 
 
In section II, part I, the historiographic turn in contemporary art, characterized by the 
metaphor of the archeological dig and the need to look backwards, is depicted as 
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contributing to artists’ historical consciousness and in particular with regard to the societal 
knowledge economy. The constant artistic search for the unknown is exemplified, as an 
expanded metaphor, by the soil and buried past, that is now understood as the only terrain 
left for further explorations. History’s traditional inert materials (documents, archives, etc.) 
are charged by artists with active forces, and are archeologically transformed into sites of 
knowledge construction. Various cultural, archeological projects reformulate a conception 
of time by materializing the past—examining and interpreting the material object, beyond 
the constrains of language, these archeological projects constitute a porous, 
multidirectional conception of time, and thus propel an epistemological difference between 
history and archeology in regard to the object. In the hands of (some) contemporary artists, 
so it seems, the avant-gardist return to the past becomes a cultural production technique, 
capable of opening up new possibilities rather than being a merely romantic, inspirational 
caprice. This return is thus transformed into a deferred present where past and future are 
constantly rewritten, where (against the dematerialization of the ephemeral art object) the 
present moment is the only possible thing left to document. The artistic present requires a 
constant deferred reflection—messianic time. The messianic time of contemporary art, its 
beatitude, as Agamben defines it is conditioned by a caesura that shows the pure 
representation and the silent core that are constitutive to an authentic work of art. This is 
an image of beauty that is weightless and postponed, existing in a standstill between 
passivity and activity—a messianic moment of de-creation. This beatitude is made possible 
due to the unforeseen, non-linear flow of time—like Benjamin’s kaleidoscopic conception 
of history, time is an ever-changing temporal constellation charged with a redemptive, 
messianic force. 
 
The final part of this thesis unfolds from my artistic work, where I ask: What is an origin? 
As we recall, origin (arche, in Greek), etymologically speaking, means, in the Western 
tradition, both beginning and commandment; that which gives birth to something (the 
principle where things begin, the arche) and that which commands its history, governs its 
development in time (the principle where order is given, the archon). I inquired into the 
concept of the origin as such, but also into my personal origin: what gave birth to, and still 
commands, my personal identity and meaning as self; what conditions my artistic 
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engagement in the world, and how? 
 In this inquiry, I practiced philosophical archeology—a research methodology that 
is nowadays associated mostly with the theoretical work of Agamben; however, in this 
research, I applied this methodology both theoretically and artistically as two different but 
complementary means of generating knowledge. This bifurcated research was befitting of 
the substantial purposes of philosophical archeology: that is, to transform the present 
through a unique approach to the past (or to historiography); to liberate oppressed 
epistemologies; and (more broadly) to render inoperative the binary logic of Western 
Metaphysics, to deactivate the conceptual machine, since the understanding of its working 
in history frees us from its tyranny and presents the past as “a work of fiction.” 
 Moreover, philosophical archeology attempts to examine the structure of the 
investigation and the subject, to research the dimension in which an artistic practice is 
deactivated and contemplated as such—thus, by a “poetic of inoperativity,” this research 
revealed a series of three artistic signatures that constitutes the material a priori of my 
practice. Acknowledging this material a priori dimension is perhaps the most important 
outcome of researching my artistic practice, that no other force, element or theory can 
compare itself to—since, with this acknowledgement, the potentiality to transform my 
artistic practice from within, and open it up for a new possible use, gains new meaning. 
As Agamben writes: 
 
What is poetry if not an operation in language that deactivates and renders 
inoperative its communicative and informative functions in order to open 
them to a new possible use? ... [W]hat poetry accomplishes for the 
potentiality to say, politics and philosophy must accomplish for the 
potentiality to act. Rendering inoperative economic and social operations, 
they show what the human body is capable of; they open it to a new possible 
use.526
 
526 Agamben, The Fire and the Tale, 55; Agamben, Creation and Anarchy, 27–28. 
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Plates 
 
 
Plate 1: I knew, but didn't believe it and because I didn't believe it, I didn't know (2017) 
Installation view. Katzman Contemporary, Toronto, 2017.
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Plate 2: Silent Maps (2016) 
Exhibition view. Red Head Gallery, Toronto, 2016.
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Plate 3: Silent Maps (2016) 
Exhibition view. Red Head Gallery, Toronto, 2016.
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Plate 4: Silent Maps (2016) 
Exhibition view. Red Head Gallery, Toronto, 2016.
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Plate 5: Silent Maps (2016) 
Untitled, 150 X 140 cm. Red Head Gallery, Toronto, 2016.
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Plate 6: Silent Maps (2016) 
Untitled, 48 X 39 cm. Red Head Gallery, Toronto, 2016.
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Plate 7: Silent Maps (2016) 
Untitled, 53 X 73 cm. Red Head Gallery, Toronto, 2016.
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Plate 8: Vaalbara (2014) 
Exhibition view. Art Museum, Toronto, 2014.
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Plate 9: Vaalbara (2014) 
Exhibition view. Art Museum, Toronto, 2014.
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Plate 10: Vaalbara (2014) 
Untitled, 100 X 100 X 30 cm. Art Museum, Toronto, 2014.
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Plate 11: Vaalbara (2014) 
Untitled, Variable dimensions. Art Museum, Toronto, 2014.
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Plate 12: Vaalbara (2014) 
Untitled, 90 X 30 cm. Art Museum, Toronto, 2014.
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Plate 13: Vaalbara (2014) 
Untitled, 40 X 30 cm. (each). Art Museum, Toronto, 2014.
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Plate 14: To Return to a Place, Is, Like Dying (2016) 
Exhibition view. Hansen House, Jerusalem, 2016.
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Plate 15: To Return to a Place, Is, Like Dying (2016) 
Exhibition view. Hansen House, Jerusalem, 2016.
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Plate 16: Galut (Diaspora) (2011) 
Installation detail, Painting by Kopel Gurwin 
 
Audio Documentation—www.idogovrin.net/galut(diaspora).mp3
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Plate 17: Between Things (2010) 
Installation detail. P8 Gallery, Tel-Aviv, 2010.
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Plate 18: Not Quite the Highest Point (2017) 
Exhibition view. ArtLab, London (ON), 2017. 
 
Not Quite the Highest Point consists of multiple sets of objects, ephemera, sounds, leftovers, miniatures, 
books and perishable instances which form various paradigmatic historical constellations or thought-spaces, 
rendered and conceived by archeological art-making.
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Plate 19: Not Quite the Highest Point (2017) 
Exhibition view. ArtLab, London (ON), 2017. 
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Plate 20: Not Quite the Highest Point (2017) 
Exhibition view. ArtLab, London (ON), 2017. 
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Plate 21: Not Quite the Highest Point (2017) 
Exhibition view. ArtLab, London (ON), 2017. 
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Plate 22: Not Quite the Highest Point (2017) 
Installation detail. ArtLab, London (ON), 2017. 
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Plate 23: Not Quite the Highest Point (2017) 
Installation detail. ArtLab, London (ON), 2017. 
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Plate 24: Teca (everything you tell me I keep in my body) (2015) 
Mixed media—Sound, Wood, Cotton. 51 X 31 X 20 cm.
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Plate 25: The Revisit II (2014) 
Mixed media—Bees Wax, Resin, Paper, Ink. 39 X 29 cm.
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Plate 26: Had We but World Enough and Time (2014) 
Mixed media—Bees Wax, Resin, Paper, Ink, Bamboo. 23 X 15 cm.
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Plate 27: From the River Archive (2014) 
Mixed media—Audio speaker, Bees Wax, Resin, Paper, Bamboo. 23 X 15 X 7 cm.
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Plate 28: Quite Whispers in the Hallway (2013) 
Video Installation. 
 
Projected text reads: 
 
The sound of a tongue in a dried mouth, quiet whispers in the hallway, and the door closes. I could hear the 
morning newspaper's pages turning; again, and again, and again... squashing. His heavy breathings. The 
sound of a cellophane wrap being constantly folded. Salty almonds crushing, grinding, crumbling, and then 
he growled: “Are you coming?” 
 
The sound of vigorous footsteps, and fatigued ones, slowly going in and out of phase. A burst of an engine, 
and sounds of asphalt grains tightly pressed against each other; again, and again, and again... Slowly halting. 
I could hear a thin stream of air being forcibly released, silently he mumbled: “Are you going?”
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Plate 29: Quiet Whispers in the Hallway (2013) 
Installation detail
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Plate 30: A Revisit (2012) 
Mixed media—Print, Paper, Ink, Tape. 53 X 48 cm.
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Plate 31: The Revisit (2011) 
CD 
 
The album’s title, the revisit, indicates its metaphysical foundation. Comprising of five pieces, the album 
exhibits several revisits to contemporary classical music which in the end reveal nothing of the original sonic 
material, yet dwell in the pieces’ worldliness. 
No sampling was taken; everything was recorded live and was later on digitally processed and edited. 
The revisits became possible, on the one hand, due to the pieces’ initial character of openness and, on the 
other hand, due to my interest in artworks that leave the horizon relatively open, in this case, for further 
composition. 
What occurs at the liminal moment in time of the revisit? 
 
Audio Documentation—www.idogovrin.net/therevisit.mp3
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Plate 32: Attentiveness Foldings (2010) 
Installation view. CCA, Tel-Aviv, 2011. 
 
Mixed media—Seashells, Sound, Paper. Variable dimensions.
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Plate 33: If the Walls Could Speak (2010) 
Site-specific sound installation. Variable dimensions. Yafo 23 Gallery, Jerusalem, 2010. 
 
The structure, literally, is a material that exists as limited information, defined in a closed and finite reality. 
Sound is contained in the structure as part of the happening within the structure, and around it; but even when 
the happening had past, the sound remains intact, floating, burned into dense layers as simultaneously existing 
derivatives, as a known testimony to the thing itself, and as an unknown testimony to the thing which was 
lost. This installation attempts to carve the layers of sound, to unfold time, and to decipher the local history 
that existed, and still exists.
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Plate 34: Moraine (2010) 
CD 
 
Audio Documentation—www.idogovrin.net/moraine.mp3
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Plate 35: 15 Maps for Becoming a Concept (2009) 
Graphic score (detail). 
 
Audio Documentation— www.idogovrin.net/15maps.mp3
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